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ABSTRACT 
Using the discourse of Political Theology as a mode of enquiry we can overcome a 
longstanding tension between aesthetics and history that characterized much of twentieth century 
thought.  Focusing on literary and occasionally musical works from the mid twentieth century, 
my aim is to show how works displaying psychedelic aesthetics are important venues for political 
deliberation with regard to citizenship.  Through affective means, psychedelic aesthetics re-
imagine the boundaries of liberal subjectivity through a consciousness expansion and return from 
that expansion.  The subject who returns from a psychedelic “experience” – which can be attained 
in various ways – comes to ethically realign and re-norm his or her “self” according to a moral 
authority beyond the authority of the nation state.  While critical of liberalism on one level, this 
“expanded” citizenship ultimately offers liberalism political advice in crisis situations by 
performing a public sacrifice on the state and disseminating social responsibility to individuals.  
Psychedelic aesthetics perform this ‘public sacrifice’ through affective enchantment, using 
spiritual and religious rhetoric to change the relationship between citizen and state.  Because 
artistic works of the mid twentieth century are essentially “ahead of the game” regarding states of 
exception and economic crises, it is to this period that we should look for methods of cultural 
recovery in current ones.  But this requires that we take both aesthetic and religious enchantment 
seriously in a post-secular world. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: LIBERAL SUBJECTIVITY, RELIGION, AND 
THE STATE 
 
To speak of an aesthetic is already a gesture toward a notion of transcendence, 
toward something above and between individual subjectivities.  Psychedelic aesthetics1 
re-imagine the boundaries of liberal subjectivity through a consciousness expansion and 
then a return from that expansion.  As such, psychedelic aesthetics challenge liberal 
subjectivity itself.  A subject who returns from a psychedelic “experience” – which can 
be attained in various ways – ethically realigns and re-norms his or her “self” according 
to a moral authority beyond the forces that shape liberal subjectivity, beyond the 
                                                
1 I use terms psychedelic aesthetics as a singular collection of a variety of different senses.  This is partly 
because the artistic works that evidence such aesthetics tend to have synaesthetic qualities; however, as will 
become apparent, my intention is to point to a version of aesthetics that pushes the meaning beyond the 
concept “of the senses.”  My attempt is not to redefine a word so much as to point to a notion of aesthetics 
that precedes modernity and what Jerome Schneewind calls “the invention of autonomy.”  ‘Sensibility’ as 
an aesthetic quality depends on modern conceptions of the body in a period of secularization, and as 
Alasdair MacIntyre and others have pointed out, accompanies the emergence of a publicly determined 
moral politics.  In Martin Heidegger’s ‘return’ to ontology as first philosophy in the 1920s, all philosophy 
becomes the ‘history’ of philosophy.  Body and world cannot be easily distinguished from one-another, and 
in this problem the collapse of subject-object distinction that is pervasive among psychedelic aesthetics 
emerges. Emmanuel Levinas articulates this with his account of Heidegger’s confrontation with Cassirer 
(see page 16).  Any theory, aesthetic or otherwise, must deal with the distinction of self and world – what 
makes psychedelic aesthetics important is that the blurring of self and world is foregrounding as a primary 
feature.  
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authority of the nation state.  He or she has gone on a journey and returned, but this 
certainly does not amount to saying, “tripping makes you a better citizen.”   
The focus here is psychedelic aesthetics, not psychedelic drugs. The metaphorical 
crossover between the two occurs as the result of behavior modification on a massive 
scale in the middle of the twentieth century.  Psychedelic drugs deterritorialize the mind 
of a subject the same way political boundaries are challenged worldwide.  With the focus 
on aesthetics, I am trying here to get at the ethic of the style of psychedelia, but style here 
is no mere choice among many.  In psychedelic aesthetics, life itself becomes the style 
and is formed by something between freedom and determinism.  As such, it gets at the 
root of human flourishing and even human rights.  To be sure, perception is part of this, 
but it is really a collapse of sight and sound and sense, of epistemology and ontology.  
Insofar as the aesthetics play on the imagination itself, they are beyond any 
phenomenology of body alone.  In this collapse of senses, a subject’s instantiation in 
place, custom, manner, habit and dwelling temporarily disintegrates; one “dies” and 
comes back.  We must ask: Does responsibility disappear in such a stateless state?  The 
return to living embodiment, to the ‘I,’ establishes the narrative possibility, not just for an 
account of what happened during the experience but also for a new way for things to be, 
for deliberation about a being toward another death.  The ethic of psychedelic aesthetics 
is one of being beyond being-toward-death, and such an ethic has enormous implications 
for liberal subjectivity. 
   3 
Psychedelic aesthetics model a subject’s deterritorialization on multiple levels of 
valence simultaneously, and in doing so they inherently provide deep critiques of 
Western liberalism as well as the theological and metaphysical assumptions that 
accompany it.  This critique, however, is not just a dismantling or a deconstruction.  
While critical of liberalism, this “expanded,” psychedelic citizenship offers liberalism 
political advice in situations of crisis by performing a public sacrifice on the State as a 
transcendent entity and then disseminating social responsibility to individuals similar to 
ancient practices of ritual sacrifice that involved ingesting the divine.   
The mythological status of the 1960s is bound up in this potential.  The aesthetics 
during that time aspired to create a popular sovereignty, requiring not just the 
dissemination of State power but also the maintaining of such power through immanently 
“enchanted” individuals.  The sacrifice of central power affirms the community, but the 
enchantment is necessary to sustain it; the sacrifice is no mere secular act.  The sacrifice 
requires the belief in the legitimacy and value of the sacrificial act.  Psychedelic 
aesthetics perform this ‘public sacrifice’ by means of affective enchantment, using 
spiritual and religious rhetoric to change the relationship between the citizen and the 
State.  As such, artistic works from the mid twentieth century are essentially “ahead of 
the game” regarding states of exception and economic crises, and it is to this period that 
we should look for methods of cultural recovery in current ones; but this requires that we 
take both aesthetic and religious enchantment seriously in a post-secular world. 
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My aim in this study is to present a theory of psychedelic aesthetics by tracking 
how psychedelic works attempt to resituate subjectivity beyond the boundaries of the 
nation State.  This is more than an ideological critique.  Specifically, psychedelic works 
in the 1960s attempt to overcome the problem of modern, liberal subjectivity by 
critiquing one version of autonomous subjectivity with a longstanding history disciplined 
by a European cultural imaginary.  Because of this, modern subjectivity is no mere set of 
beliefs to be transcended through consciousness-raising; it is rather an enculturated 
sensibility fashioned by habitus.2  Psychedelic aesthetics essentially perform a different 
kind of habitus, which amounts to a kind of behavior modification that parallels 
deterritorialization and depoliticization throughout the twentieth century worldwide.  In 
the psychedelic experience the subject, the citizen and the State collapse and amalgamate 
in a poetic re-making.  This remaking is necessarily dynamic and cannot be isolated, and 
any theory approaching it must be flexible in terms of temporality.  At the same time, 
such a theory is no mere mythological or structural criticism. 
Psychedelic aesthetics do indeed potentially work to change liberal subjectivity 
above the specific intentions of individuals involved in psychedelic experiences, and so 
they may operate in a mythological time.  In the process, they evangelize a more 
cosmopolitan version of citizenship that relies less on concepts of the individual and 
more on affective, inter-subjective waves.  They operate where modern utopias and 
cultural myths meet.  The inter-subjective nature is often represented through metaphors 
                                                
2 This is of course Pierre Bourdieu’s term, which I give a fuller account of later. 
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of electricity and “turning on.”  More recently, these ‘inter-subjective waves’ have come 
to play a large part in affective studies, theories of insurrection, and religious theory.   
The purpose for a theory of psychedelic aesthetics is to articulate these recent 
cultural trends and historically situate them.  For example, drawing heavily on Marxist 
and poststructural theories, a group calling itself The Invisible Committee published a 
politically incendiary book entitled The Coming Insurrection in 2007 in France as a 
response to riots in French suburban ghettoes known as banlieues (13).  In November of 
2008, members of the Invisible Committee were arrested by French authorities on the 
charge of “criminal association for the purposes of terrorist activity,” and the book was 
used as evidence (5).  After it was translated into English and published by the small 
academic journal, Semiotext(e), then distributed by MIT Press, political pundits on the 
right jumped on the publication as a sure sign that liberalism was under attack by 
academic elites.  Ironically, the pundits gave far more public exposure to the incendiary 
ideas in doing so.  The Coming Insurrection then served as a motivating factor for 
philosopher Simon Critchley’s exploration of political theology and “supreme fiction” in 
Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology (2012), in which Critchley calls 
for a return to poetry as a way to revive faith in liberal democracy.   
As described by the Invisible Committee, affective waves bring violence and 
destruction to the nation-state that cannot be traced to one source, and the lack of 
subjectivity resists any culpability necessary for legal prosecution.  No one or no one 
group can be deemed responsible.  
   6 
Revolutionary movements do not spread by contamination but by resonance.  
Something that is constituted here resonates with the shockwave emitted by 
something constituted over there.  A body that resonates does so according to its 
own mode.  An insurrection is not like a plague or a forest fire – a linear process 
that spreads from place to place after an initial spark. (12) 
 
What looks like literary criticism here becomes justification for de-politicization or, for 
some, terrorist insurgency with no central authority or command structure.  The question 
becomes one of not just the intentionality of the resonating individual but what effect 
intentionality has on a larger chorus.  Like Deleuze and Guattari’s descriptions of affect 
with terms like “becoming” and “assemblage,” insurrections work more like music, 
“whose focal points, though dispersed in time and space, succeed in imposing the rhythm 
of their own vibrations, always taking on more density” (Invisible Committee 13).  Yet, 
unlike the 1960s activist terrorism in the United States, according to The Invisible 
Committee, the “weather underground” cannot control the forces of nature.  Insurrection 
for them is not a matter of a cell or an organization but an assemblage of violence.  One 
does not “help the revolution along.”  The Invisible Committee claims a kind of 
“becoming” that happens extra-subjectively.  Their rhetoric embraces an enchanted and 
vibrant vitalism, and the fear that the book inspired expresses the fact that political 
officials take seriously the radicals’ claims, at least implicitly, to be in touch with the 
infinite forces motivating life and death.  There is an implicit hermeneutic fusion with the 
“force of nature.”  With this, The Invisible Committee participates in a return to nature as 
primordial and pre-political typical of psychedelic aesthetics.  As the mind-manifested 
return to the pre-political formulates an emerging political desire, The Invisible 
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Committee’s uniting of affective alliance to religious violence and extremist terrorism 
resounds with studies in Political Theology. 
Such studies accompany alarmist critiques that “secular society” is in danger from 
a breakdown in liberalism during the post-Cold War era, which has accompanied an 
increase in religious fundamentalism.  For example, Olivier Roy has argued in Globalized 
Islam: The Search for a New Ummah that the same forces of globalized secularism which 
produced neo-fundamentalism in discussions of “Islam” post 9/11 are also those forces 
which have produced conservative Christian “neo” fundamentalists with their intensified 
interest in affective and personal relationships with God (220-231).  New Age religions 
adapt to commercializing forces of globalization, “diluting” traditional religiosity, and 
then producing the desire for stronger religious bonds among especially de-territorialized 
converts.  According to Roy, “religious norms are not so much culture-compatible as 
culture-blind, because they bypass the very concept of culture in the same way as the US 
army dreams of an ‘any-religion-compatible’ combat ration” (330). Roy then claims, “the 
culture-blind approach of neofundamentalists explains why, in Christianity as well as 
Islam, only fundamentalists are winning more converts in an era of globalization and 
uprootedness.”  The desire for “stronger” religion here appears to be in the anchoring it 
provides for an individual to be a subject, but this also appears to be a reaction to the 
historical contingencies arising with globalization and “uprootedness” or de-
territorialization.  Neo-fundamentalism in this reading would then be an attempt to re-
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territorialize after the expansion and trauma of de-territorialization.  How such global 
positioning occurs would then produce effects on citizenship.   
But the roots for theorizing such moves occur in the 1960s.  Unsurprisingly, it 
was during this time that the terms of poststructural criticism came into play to account 
for the dynamic forces affecting and resituating subjectivity (self) and objectivity (world 
or territory).  The criticism was intertwined with the French State’s relation to 
insurrection decolonization in the postwar years, and it receives a renewed vigor in the 
United States after 9/11.    
While in the late 1960s and 1970s, an interest in post-structuralism may have 
implicitly signified a kind of radical leftist critique of culture, the interest in post-
structural theory no longer implicitly signifies a political view on a horizontal spectrum 
of right or left.  Religious theorist John Caputo, in The Weakness of God, has turned to 
Jacques Derrida and postmodern thought while arguing for an uninstitutionalized reading 
of God: “prayer is not the private property of the faithful but a common passion, indeed, 
the common lot of us all, for we are all praying and weeping for the coming of 
something, even if, especially if, we know not what, which leaves us praying to be able to 
pray” (18).  Similarly, Don Cupitt has argued for an anarchic reversal of European 
universalism in Mysticism after Modernity, a reversal that takes place in the act of writing 
as a kind of practical mysticism.  As the discourse of Political Theology shows, in our 
current era, faith has become increasingly publicized as radically affective, vertical, and 
subjective – often based on charismatic gnosis, which like the counterculture in the 1960s 
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challenged traditionally authoritative institutions through affective identification.  It is my 
contention that the forces concerning liberal society today have roots in 1960s activism 
and are informed by what I am calling psychedelic aesthetics.   
If I am correct, this lineage and political shifting creates a state of confusion 
between notions of political conservatives and liberals as identity categories.  It is not 
merely that bipartisan politics do not work; it is the framing of the political identities 
themselves that does not work.  Neo-fundamentalism, I will claim, is largely 
“psychedelic,” and traditional distinctions between liberals as “secularists” and 
conservatives as “religiously pious” or “Christian right” no longer hold.  The challenge 
such a statement poses to dogmatic liberals, to those for whom a turn to strong faith is the 
exact opposite of the ideals of the 1960s, lies in the tension between religious 
enchantment and unexamined beliefs in narratives of secularization and modernism.  
Psychedelic aesthetics, however, move beyond traditional conceptions of nation-states 
and have larger concerns than bipartisan politics or horizontal political spectrums.  
Rather than focusing on religious studies or social scientific approaches to the 
phenomena of de-territorialization and re-positioning, I believe that to study affective 
waves requires the study of aesthetic works across multiple mediums.  As Aldous 
Huxley, perhaps the grand theorist of psychedelic aesthetics and unassuming political 
theologian pointed out in Ends and Means in the late 1930s, social problems need to be 
addressed from multiple angles simultaneously.  My focus in this work is literary prose 
and philosophical theory, with the intention to build on my previous work, Toward an 
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Ethical Aesthetics: A Study of Levinas, Mid Twentieth Century Avant-garde Jazz, and 
Poetry.  In that work, my central claim is that attempts to dismantle traditional notions of 
aesthetic form in avant-garde jazz and poetry of the 1960s relocate the form of an artistic 
work as the body of the artist, thus creating heightened ethical and communicative 
relationships between performers and audiences through instant interaction.  In the 
current work, this concept is extended through my analysis of Antonin Artaud’s affect on 
Abbie Hoffman’s activism.  In both works there is a heavy transatlantic quality that 
perhaps makes my work seem a bit Eurocentric.  My goal, however, is not so much to 
claim direct lineage for aesthetic ideas that permeate culturally.  In fact, I tend rather to 
believe that social ideas work in affective waves that are oversimplified by strictly causal 
historical and even material-historical analyses.  Artistic ideas do not work in linear 
sequence, and I believe that aesthetic enquiry is the most useful way to track these waves.  
But that does not mean historical situations are irrelevant in aesthetic studies.  The 
historical forces that come to shape this project are large – much larger than the 1960s – 
and I root my study within the discourse of Political Theology so that I may access the 
idea of liberal subjectivity that I feel psychedelic aesthetics challenge.  The philosophical 
theories I employ here allow me to move more efficiently through the historical forces 
that shape the development of psychedelic aesthetics. 
For a myriad of reasons, aesthetic studies have been difficult to perform in 
relation to politics in the United States, to religion, and to publics as a result of a narrative 
of secularization that “officially” claimed the “disenchantment” of the world, a claim that 
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does not currently appear to have held true in what scholars are now calling the post-
secular age.  Frankly, the appeal of a disenchanted, secularist narrative has accompanied 
a materialist and purely consumerist view of art that deprives it of spirit. And this is no 
mere moaning for more attention to the humanities. 
The simplest reason for an aesthetic study, as opposed to a sociological, material-
historical, cultural or religious studies approach is that in the twentieth century, aesthetic 
theory moved beyond subject-object relationships.  Much of this comes from European 
philosophy.  No single thinker is ever entirely responsible for such changes, but a good 
heuristic to start with is Martin Heidegger’s return to the study of ontology in the 1920s.  
Heidegger’s philosophy inaugurated a re-reading of the entire history of philosophy, and 
in returning to questions of the nature of being, he moved beyond ‘modern’ conceptions 
of subjectivity that had informed and been posited by thinkers like Immanuel Kant.  
Emmanuel Levinas, an important student of Heidegger, recounts a famous encounter 
between Martin Heidegger and the neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer at Davos in 1929.  
Heidegger was presenting 
being understood starting from its verbal form as the event of being and as that 
which is an issue for men.  A necessary meaning to the understanding of all 
beings.  For Heidegger, science is certainly one of the modalities of the 
intelligible, but a modality that is already derivative.  He sought the origin in the 
human being, whose being consists in understanding being and thus the point 
where the being of beings acquires meaning. (35)  
 
Heidegger’s thinking as perceived by the young Levinas and his peers signifies the 
overturning of modern European philosophy and especially neo-Kantian philosophy.  He 
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says, “For a young student the impression was of being present at the creation and the 
end of the world” and that “Cassirer presented an order that was going to be undone.” As 
I will frame it, Immanuel Kant’s thinking accompanied the emergence of modern, 
European autonomous subjectivity – a subjectivity that still powerfully informs aesthetic 
sensibilities.  This means that while the art and the study of aesthetics may have moved 
beyond subject-object relationships throughout the twentieth century, many people 
remain habituated to modernist aesthetic sensibilities; even if they have never heard of 
Kant, he is still present and relevant.   
The overcoming of subject-object distinction in post-Heideggerian (and in a 
different way, pragmatist) thought presented classical ‘theory’ of all sorts – but especially 
aesthetic theory – with a conundrum: If there is no inside and outside, how can one 
possibly do theory?  How can one philosophize at the “end” of philosophy?  How can one 
speak of aesthetics – of “the senses” – except in a way to show the transference of power: 
that is, to show who has been subjected to what? The difficulty of such questions led 
many to believe by the end of the twentieth century that any “theory” was either 
impossible or ‘dead’ or served merely to distinguish an academic elite from the public.  
But these questions themselves inherit and express the burden of modern-subjectivity 
informed by Kant, the burden of subjective respons-ibility.  It is in some ways an 
arrogant burden – one that takes on the burden as a performance to maintain its own 
discursive authority and subjectivity.  As such, I believe the refusal to engage with the 
‘impossibility’ of theory is merely an act of bad faith that perpetuates intellectual 
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arrogance.  Such regressive and complacent thinking has led more recent philosophers 
like Simon Critchley, heavily informed by Levinas, to call for a “faith of the faithless” or 
an “ethics of infinity” in his books of the same titles.  In such theories, subjectivity itself 
is an ongoing ethical question, and it is ongoing because it is politically deliberative, 
especially with relation to conceptions of freedom and spirituality.  As this philosophical 
shift in perspective moved across the Atlantic Ocean, largely through a mass exodus of 
European scholars between the wars, it mingled with the always more “enchanted” 
American thought – be it pragmatism or New Thought. 
Mitchell Aboulafia, in Transcendence: On Self-Determination and 
Cosmopolitanism, brilliantly shows this problem to crisscross the Atlantic Ocean during 
the twentieth century by comparing the work of Jean-Paul Sartre to the pragmatism of 
John Dewey – two philosophers not regularly thought of together.  “The ‘trick’ to 
addressing the similarity between Dewey and Sartre,” Aboulafia says,  
is to see that they both assume that experience entails prereflective and reflective 
relationships to the future . . . Even though Sartre’s account of how the 
anticipatory is possible is different from Dewey’s more naturalistic account, their 
theories of action both depend on a practical orientation toward the future. (37)       
 
The theoretical moves that thinkers like Critchley and Aboulafia make use of implicitly 
point well beyond conceptions of either the ‘death’ of theory or the ‘end’ of philosophy. 
Indeed, they push toward a conception of being beyond ‘being-toward-death,’ which had 
characterized human life for Heidegger, Sartre, and to a lesser extent Levinas.  But for 
me, they don’t reach far enough.  The collapse of subjectivity and objectivity are at the 
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heart of psychedelic aesthetics, and studying them can build off of the deliberative 
qualities of these philosophers by grounding them in literary study.  Such an approach 
must necessarily be interdisciplinary. 
 
Methodological Problems in the Disciplines    
It has been a problem in literary studies to move beyond the relationship of text 
and reception of text, just as in philosophy there has been a tendency to oversimplify the 
stability of texts and their relationships to authorship.  Too narrow a conception of 
literature as “text-based” frames the experience of literature in terms of a subject-object 
relationship.  Of course, many post-modern literary works destroy such a conception and 
make theory in its older sense more difficult.  In this space, texts, whether literary or 
critical, become more performative than simply expressive or descriptive.  Criticism 
becomes literature and vice versa.  Over-specialization in disciplinary fields that cannot 
conceive of the generative aspects of both literature and criticism, but rather attempt to 
posit that writing and reading can be separated from one another, or that the text can be 
studied “scientifically,” remove the deliberative qualities of literary study and theory by 
relegating literature to the place of an historical artifact.  As such they remove all 
politically discursive power of art, no matter the medium while essentially siphoning-off 
enchanted qualities of that art into homogenous ether.  This disciplinary fragmentation 
creates the exigency for a return to aesthetics as an ethical frame for study.  Such work is 
being done in philosophy and theory, with thinkers like Simon Critchley and Victoria 
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Kahn3 who call for attention to poetics as “making” and Homo Faber.  If this work 
appears as heavily ‘philosophical,’ that is why.  Aesthetic focuses can reorient and 
perhaps ameliorate professional tensions within various ‘disciplines’ that are simply 
unproductive while putting them into dialogue with other, more culturally relevant public 
areas of study – biopolitics, religious studies, political economy, etc.   
If an aesthetic focus is adopted, a methodological problem arises: how do we 
study “affective waves” that move beyond subject-object distinction?  Rather than 
focusing heavily on affect theory itself, my treatment here will be partly historical.  In 
doing so, I hope to provide some scholarly backing for the rise in affect theory itself, 
although my true aim is something more politically motivated with regard to citizenship 
and less interested in a “field” of Affect Theory.  In my reading, affective ‘waves,’ like 
cultural ‘movements’ exceed form.  Like Gilles Deleuze’s ‘rhizomatic’ thinking, 
developed from Henri Bergson’s vitalism, studies of plant-life have changed traditional 
notions of how consciousness operates.  This research is ongoing in the “hard sciences,” 
especially with relation to psychedelics.  For example, The Cottonwood Research Project, 
headed by Rick Strassman,4 who conducted extensive research on Dimethyltriptamine  
(DMT) in the 1990s, recently announced the publication of a paper documenting the 
presence of DMT in the pineal gland of live rats:   
                                                
3 See particularly with regard to Kahn, “Political Theology and Liberal Culture: Strauss, Schmitt, Spinoza, 
and Arendt” in Political Theology & Early Modernity, edited by Graham Hammill and Julia Reinhard 
Lupton. 
 
4 Strassman is also the author of DMT: The Spirit Molecule, which documents his research. 
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Research at the University of Wisconsin has recently demonstrated the presence 
of the DMT-synthesizing enzyme as well as activity of the gene responsible for 
the enzyme in pineal (and retina).  Our new data now establish that the enzyme 
actively produces DMT in the pineal.  The next step is to determine the presence 
of DMT in cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), the fluid that bathes the brain and pineal. 
CSF is a possible route for pineal-synthesized DMT to effect changes in brain 
function. Successfully establishing DMT’s presence in this gland adds another 
link in the chain between the pineal and consciousness and opens new avenues for 
research. 
 
DMT has been found to be a common compound in many forms of organic life.  This 
research is pushing the boundaries not only of consciousness studies, but also of the 
definitions between humans and animals.  Like recent philosophers, who, building out of 
Heidegger’s return to origins of speech and being, and, through poststructuralism 
challenged the traditional notions of subjectivity inherited through the Kantian tradition 
call for a return to poetics as “making,” contemporary scientific studies can now 
physically discuss subjectivity and objectivity with more precision.  In any case, 
however, as the definition of humanity exceeds traditional notions of humans as rational 
speaking animals, there are emerging implications for liberalism, which is rooted in the 
valuing of human rights.  As the parameters for defining humans are modified, so must 
the conception of human rights be modified.  Awaiting further research in the hard 
sciences, I present a study of psychedelic aesthetics because I believe they implicitly 
point the way to notions of metempsychosis by creating works and experiences as 
incarnations of the psychedelic or “mind-manifested” state.   In doing so, psychedelic 
aesthetics present a way of moving beyond twentieth-century philosophy’s concern with 
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time and being-toward-death and open up deliberative potential for discussing 
international human rights as soft law.5 
In order to articulate how psychedelic aesthetics do this, I draw on the terms 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari express in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism an 
Schizophrenia, particularly the notions of “deterritorialization” and “assemblage.”  
Deterritorialization in my reading refers to any process disrupting a sense of place, home, 
natural environment, or species identification; while an assemblage manifests as an 
orientation, or more properly a re-orientation, from that deterritorialized space:   
Deterritorialization, “I was disoriented…” (a perception of things, thoughts, 
desires in which desire, thought, and the thing have invaded all of perception: the 
imperceptible finally perceived.  Nothing left but the world of speeds and 
slownesses without form, without subject, without a face.  Nothing left but the 
zigzag of a line, like “the lash of the whip of an enraged cart driver” shredding 
faces and landscapes.  A whole rhizomatic labor of perception, the moment when 
desire and perception meld. (283)  
 
Importantly, an assemblage is not merely a result of the imposed will of a subject.  It is 
not “in the eye of the beholder,” but rather determined by multiple social forces acting 
simultaneously on the subject:   
There is no doubt that an assemblage never contains a causal infrastructure.  It 
does have, however, and to the highest degree, an abstract line of creative or 
specific causality, its line of flight or deterritorialization; this line can be 
effectuated only in connection with general causalities of another nature, but is in 
no way explained by them.  
 
                                                
5 See the final chapter for a more in-depth discussion of soft law. 
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Through an assemblage then, a subject locates his or her ‘self’ while simultaneously 
knowing that self to be “unoriginal.”  Drugs, in this context “appear to be an agent of 
becoming.”   
The psychedelic experience always includes a deterritorializied assemblage, but 
also the articulation of the assemblage through the process of re-territorialization, of 
orienting and grounding.  In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari, writing in the 
recent aftermath of the psychedelic movement, are understandably suspicious of drugs.  
They do claim, however, that “drugs give the unconscious the immanence and plane that 
psychoanalysis botched” (284).  The mistake drug addicts make, Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest, is always to “start over again from ground zero, either going on the drug again or 
quitting, when what they should do is make it a stopover, to start from the middle.”  They 
conclude with a sense that drug use is “over”: “Drugs are too unwieldy to grasp the 
imperceptible and becomings-imperceptible; drug users believed that drugs would grant 
them the plane, when in fact the plane must distill its own drugs, remaining master of 
speeds and proximities” (286).  Deleuze and Guattari are perhaps overly concerned with 
addictive drugs rather than psychedelics, but in Ken Kesey’s terms, this amounts to the 
need to “graduate” from the famous Acid Tests in the mid 1960s.  For Deleuze and 
Guattari (and again we can get a sense of the kinds of drugs they are critiquing here), 
drugs speed things up and slow things down, but the process of becoming is something 
different. 
Starting from the form one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, or the 
functions one fulfills, becoming is to extract particles between which one 
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establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are closest 
to what one is becoming, and through which one becomes.  This is the sense in 
which becoming is the process of desire. (272) 
 
The fulfillment of “the process of desire,” with respect to psychedelics, has remained in a 
state of cultural limbo due to legal restrictions preventing research, but as more recent 
studies have suggested, there is more to the picture with regard to psychedelics than what 
Deleuze and Guattari have to say about drugs in general.  Even so, their terminology is 
useful. 
In his recent ethnography of psychedelics, Neuropsychedelia, New School 
anthropologist and M.D. Nicolas Langlitz points out that psychedelics like LSD are 
generally on the wane in terms of street use due to their non-addictive qualities, which 
makes them less lucrative to sell and maintain a consistent customer base.  Yet a 
resurgence of psychedelic testing in “the decade of the brain” has proved fruitful both for 
scientific and religious perspectives.  His fieldwork in laboratories in the United States 
and Switzerland suggests 
that the current resurgence of psychedelic science is not just another story of 
disenchantment (from magic mushrooms to 5-HT2A receptor agonists) but has 
produced a form of laboratory life that continues to be suffused with the peculiar 
kind of mysticism that emerged from the psychedelic culture of the 1950s and 
1960s. (Kindle Locations 118-121) 
 
These scientific studies, he claims, do not result in a presentation of “bare life,” and he 
ends up arguing that “perennial might be a more suitable term” as a way to address 
“theological questions and spiritual experiences [which] continue to serve as a moral 
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motor of the ongoing revival of scientific studies of hallucinogenic compounds” (Kindle 
Locations 432-433).  The perennial (among other uses in this context) resounds as a 
reference to Aldous Huxley’s Perennial Philosophy. 
Bringing together Langlitz’s view with Deleuze and Guattari’s affective terms, we 
can claim that psychedelic aesthetics are not one aesthetic, but a collection of affective 
tendencies that move backward in time while also being future-oriented.  A strict period 
study alone will not capture the different temporal gestures within the aesthetics.  They 
are philosophical in the sense that they gesture toward humans in general rather than 
“man in the particular,” and in doing so they constantly attempt to exceed the form of one 
life.  These aesthetics gesture then, toward the ‘spiritual,’ toward a communion and return 
from something beyond self, and as they incarnate in critiques of citizenship, they 
introduce (or re-introduce) a kind of spiritual enchantment to spheres once thought to be 
entirely secular and historicized.  Because of these spiritual aspects, I have chosen 




Political Theology, as I use the term, relates to an interdisciplinary scholarly 
discussion developing out of the journal Telos in the late 1980s.  Traditionally aligned 
with a radical leftist critique of culture, Telos later came to be suspicious of attempts to 
take a position “outside” of culture.  In the late 1980s, the journal began to publish a 
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number of articles studying the German legal theorist, Carl Schmitt.  As Scott G. McNall 
writes, because of Schmitt’s Nazism, “the very fact that the journal reviewed and 
discussed his work was deeply suspect, [and] Schmitt predicted the decline of federations 
and nation states, seeing them as inherently unstable, while Telos celebrated loose 
affiliations” (110).  Telos founder, Paul Piccone was a leftist critic who rejected 
“managerial liberalism” and sought a turn “to authors outside the Left and on the edge of 
liberalism as sources.  Carl Schmitt was the most prominent of these” (Turner 117).  
Schmitt’s 1922 book, Political Theology, famously opens by defining the sovereign as 
“the one who makes the decision in a state of exception” (Schmitt 5).  While the book has 
been important for growing concerns over the place of religion in the religious sphere, it 
has also been of interest because of the famous aesthete, Walter Benjamin.   
In his habilitation, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, Benjamin writes that 
“whereas the modern concept of sovereignty amounts to a supreme executive power on 
the part of the prince, the baroque concept emerges from a discussion of the state of 
emergency, and makes it the most important function of the prince to avoid this” (65).  
He then claims that “the theological-juridical mode of thought, which is so characteristic 
of the [seventeenth] century, is an expression of the retarding effect of the over-strained 
transcendental impulse, which underlies all of the provocatively worldly accents of the 
baroque” (65-66).   The focus on the prince as the continued site of community holds the 
physical world and the theological world together for Benjamin.  The more worldly the 
State, the more transcendent the leaders must be.  Benjamin’s notes to this section cite 
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Schmitt’s Political Theology, and as Samuel Weber has noted, Benjamin personally 
wrote Schmitt, sending a copy of The Origin of German Tragic Drama, and thanking 
Schmitt for thought crucial to his aesthetic theory:  
You will very quickly recognize how much my book is indebted to you for its 
presentation of the doctrine of sovereignty in the seventeenth century. Perhaps I 
may also say, in addition, that I have also derived from your later works, 
especially the "Diktatur," a confirmation of my modes of research in the 
philosophy of art from yours in the philosophy of the state. (In Weber 5) 
 
Benjamin, one of the most important aesthetes in the twentieth century was, through 
Schmitt, able to use Political Theological ideas for the basis of aesthetic criticism, and the 
subtext of Benjamin’s book is the liberal crisis in the Weimar Republic during the late 
1920s.  To some, it is fascinating that Benjamin would so openly align his thinking with 
Schmitt, who was already a conservative and went on to become a member of the Nazi 
party and an outspoken anti-Semite.  The renewed interest in Schmitt in journals like 
Telos and diacritics in the late 1980s and early 1990s marks a moment when thinking 
which had originally aligned itself closely with Benjamin and the Frankfurt School’s 
leftist politics, had come to be suspicious of their Critical Theory.  But even earlier in the 
century, Schmitt’s influence is apparent.  Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward, translator’s 
of Schmitt’s Political Theology II, note in their introduction that in post-1968 Germany, 
the rabbi and theologian, Jacob Taubes, invited Alexandre Kojeve to lecture in Germany 
– a political move to inspire Leftists with French thought – Kojeve’s response was that 
the eighty-year-old Carl Schmitt was “the only person in Germany worth speaking to” 
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(19).  When this drew obvious concern among German intellectuals, Taubes used 
Benjamin’s correspondence with Schmitt as conciliatory evidence (20).   
Inherent in the revived discussion of Political Theology is a critique of the 
secularization narratives that historically parallel the development of modern nation 
states.  Since I am claiming that psychedelic aesthetics employ spiritual or religious 
affectation to critique modern subjectivity, Political Theology seems an apt, even if at 
first-glance surprising, discourse to pair with the psychedelic.  Or, perhaps the political 
convergence with drug legislation and social protests is relatively obvious while the 
theological aspects are more oblique.  
While Political Theology has different and more specific variants as a term in 
Christian discourse, the rise of its interest among scholars since the late 1980s has also 
accompanied questions concerning the nature of religious discourse in the public sphere, 
particularly in the post 9/11 era.  The Italian philosopher of aesthetics, Giorgio Agamben, 
builds on Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology, calling the post 9/11 era an extended state of 
exception.  Accompanying this is the disappearance of a certain European notion of 
transcendence in favor of more immanent views, especially in relation to bulky legal 
apparatuses that cannot function in states of exception.  These “leaderless” states imply 
an “absent throne” (or perhaps a puppet-throne) and a return to nature, the pre-political, 
or the perennial.  Agamben names this, building from Schmitt, explicitly in the book 
State of Exception: 
The immediately biopolitical significance of the state of exception as the original 
structure in which law encompasses living beings by means of its own suspension 
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emerges clearly in the “military order” issued by the president of the United 
States on November 13, 2001, which authorized the “indefinite detention” and 
trial “by means of military commissions” (not to be confused with military 
tribunals provided for by the law of war) of non-citizens suspected of involvement 
in terrorist activities. (3) 
 
Essentially, Agamben argues that since 9/11 the United States has been in a state of 
exception where legal apparatuses are constantly suspended because the deliberative 
process is too slow to react to states of emergency.   
In specific connection to the discourse of Political Theology, Agamben and other 
intellectuals have been taking a scrutinizing look at the foundations of liberal nation 
states in attempts to make sense of economic collapses and large-scale humanitarian 
problems.  The place of religion in relation to politics and the public sphere is central to 
the discourse.  Many, like philosopher Jurgen Habermas, feel that what liberal 
democracies need is an “awareness of what is missing” with regard to shifting views 
about secularization.  Along with Habermas, philosophers such as Richard Rorty, Jacques 
Derrida, as well as a younger generation – Judith Butler, Giorgio Agamben, Simon 
Critchley, and Paul Kahn – have in the past decade engaged increasingly with the role of 
religion and ethics in the public sphere.  In general, this amounts to a willingness to 
engage with religious thinkers in public forums.  Habermas’s discussions with Joseph 
Ratzinger (before he became Pope) evidence this when he says, “Indeed, a liberal 
political culture can expect that the secularized citizens play their part in the endeavors to 
translate relevant contributions from the religious language into a language that is 
accessible to the public as a whole” (Dialectics 51-2).  I believe that by looking at how 
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psychedelic aesthetics critique notions of liberal subjectivity we can not only take up the 
“task to translate” that Habermas calls for, but we can also see that this task has been 
ongoing in aesthetic works since at least the 1950s and 1960s yet ignored because of a 
now outdated secularist frame.  Let me begin by grounding this with a discussion of 
liberal subjectivity and then move into the historical relationship between that 
subjectivity, the nation state, and religion.  Along the way, I will track how psychedelic 
aesthetics critique this subjectivity.   
 
Subjectivity 
What do I mean by “this subjectivity”?  While at times I may use the terms 
“subjectivity,” “self” and “ego” synonymously, I generally use the term subjectivity to 
get at the forces that shape and discipline an ‘I’ over time.  The term subjectivity de-
emphasizes individual agency in order to get at social aspects of self.  While each 
individual person may have an ego, groups of people may be ‘subjects’ in the sense that 
they are subject to legal discipline, social norms, and religious traditions that move over 
many generations.  Subjectivity itself is an historical category.  ‘Modern’ subjectivity, 
then, is a philosophical term to express a worldview turned inward over the Early Modern 
period.  Concerning “this” European subjectivity, Robert C. Solomon’s Continental 
Philosophy Since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self is a useful introduction.  A broader 
and more aesthetic exploration occurs in Richard Sennett’s work, which tracks aesthetic 
perspective in The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities.  Sennett 
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explicates the emergence of privacy through architecture and public space by way of the 
Enlightenment and critiques a version of Christian transcendence he feels is internalized 
and secularized in Western modes of life.  Subjectivity can be historicized, but 
subjectivity also works in aesthetic enquiry.  As in lyrical poetry or drama, the ‘I’ is not 
so much an author but an intertextual poetic figure containing traces of past works.  The 
subjective ‘I’ critiqued by these aesthetics is a socio-cultural inheritance that moves and 
develops through time in various different incarnations acting as a binding force for 
individuals.  
Subjectivity, as I use the term, performs ‘habitus,’ which I take from the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu (who in turn took it from the Scholastics).  The term is useful mainly in 
that it allows for individual subjectivity to be shaped and contribute to something larger 
than itself in a reciprocal relationship with culture.  As Randal Johnson summarizes, 
Bourdieu  
defines habitus [as] the system of ‘durable, transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to structuring structures, that is, as principles which 
generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them.’ (5) 
 
What is especially useful with regard to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is that it is 
dynamic, and it can track motivational practices without being seduced into over-
simplified arguments based on linear causality.  It also helps to legitimate cultural study 
that is inter-subjective.  The concept of habitus allows us to view the Enlightenment 
social construction of the autonomous subject as historically situated and as continuing to 
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have behavioral influence amidst more recent critiques of it.  While one might be tempted 
to simply claim that any such notion of ‘subjectivity’ is merely atavistic in a rhizomatic 
world of coming insurrections – a world of what Kathleen Stewart describes as “Ordinary 
Affects” or Jane Bennett calls “Vibrant Matter” in their respective books on those 
subjects – it is important to note such critiques’ reliance on an initial frame of 
autonomous subjectivity as a buffer for thinking and publishing.  In other words, I am not 
presenting subjectivity as something to “get over” but rather as a heuristic that was 
developed by socio-historical factors, performing a kind of habitus verifiable in artistic 
works.  What makes psychedelic works so interesting is the ways they attempt to 
deliberately reshape that heuristic.  They are essentially fictive in that regard.  They deal 
with the self as a model to be remade, but in doing so they inherit and critique a social 
version of ‘Self’ through habitus.  It is ultimately for me a question of poetics.   
Historically, a particular strain of European subjectivity has ideologically 
accompanied a variety of versions of liberalism in the sense that liberal economies have 
traditionally relied on some version of subjectivity.  This reliance has been in the form of 
citizenship, an ancient idea that developed in particular ways during the Enlightenment 
with the emergence of modern nation states.  Liberalism itself is not static, but rather 
shaped in various ways over time, especially in the early twentieth century, when legal 
theorists like Carl Schmitt saw economic forces as depoliticizing.  As David Forsythe 
writes in Human Rights in International Relations: 
While there are many varieties of liberalism and liberals, the classical idea of 
liberalism remains centered on respect for personal moral rights, based above all 
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on the equal worth of the individual, whose preferences should be followed in the 
public domain. Classical liberals emphasize above all legal rights derived from 
political morality, independent court judgments, and peaceful policy making. (42) 
 
Schmitt’s critique of liberalism is founded in his early concept of the political, which 
requires states to have clear decision-makers.  Liberal democracy, for Schmitt, tends to 
disperse authority too widely, making decisions slow and ineffective.  This is evidenced 
in his praise of Hitler taking action during the state of exception that ended the Weimar 
Republic.  The idea of popular sovereignty, on the other hand, makes it less possible for 
there to be one sovereign who decides in the state of exception and thus, in his or her 
ability to break from the norm, establish what norms are; but of course this is a matter of 
faith in the representational status of leaders.     
Schmitt’s argument concerning depoliticization is itself historicized (and indeed 
his historical interest in literature led his methods to anticipate new historical criticism).  
In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt frames the political as arising from an implicit 
historical trajectory shaping European culture throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries: a trajectory from the moral, with its emphasis on good and evil (1700s); 
aesthetic, with its emphasis on beauty and ugliness (late 1700s / early 1800s); economic, 
with its emphasis on profitable and unprofitable (1800s); and finally, in the political, with 
its emphasis on the State’s ability to distinguish between friend and enemy (1900s).  
Embedded in the friend-enemy distinction as “the political” is morality, aesthetics, and 
economics.  The sovereign protects culture as well as territory.  The question of the 
friend-enemy distinction is, for Schmitt, to be determined internationally, that is, between 
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States; and the reterritorializing of Europe after the First World War provides his context.  
Schmitt says,  
The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a 
union or separation, an association or dissociation.  It can exist theoretically and 
practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon all those moral, 
aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions.  The political enemy need not be 
morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, 
and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions.  
But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature 
that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially different and alien, so that in 
extreme cases conflicts with him are possible. (26-7)   
  
It is important to see that Schmitt implicitly historicizes his concept of the political in 
terms of “progress” away from morality.  Politics relies on a subject capable of deciding 
who the enemy is, not out of dislike or hatred, but as a way to position action through 
totalization – to give a conception of political identity (Strong xvi).  Depoliticization, for 
Schmitt, without clear friend-enemy distinction, creates the conditions for a leaderless 
State and the most inhumane of wars because of either the necessity to vilify the enemy 
or simply let “nature” take its course.  It is relatively easy to see from this perspective 
why National Socialism may have seemed appealing as an identity category for Schmitt.  
Living in the ineffective liberal democracy of the Weimar Republic was an economic 
disaster, and the conservative Schmitt longed for a decider to maintain stability.   
States rely on subjectivity but also on the special subjectivity of the Sovereign 
capable of making a decision.  We can see in Schmitt’s importance to recent scholars the 
growing questions concerning cosmopolitanism and the changing relationship between 
the individual subject, the State, and citizenship or national identity.  States and 
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economies in the 1920s could no longer be theorized in isolation, as the Great War had 
shown.  Questions about the control of markets are intimately connected to the 
conception and role of the Western nation state, which in turn is intimately connected 
with ideas about subjectivity.   
Liberalism also relies on subjectivity, and in more recent times when liberalism 
falters or changes, I believe it is partly due to a reliance on subjectivity that has become 
increasingly archaic. In the late 1960s, when Schmitt wrote the more theological Political 
Theologie II, he claimed, “today we can no longer define politics in terms of the State; on 
the contrary what we can still call the State today must inversely be defined and 
understood from the political” (in Strong xv).  As Tracy B. Strong summarizes in his 
introduction to the first Political Theology, for Schmitt: 
Underlying the state is a community of people – necessarily not universal – a 
“we” that, as it defines itself necessarily in opposition to that which it is not, 
presupposes and is defined by this conflict.  It derives its definition from the 
friend / enemy distinction. That distinction, however, is an us / them distinction, 
in which the “us” is of primary and necessary importance. 
 
Schmitt’s concerns about liberal democracy are fueled partly by the tendency for the 
public and the State to blur, instigating what would be for him the impossibility of 
politics.  They are also fueled by democratic proceduralism that makes of law a technical 
apparatus, forgetting the necessity of juristic decision-making that is necessarily 
interpretive.  He would rather know who exactly is making the decisions.  This requires a 
fairly stable view of both subjectivity and sovereignty.  
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 Psychedelic aesthetics, which emerged during an economic boom for liberalism 
during the post World War II years, especially in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, attempt to reform European subjectivity while preserving liberal values by 
discarding a certain sense of ‘self’ or ‘individuality’.  They also accompany a broadened 
friend / enemy distinction brought about by the Cold War.  The world became the 
political stage after the use of atomic weapons, with the main friend-enemy distinction 
being between the liberal west and the communist east.  The aesthetics of the period 
sought to point toward a new kind of citizenship that created conceptual problems for 
citizenship defined strictly by territory.  This “new” citizenship did not happen as a 
complete historical event; it continues to be affectively shaped today, while older perhaps 
more archaic ones, continue as well.  It is my goal to trace that reforming of European 
subjectivity with this project. 
 
Psychedelic Aesthetics and Political Theology 
People react to the psychedelic in different ways, but nevertheless they react.  
When one mentions the term ‘psychedelic,’ it likely conjures up a myriad of associations.  
Most likely the first associations have something to do with drug usage and are followed 
with a knee-jerk affectation of “far-out-ness.”  Someone in the room will likely affect a 
stupor and speak like Tommy Chong, but even this gesture toward comedy only 
evidences an unresolved issue.  Concerning the psychedelic, we may also think of bright 
dripping colors, light shows and guitar-based rock and roll with prosaic song-structures, 
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of festival culture.  The term conjures the 1960s political protests, counterculture, and a 
liberation of social mores.  A secondary reaction to these might evoke New Ageism, 
hippies and gurus.  Whether it is shrugged off as a more ‘innocent’ time, idealized as the-
time-that-never-was-and-never-will-be-again, or blamed as the decade of decline, the 
period operates under its own aura. From the outset then, the psychedelic is already an 
affective category for most Americans, and one’s relation to psychedelics has 
traditionally and perhaps too quickly situated one’s politics.   
The term ‘psychedelic’ itself nicely performs the same oversaturation of 
associative meaning that it seeks to describe.  ‘Psychedelia,’ as the phenomenon came to 
be known, was undoubtedly a product of the spread of liberalism all over the world as 
Europe lost colonial control and America attempted to preserve liberal values against 
communism.  From hindsight, psychedelia looks like a particularly effective form of 
consumer culture.  Across media, stylistic reverberations synthesize an explosion of color 
and texture – a celebration of “free-flowing” naturalness that is nevertheless highly 
crafted.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in popular music. 
Indeed, an easy way to evidence the commercial spread of liberalism through 
psychedelic affectation is in music.  Iain Anderson in This is Our Music tracks how the 
United States used jazz music and musicians such as Louis Armstrong and Dizzy 
Gillespie as cultural ambassadors to help spread its political agenda as well as respond to 
Soviet criticisms of gross racial inequality in the U.S.  However, with the emergence of 
rock and roll and its psychedelic variants quickly following, we can now hear the transfer 
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of liberal values in the stylistic codifying that came to be psychedelic music.  Numerous 
musical anthologies, such as the Psychedelic States series put out by Gear Fab records, 
which collects the 1960s recordings of lesser-known psychedelic bands from each state in 
the union, attests to the resurgence, not just of psychedelia itself, but also to the nostalgic 
quality of the reception of psychedelia around the world.  The Psych Bites series does the 
same for Australia; EMI’s Psychedelia at Abbey Road and Mojo Presents: Acid Drops 
Spacedust and Flying Saucers both compile sounds in the UK.  The Trashbox (originally 
Pebbles) and Nuggets: Original Artyfacts from the First Psychedelic Era are both classic 
collections. Now Again records’ Those Shocking, Shaking Days tracks psychedelic rock 
in Indonesia. World Psychedelic records has put out compilations tracking the sound in 
Brazil, and a bit later in Africa, with their World Psychedelic Classics 3.  The list goes 
on. 
A more recent and specific compilation, such as The Shadow Music of Thailand, 
released by the small record label, Sublime Frequencies, documents the reception in 
Thailand of the surf-rock sounds of Cliff Richards and The Shadows.  The Thai bands 
continue to perform regional folk music, but stylize it with the new aesthetic, just as 
skiffle groups and rock groups in the United Kingdom and United States drew on rural 
music as content for their stylistic experimentations.  It is helpful to hear the consistency 
in the way psychedelic style spreads globally.  While rock and roll music had already 
been advertising liberalism and deterritorializing political boundaries, psychedelic music 
brought with it a subset of evangelical aesthetic values, most notably the idea that space, 
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both musical and political, could be manufactured and manipulated, and that boundaries 
– whether geographic or mental – were fluid and virtual.  The aesthetics cannot be 
divorced from the technological space in which they emerge, but what is so interesting is 
the ways the works themselves point to a kind of timeless perennial.   
Psychedelic aesthetics are potentially generative and poetic because they develop 
spaces from which one might construct a self as something new.  Undoubtedly, an 
expanded sense of self, mind-manifestation, and a blurring of subject-object relationships 
is at the root of the psychedelic.  This sensibility aligns with the liberal push toward a 
more porous self that ideologically opens, especially in attempts to advertise it against the 
perceived threat of communism in the Cold War.  Although transgression may have been 
a theme for much of the youth movement, ideologically the youth were also selling (and 
being sold) the idea of ‘lifestyle’ itself to the rest of the world.  This very process of a 
constructed, liberal self was an ideological weapon in the Cold War used to transfer 
values aesthetically.  Yet even despite CIA projects like MK-ULTRA, it seems wrong to 
consider the psychedelic movement as itself “engineered” by some sort of liberal 
democratic consumerist masterminds.  Something like an affective wave seems more 
appropriate.  The way the aesthetics code this is through various kinds of enchantment – 
and psychedelic drugs are just one way to access enchantment.   
It should be noted, of course, that democratic liberal subjects are not the first 
humans to use psychedelic substances, but the growing interest in the 1950s and 1960s in 
indigenous and ancient religion is itself a manifestation of deterritorialized nostalgia that 
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seeks to return to the pre-political.  In Western politics, however, a longstanding intimacy 
exists between the idea of the State and the idea of self, and a very similar affinity 
obviously occurs between the idea of self and religion, especially in its binding sense as 
religio.  In the discourse of Political Theology, the question of the public role of religion 
and religious affectivity has become central to discourse of liberal democracies and 
globalization.  This has prompted a political exigency for theories of the religious.  By 
looking at psychedelic aesthetics and their use of enchantment, I am hoping to contribute 
to how we think of the relationship between art, spirituality and citizenship. 
Much scholarship in Political Theology today comes in the form of large tomes 
that cover large swaths of human history.  As a result they often rely on structural and 
post-structural readings.  Marcel Gauchet’s The Disenchantment of the World: A Political 
History of Religion, for example, argues that the idea of transcendent religion arises in 
Mesopotamia and Egypt 3000 years ago with the first states, that the state is more 
formalized with emergent monotheism, and culminates with the more recent “rational 
religion” that presents itself as the very overcoming of religion.  He writes:  
the fundamental paradox of religion is both to gain self-possession by consenting 
to dispossession, by turning away from the goal of dominating nature and to 
legislate on our own behalf in favor of another goal, namely that of securing an 
identity defined and controlled at every step. (7)   
 
The “dispossession” we consent to, according to Gauchet, comes in the form of an 
acknowledgement of inheritance and ancestry.  The ancient world’s large projects such as 
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Stonehenge and the Egyptian pyramids are partially accounted for here.  Gauchet goes 
on: 
Religion in its pure state is drawn into a temporal division that puts the present 
into a position of absolute dependence on the mythical past, and guarantees the 
irrevocable allegiance of all human activities to their inaugural truth.  At the same 
time it ratifies the non-appeasable dispossession of human actors from what gives 
substance and meaning to their actions and gestures.  The key to inter-relationship 
between religion and society, as well as the secret of the nature of the religious, 
lies in its radical conservation which structurally combines co-presence to the 
origin with disjunction from the originary moment, combining unstinting 
conformity to what has been definitively founded with a separated foundation. 
(25)  
 
Both the self and the State here are figured within a founding violence that preserves 
through conservation (religio) while enacting dispossession through the setting aside 
(sacred).  During the Enlightenment, rational religion’s attempts to overcome religion 
itself amounted to attempts to separate the founding act of the nation-state from past 
myths.  This accounts for the emerging figure of the irrational enthusiast, extremist or 
schwarmerei on the one hand, and the patriot on the other hand – and the terrorist 
somewhere in between.   
Religion in the context of a construction of “the secular” risks an inherent 
fanatical violence that William T. Cavanaugh has challenged.  In The Myth of Religious 
Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict, Cavanaugh hypothesizes 
that religion-and-violence arguments serve a particular need for their consumers 
in the West.  These arguments are part of a broader Enlightenment narrative that 
has invented a dichotomy between the religious and the secular and constructed 
the former as an irrational and dangerous impulse that must give way in public to 
rational, secular forms of power. In the West, revulsion toward killing and dying 
in the name of one’s religion is one of the principal means by which we become 
convinced that killing and dying in the name of the nation-state is laudable and 
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proper. The myth of religious violence also provides secular social orders with a 
stock character, the religious fanatic, to serve as enemy.  (Kindle Locations 78-
82).  
 
The more porous liberal self that is presented by psychedelic aesthetics operates as a 
hybrid between a secular fanatic evangelizing liberal values and a religious fanatic 
evangelizing an ecstatic and mystical experience.  This self as an ideological weapon 
enacts a kind of violence in the wiping away of and re-inscription of ego on the one hand; 
it performs another sacrifice on the political institution of the state on the other hand, by 
seeking to return to the pre-political.  We come to see that one cannot simply divorce the 
spiritual from the secular in the psychedelic context; rather, the psychedelic subject 
becomes enchanted and re-enchants.  Denying such enchantment in terms of a secularist 
frame is not only inaccurate in terms of people’s varied daily religiosity; such a view 
perpetuates a frame where religious violence is the most potent action against archaically 
transcendent political entities.  The psychedelic subject performs or re-performs the 
founding possession-dispossession that Gauchet writes of during a particular moment 
with particular historical exigency – the 1960s.  In the process, the psychedelic subject 
challenges the foundational myth of secularism. 
  
The Question of Citizenship 
Much recent scholarship, mostly under the name of Political Theology, has 
pointed out flaws of secularization as a grand narrative.  This project attempts to 
contribute to that conversation by showing the ways self and self-transcendence is 
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represented in psychedelic aesthetics.  It is an attempt, therefore, to theorize liberal 
subjectivity, to map how that subjectivity changes and how that change affects – and is 
reflected in – politics and notions of citizenship.  The project therefore hovers at a 
boundary between material history and aesthetic questions around transcendence.  My 
focus on aesthetics is meant to allow for connections to be made across mediums and to 
question the ethical presentation of tangible works that occur in material, historical 
circumstances.  My descriptive goal is therefore more heuristic than nominalist.  
Psychedelic aesthetics are both evangelical and politically deliberative.  They 
point toward a future of possibility: lifestyle and art collapse intentionally, process 
becomes its own performance, and the audience-performer relationship fuses, 
overcoming dramatic irony or doubling and producing a “new” sense of consciousness.  
In order to get at the deliberative aspects of psychedelic aesthetics, I employ the 
discourse of Political Theology, which looks at attitudes and possibilities in political life 
as praxis in relation to belief patterns and metaphysical comportment; it then tries to 
establish how such belief patterns have influenced governance and “governmentality” 
over time.  For this reason, the method moves toward conceptual history, political 
science, and philosophy rather than a material analysis of realpolitik.   
Instead of focusing on institutions of government or religion, as has been the 
tendency in Political-Theological discourse, my aesthetic focus on philosophical, literary 
and occasionally musical texts allows insight into more mundane practices, especially 
those relating to a broader sense of “spirituality” by using literary and musical material as 
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a focus.  I track the mundane mainly through literary and musical cultural products 
because I wish to get at the affective qualities of aesthetic works that frame engagement 
with the political in terms of ultimately religious concepts like sacrifice, neighborliness 
and performance of faith – the qualities that cannot be parsed out as spiritual or secular, 
but all of which relate to citizenship.  The concept of the psychedelic allows me to draw 
on the poetic (in the sense of making or poesis) aspects of liberal self and citizenship, so 
there is an implicit argument that interpreting aesthetic works is a deeply politically 
deliberative act, and in a sense, the making of this text enacts the content it discusses 
through an intentional kind of polysemus seepage.   
My use of the saturated term ‘psychedelic’ acts poetically to get at aspects of 
liberal selfhood.  It qualifies the aesthetics that create the affective motivation for a 
change in the idea of self; indeed, even a philosophical change in the idea of the category 
of ‘human.’ What psychedelic aesthetics amount to is a massive attempt at behavioral 
modification at the level of culture through a reframing of the metaphor of ‘self,’ which 
cannot be confined simply to the 1960s.  Really, it thematizes a large shift in Western 
thought during the twentieth century. 
Let me once again situate this in disciplinary terms: such reframing of self is 
mirrored across much academic discourse of the late twentieth century.  Cognitive 
scientists like George Lakoff have shown the ways metaphors do not merely structure 
language and signs, but thought and behavior itself.  Well-used neuropaths create the 
interstate highways of the mind and thus establish positions that anchor vantage points 
   40 
and frame reality.  Similarly, semioticians like Gunther Kress have extended both 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s and Charles Sanders Peirce’s conceptions of signs, referents and 
language into affective and multimodal studies.  In philosophy, the late work of Jacques 
Derrida and the recent work of Giorgio Agamben, building out of Martin Heidegger’s 
concept that language “speaks us” and Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical work, has sought to 
more rigorously examine conceptions of the “human,” moving beyond the traditional 
western notion of rational speaking animal,6 which of course is derived from Aristotle’s 
conception of the ‘political’ animal made possible by speech.7  Again, at the limits of 
language and speech (logos), the question arises: is philosophy or theory possible?  And 
the recent answer has been: yes, but only through engagement with infinity, the spiritual, 
and the uncontainable. 
Psychological literature in the twentieth century, from which many early 
psychedelic theories arose, of course also questions the nature of subjectivity and the 
sources of motivation as well; but it comes out of a larger tradition examining faculties of 
“mind” and so historically has dealt with humans in their particularity as opposed to 
philosophy’s interest in humans in general.  The great twentieth-century psychological 
thinkers all push toward a greater social account and in their own ways transcend 
subjectivity, as well as presenting theories of the State; and it is out of their work that 
                                                
6 See Derrida’s The Animal Therefore that I am and Agamben’s The Open on this point. 
 
7 Kenneth Burke, who expands on Aristotle calling “man” the symbol-using animal, still implies a techne 
for the use of symbol, thereby adhering more to the subject’s ability to manipulate signs than the ways 
signs, symbols and metaphors use us.  
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much psychedelic theory was explored and refined.  Much of their work is thinly masked 
political theology and theory of the State.   
Social accounts that transcend individual subjectivity may be performed in one of 
two ways: 1) by radicalizing subjectivity, isolating it and negating it; or 2) through 
dissemination into a social consciousness of some sort.  In all cases, the trend across 
humanistic disciplines has been to move “outside” of the subject, the very thing that I am 
claiming psychedelic aesthetics try to do.  Much of the 1960s sociological work, 
following Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd, however, emphasized the “inner-directed” turn 
as anodyne.  
I believe that twentieth century politics underwrites this move “outside the 
subject,” because it appears that no matter how the metaphorical figures congruent with 
liberalism – the figure of humans separate from nature, for example – came to shape 
subjectivity, humans always seem to be more than that subjectivity.  And so what I mean 
by ‘politics’ here is the deliberative discourse concerning how to negotiate human 
affairs.  This entails an intention toward a future, a forward-looking imagination based on 
forensic and epideictic exigencies.  My conception also differs from Carl Schmitt’s 
conception of politics as being determined by friend-enemy distinction in that, following 
thinkers like Emmanuel Levinas and Simon Critchley, I believe politics must be situated 
in some way or another with the question of infinity.  I am interested in the psychedelic 
experience and representations of that experience as attempts to create positive research 
on this question.  
   42 
In the West, liberalism has provided the most influential model by which politics 
are performed; but of course recently liberalism, even in its more recent incarnations, has 
faced significant challenges.  These challenges are evidenced by the philosophical 
exigency to overcome subjectivity as liberalism has traditionally shaped it and visible in 
the material production of culture as aesthetically sensible.  The challenge to subjectivity 
exhibited by psychedelic aesthetics shakes the foundations assumed by liberalism.  How 
for example, can politics deliberate toward a future where humans are no longer separate 
from, but rather a part of nature?  If we accept that we cannot deliberate from a position 
outside the world – that to even attempt to do so would perhaps be fundamentally 
unethical to begin with – how is political action in the form of decisions to be 
determined, even outside of the notion of progress itself?  This remains the task of theory. 
Because of these difficult questions, and because it is not sufficient to focus on 
institutional religion and politics alone, I believe affective tendencies must be accounted 
for in individuals, so I have chosen to focus on aesthetic products.  This is not in order to 
save the individual subject’s “freedom” from the powers that be, but rather because the 
process of engaging with the corporate entity is not simply top-down, but rather an 
ongoing poetic action.  It is not a matter of resistance to discipline in the abstract so much 
as it is a matter of faith.  The position of faith occupies both being disciplined and willing 
or intending toward at the level of subjective decision-making, as the citations of Gauchet 
allude to above.  How does faith “power” poetry and make action in the world?  If 
Gauchet is correct that civilization is about ancestral memory, then have we not been 
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walking among the dead for some time now?  Have we not been blurring this world and 
the other since the beginning of poetry?  
‘Psychedelic aesthetics’ is a way to articulate an operation figuring a dynamically 
disseminating subjectivity, a collapse of subject-object relationships often aligned with 
mysticism, and a reassembly into a broadened, de-territorialized consciousness.  This 
process of dissemination has been implicitly discussed in the discourse of Political-
Theological discourse, mostly by looking at traces and lineage and incarnations of power, 
partly in the tradition of Ernst Kantorwicz’s The King’s Two Bodies and partly in the 
tradition of scholars analyzing the German legal theorist and critic of liberalism, Carl 
Schmitt, whose 1922 book, Political Theology, contains the oft-quoted passage: 
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized religious 
concepts not only because of their historical development – in which they were 
transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the 
omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver – but also because of their 
systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological 
consideration of these concepts. The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to 
the miracle in theology.  Only by being aware of this analogy can we appreciate 
the manner in which the philosophical ideas of the state developed in the last 
centuries. (36)   
 
There is an intersection between structuralism and history in this passage that manifests 
what might be characterized as the problem of the twentieth-century: a tension between 
vertical, sacred time (being and essence), and horizontal, secular time – the tension 
brilliantly, even if over-simplistically, pointed to by Mircea Eliade in The Sacred and the 
Profane.  Eliade argued that ‘modern man’ is out of touch with “sacred” space, living in 
the world of the profane and forgetting the centering potential of “primitive” religious 
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thought.  He claimed, “the sacred reveals absolute reality and at the same time makes 
orientation possible; hence it founds the world in the sense that it fixes the limits and 
establishes the order of the world” (30).  While such binaries oversimplify the matter, 
Eliade’s claim articulates the European nostalgia for the pre-political and poses the very 
problem of positioning that my method of tracing tries to anchor.  Eliade’s assertion also 
points to the political space of the sacred in public spheres.  If the spiritual is invoked in 
politics, it is with a view to orienting and futurity. 
Rather than a focus on States or “major” religion, this study attempts to show how 
psychedelic aesthetics operate through religious acts of substitution, release and 
integration that fundamentally relate to the “spiritual.”  In post-1960s America, one often 
hears people claim, “I’m spiritual but not religious.”  While the term “spirituality” may 
seem quite general, I am in agreement with Peter van der Veer that a “vague term like 
spirituality has been adopted precisely to make peaceful communication between 
different conceptual universes possible” (793).  The difficulty arises in determining what 
kinds of meaningful contributions – as either a term or as a practice – spirituality may 
have.  The fact that with regard to the psychedelic, spirituality is superficial, that new 
ageism is often trite, is helpful here.  It evidences a breakdown between friend-enemy 
distinctions and a re-orientation toward the infinite, even if it does so in limited and 
seemingly empty or diluted ways; it is always a question of limits. 
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Psychedelic Aesthetics and Spirituality 
How do we measure superficiality? What is “above the face”? Above seeing?  
These questions are at the heart of both aesthetics and belief.  Insofar as it implies the 
invisible by claiming a surface, the superficial gives dimension to hidden forces – not 
always necessarily supernatural ones – that might best be described as occult.  When 
compared to everyday usage of the word superficial, the dilemma is clear – it is a 
problem, metaphorical in nature, of “surface” versus “depth.”  Poetic figures inevitably 
bring up questions relating to the nature of the body and embodiment, of what constitutes 
an aesthetic form or composition.  This often occurs in psychedelic works; for example, 
in Precipitations: Contemporary American Poetry as Occult Practice, Devin Johnston 
argues that in the mid twentieth century 
poets have engaged the occult in order to rethink agency and subjectivity.  For 
poets such as H.D., Robert Duncan, and James Merrill, the appeal of occultism 
lay not so much in the answers it offered, or the dialectic it sketched, but rather in 
its resistance to systemization and closure. (128) 
 
It is in this resistance to closure through a turn toward the occult or the “enchanted” that 
something as vague as “spirituality” may be aesthetically tracked.  The aesthetics of 
openness have been explored by Umberto Eco in The Open Work and Marjorie Perloff in 
The Poetics of Indeterminacy, but neither explicitly addresses the matter in terms of the 
psychedelic or in a broader historical and political conception (although there is certainly 
much overlap in terms of the aesthetic ideas and implicit argument).  And while there is 
vast discourse about mysticism and poetry, less has been said about works of fiction and 
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prose in this regard.  In all genres and mediums, however, the rethinking of subjectivity 
and agency implied by an aesthetic of openness is entrenched in revaluation of liberal 
political life, as well as in general critique of modernity that characterizes many 
psychedelic works. 
Critiques of the limits of ‘self’ have been central to discussions of modernity and 
post-modernity over the past century (at least), and most discussions within the discourse 
of Political Theology hearken back to the 16th and 17th centuries, to the roots of modern 
government.  It is useful to note that along with the formation of modern forms of 
government there also arises a kind of mythical-spiritualism.  This can be seen in orders 
such as the Rosicrucians, founded by a quasi-historical personages like Christian 
Rosenkreuz (an early example of a westerner receiving esoteric knowledge from the 
east).  Occultism and mysticism create counter-narratives to political foundations that 
intentionally obfuscate meaning, and secret societies build elaborate esoteric systems to 
preserve identities in lineages well into the twentieth century with Aleister Crowley, who 
undoubtedly influences psychedelic aesthetics.   
There are many less occult-like examples of mystics over the years, and a broad 
spectrum of practice emerges, from the divination of the early tarot decks of Italy to the 
more austere “inner light” of George Fox and the Quakers: as above, so below.  While 
such traditions quickly move beyond the scope of this project, I bring these figures up to 
suggest and remind first, that the true roots of the psychedelic tradition in the west must 
be historically aligned within such traditions; and second, that in thinking of mysticism as 
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practice, it is first of all necessary to note its emphasis on individual hermetic and 
divinatory abilities.  This is because the focus on individualism is what makes these 
practices work so well with emerging concepts of liberalism – no matter how superficial.   
In other words, the psychedelic is not merely an amplification of Romanticism; its 
roots are older than that, and probably manifest in early religion itself, even if people like 
William Blake and Emanuel Swedenborg exert profound and lasting influences and 
commonly get referred to in foundational ways.  This only evidences the philosophical 
tendency for the psychedelic aesthetics to deal with conceptions of “humanity.”  Such a 
tendency performs the transcendence of subjectivity. 
At the same time, historical forces cannot be denied.  Political Theological 
discourse has had much to say about “institutional” religions that were once claimed to be 
nullified through “secularization,” by the advent of modern states and privatized with the 
emergence of bourgeois culture and the public sphere.  This is perhaps because it is 
simply easier to see direct relationships to the political by way of institutions than in 
everyday religiosity.  Thus, the discourse has had less to say about more mystical or 
“enchanted” religions, and I believe that this lack is carried-over from the narratives 
aligned with Max Weber’s term, “disenchantment,” a parallel to secularization that the 
discourse so often critiques.   
On the flipside of narratives of disenchantment, mystical and enthusiastic 
religious tendencies have had their share of political influences, both historically and 
contemporarily in the United States, especially with regard to civil rights movements.  
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There is in liberalism an avowal of inherent and ongoing interest in care for the 
individual as an intrinsically precious entity, an entity whose limit-potential is undefined, 
but also an individual who must be made into a political “subject.”  But discursive trends 
have led too quickly to establish the post-1960s trends toward “the spiritual” as simply 
vacant “New Ageism.”  If psychedelic aesthetics track a move away from transcendent 
nation-state authority, one would likely assume that a move away from transcendent 
religion would accompany it.  To lament such a move is really irrelevant except in the 
case that there is an ongoing tendency for deterritorialized subjects to become the most 
violent advocates of a religious enchantment based on affective and anti-rational identity 
affirmation.  The intensity of the violence accompanies a friend-enemy conflict where 
religious fanaticism and citizenship cannot be distinguished in what many thinkers are 
now calling the ‘post-secular world.’   
Claude Lefort has argued regarding “the political” that “the very notion of ‘limits’ 
in fact derives from a desire for an ‘objective’ definition – a desire that lies at the origin 
of the political theory . . . that has developed in the course of our century” (151).  In 
political terms and governance, laws presuppose both subjectivity and objectivity.  The 
subject must be able to be located as citizen or alien within the “objective” space of 
public reality.  And despite much critique of modern subjectivity’s drawbacks, even 
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recently our most prominent liberal thinkers essentially claim the same thing.8  What 
remains necessary, then, is a re-articulation of subjectivity with regard to personhood.  
Again, it is not out of sentiment for the individual; it is because the theoretical 
view that posits the objective is a product of modernism, and it is because modernism 
assumes a subjectivity nurtured by that objective space that individuality must be 
accounted for in a more temporalized way with regard to history.  We know that we do 
not ever truly have access to an objective view, yet we experience as subjects, and it is 
from there that it is practical to start.  To speak of theory in respect to psychedelic 
aesthetics is to assume a collapse between subjectivity and objectivity, transcendence and 
immanence, and a re-articulation of a position after that collapse.  There is no stepping 
outside.  It is more a matter of already being exposed. 
Giorgio Agamben’s aesthetic genealogies and his work on Homo sacer have 
called into question the articulation of subjectivity as citizenship, with important 
implications for political prisoners whose subjectivity is denied in terms of rights and 
democratic process, at least partly because of the “stateless-ness” of international 
                                                
8 What I mean here is the common tendency in liberal thinkers to oversimplify the concept of a “public 
space” for discursive purposes.  This is especially endemic to political discourse: a figure of a neutral space 
is invoked in which political decisions get made.  We argue about what makes a citizen, about who gets to 
belong to and represented within that neutral space, but it is the figure of neutral space itself that 
wrongfully warrants this.  So, for example, in Jurgen Habermas’s dialogue with Joseph Ratzinger, he 
continually refers to what liberal citizens ought to do in translating and allowing religious discourse to enter 
a public space, all the time rhetorically within the frame of neutral, public and “secular” space, ignoring the 
fact that by either historical or spiritual accounts, there is nothing neutral about it.  Habermas undoubtedly 
knows this is a choice and a necessity of dialogue, and he points to this in An Awareness of What it 
Missing, but reductions are nevertheless costly.  
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terrorism.  As Agamben summarizes, some version of the liberal subject remains 
necessary for democracy.  He cites Jurgen Habermas: 
Habermas opposes the thesis of a popular sovereignty that is entirely emancipated 
from a substantial subject-people (constituted by “members of a collectivity who 
are physically present, participating, and involved”) and fully resolved in the 
communicative forms without subject that, according to his idea of publicity 
“regulate the flow of the political formation of public opinion and will.” (The 
Kingdom and the Glory 257) 
 
Here, the post Cold War crises in liberal democratic government reveal a connection to 
continuing problems of dynamically conceiving of subjectivity, citizenship and ‘self,’ 
even if such subjectivity merely instrumentally “regulates the flow” of information.  At 
the same time, Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan write in their introduction to the 
massive collection of essays, Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular 
World:  
Strictly speaking, neither the locus of ‘self’ (often implying self-identity and self-
determination) nor that of ‘understanding’ (with its now cognitive, then 
historicist, culturalist, and hermeneutic overtones) can be of much help where 
religion and the theological are concerned. (3)   
 
The tension between self as political subjectivity and “religion and the theological” 
remains an ongoing problem, solved implicitly by transcendence of self and subjectivity.  
It is no wonder with regard to this that psychedelic aesthetics often refer to practical 
mysticism.  Insofar as mysticism has in its own traditions helped to at least cope – if not 
to solve – problems of subject-object distinction, when coupled with liberal subjectivity, 
mysticism has provided various methods of praxis for maintaining some sort of 
composure in the face of mystery.  It is this praxis that is evidenced in psychedelic 
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aesthetics.  But difficulty arises in avoiding an overly reductive and therefore ineffective 
appeal to mysticism.   
Perhaps the most well-known and philosophically legitimate example of practical 
mysticism can be found within strains of American pragmatism, a philosophy with its 
own ties to Spiritualism in the nineteenth century.  In The Interruption of Eternity: 
Modern Gnosticism and the Origins of the New Religious Consciousness, Carl Raschke 
provides a sobering analysis of American spiritualism in the 1960s and duly notes its 
heritage in the positive thinking of New Thought and Christian Science that was the 
backdrop for William James’s Varieties of Religious Experience.  Writing in the early 
twentieth century, James claimed that “the advance of liberalism, during the past fifty 
years, may fairly be called a victory of healthy-mindedness within the church over the 
morbidness with which the old hell-fire theology was more harmoniously related” (in 
Raschke 205).  As Raschke points out, Gnosticism worked well with American 
liberalism, but what changed in the middle of the twentieth century during the postwar 
years was a generation that had to “come to terms with apocalyptic monsters” (207).  The 
threat of nuclear annihilation, combined with an already limited sense of history, helped 
to create the “now generation.”  The “spiritual” turn of the Beat Generation, with its 
fascination with its own formulations of Eastern religion, really looks like a hodge-podge 
of hedonistic impulses directing a eudaimonia of the moment.  Raschke’s book is 
ultimately a warning against the de-historicizing inherent in Gnosticism.  My theory of 
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psychedelic aesthetics takes this into account by providing an in-depth tracing of the 
European thinking that led up to the ‘psychedelic movement.’ 
But one can also see a different turn toward historicity in later pragmatism.  In 
Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatic terms, following Benedict Spinoza’s call in his 
Theological-Political Treatise for an intellectual elite to help determine scriptural 
meaning – an authority Spinoza thought should not be privatized but protected by the 
government – Rorty develops the idea of the “ironist” intellectual – one who, like 
Spinoza, knows he or she must be capable of a kind of double-speak but also protected 
from people whose lesser interpretive skills will not be able to grasp the perspective 
required by irony.  Freedom of speech again becomes a central political value here, 
especially because conversation determines meaning-context rather than an abstract 
notion such as History.  The right to speech enables and preserves human freedom, but 
even this requires a distinct subject.  It also, according to Rorty (similar to Habermas 
here), necessitates a distinction between public and private if liberalism is to prosper.  As 
Neil Gascoigne summarizes, the danger that Rorty’s ironist presents to society is to be 
“seduced by the idea of a single vision, they allow their ‘search for sacred wisdom’ to 
take ‘precedence over common moral consciousness’ and thus feel no solidarity with 
their ‘fellow humans’” (150).9  The danger is in the production of the enthusiast or 
fanatic, whether religious, patriotic, or some mix of the two.  One must essentially 
                                                
9 Mitchell Aboulafia finds that G. H. Mead is worth looking at in relation to Rorty because Mead “makes 
novelty more mundane than […] Rorty and relates it to the development of reflection and our self-
concepts” (123).  
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separate one’s search for the sacred by privatizing it.  Committed, liberal ironists would 
then, building off of “the sense ‘that persons and cultures…are incarnated vocabularies’ 
[also recognize] that ‘incarnation’ implies the shared capacity to feel pain and suffer 
humiliation” (151).  The result of such a world would be the creation of a “liberal utopia” 
where cultural critics become moral advisers, where philosophy serves practical, 
democratic ends by maintaining a distinction between public private, and “reweaving our 
vocabulary of moral deliberation in order to accommodate new beliefs” (in Gascoigne 
151).  Is it not implied that in “beliefs” here is the ability to accommodate new “sacred 
privacies”?  What would these look like? Is there any way that this process can account 
for the superficiality and danger of Gnosticism that Raschke sees above? Rorty’s thinking 
allows for both a continued necessity for articulating the interests of a self that benefits 
more than the individual through social commitment; this commitment becomes an act of 
faith and faith becomes a necessary element to be discussed in public spheres.   
 Another possible implication of Rorty’s thinking (at least in his earlier work) is 
that public spheres, in being able to keep the “sacred” private, have accomplished the best 
part of Weberian secularization: an ordered and relatively peaceful method of 
cohabitating with people of varying belief systems.  Not only that, the vision includes a 
deeper awareness of diversity of belief accomplished by a broadening of concepts of 
“human,” along with the public-will to end suffering that was previously eclipsed by 
ethnocentrism and limited world-views.  This sounds great, and it is definitely utopic.  Is 
secularism itself utopic? 
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I set Rorty up a bit here, because, like Fox Mulder, the metaphysical detective 
from The X-Files, “I want to believe.”  And yet, in 2013 the distinction between public 
and private is blurry at best; to think in terms of one public is overly reductive and 
inaccurate.  We are warned of affective waves in The Invisible Committee’s The Coming 
Insurrection and ongoing figuring of terrorists as infinite others.  In short, I do not think it 
is merely an act of commitment by the ironist elites to maintain a division between public 
and private that will maintain effective political deliberation.  Rather, as much discourse 
in Political Theology attests, the affective and cognitive needs provided by “spirituality” 
require not only private but also public accommodations, not just in the sense of freedom 
of religion, but in the practical sense that an individual does not easily distinguish ethos 
separated from its more rooted meaning as definition as “custom, manner, place, habit or 
dwelling” because, as subjects, we are more than individuals – even with, as Antonio 
Gramsci would say, “an infinity of traces.”  Nor can humans simply and authentically 
collect their angst in a being-toward-death, if we are, as Rorty suggests, “incarnated 
vocabularies,” or if we are, as Emmanuel Levinas would argue, situated prior to 
consciousness or the ability to make a decision or avowal by an infinite metaphysical 
Other.  Clearly, subject-object distinctions do not really work, and the playing out of the 
failure to make such distinctions characterizes much of the twentieth century cultural 
practices in the West. 
The failure of such distinctions creates a more recent worldview where the gap 
between the ironist elite and the “literal mass” is ambiguous.  As Rorty suggests, 
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liberalism potentially effects a broadened awareness of what humans are and with that a 
social commitment to end human suffering in an ongoing commitment to “freedom.”  
The broadening movement itself dissolves the claims to ironist elitism.  With regard to 
psychedelic aesthetics, “freedom” here is a kind of transcendence to aspire to, a 
“liberation” or moksha, the Sanskrit term for liberation that Aldous Huxley uses as the 
drug of choice for his psychedelic republic in the liberal-utopic novel, Island.  Hent de 
Vries and Lawrence Sullivan suggest that navigating this problem necessitates 
[r]ewriting a certain idea of transcendence (the notions, dimensions, or 
experiences with which “religion” and the “theologico-political” are most often 
identified) in the language of immanence, associated with the history of atomism, 
materialism, naturalism, and pantheism.  The latter traverses the history of 
thought as a heretical countercurrent, of sorts.  Yet this rewriting also implies 
interrogating the historical and systematic pertinence of the very distinction and 
opposition between transcendence and immanence as well. (25) 
 
This task of rewriting transcendence is something I think overlaps the task of much 
current theory, a task I suggest psychedelic aesthetics takes on, and what this project 
seeks to do as well. 
 
A Note on Method 
The method of this work performs part of my argument: By looking at 
psychedelic works, largely from the late fifties to the early seventies, we can track a 
broadening of liberal commitment and critique of subjectivity and citizenship that will be 
useful in current political deliberation while simultaneously participating in a cultural 
recovery process valued by liberal political theologians.  My aim is to show that a 
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commitment to spirituality manifests itself in psychedelic works and thoughts, that this 
commitment extends the idea of subjectivity beyond not only the human body but beyond 
one human’s lifespan.  Such broadened conceptions attempt to develop a working 
definition of human life that is both bodied and disembodied at various points, a version 
of life that can be seen in eschatological notions of culture as metempsychosis and 
“reincarnation.”   
Let me stress that reincarnation as a concept here is used mostly as a metaphor, 
but a practical one at that.  Its fictive and poetic qualities afford conversational openings 
for practical deliberation.  The metaphor is indeed in keeping with ego death and dying in 
the psychedelic experience.  In other words, the concept should effect more than a 
particular theological doctrine or belief system.  By developing an aesthetic use of 
reincarnation through the study of concrete works, I aim to aid an open-ended, liberal 
political discourse concerning the possibilities of dynamic selfhood and subjectivity, 
opening up discursive channels between bio-politics and belief.  Aesthetically, treating 
works as incarnations performs what Richard Sennett in The Conscience of the Eye 
suggests as necessity – to have a God who ages or is capable of change.  What would this 
mean? 
Superficiality, as I have said, is especially pervasive in the study of anything 
psychedelic.  Any depth of subjective experience, no matter how earnestly felt, easily 
becomes cliché.  Therefore, incorporating such subjective experience into public 
discourse requires navigating what may seem to be immature, surface arguments.  In this 
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work I am particularly concerned with showing how psychedelic artistic works, mainly 
literary and musical, perform a kind of habitus that significantly contributes to dynamic 
conceptions selfhood.  When looked at as a broad cultural style along with the theoretical 
perspectives of psychedelic luminaries such as Aldous Huxley, psychedelic aesthetics 
imply a set of liberal values that critique and re-imagine a kind of subjectivity fashioned 
by Enlightenment thought.  It is not enough to simply call this critique ‘post-modern’ or 
to jump into definitions by historical period.  Aligning my argument with the discursive 
trend of Political Theology is a way to show that the critique of subjectivity in 
psychedelic aesthetics gets right to the heart of problems relating to citizenship and 
governmentality that scholars have recently taken interest in as a reaction to perceived 
crises in liberalism.  These discussions have tried to understand liberalism’s problems as 
the result of Enlightenment ideals that did not adequately attend to cognitive and 
affective needs of people with regard to metaphysics and religion.  Instead, a pervasive 
narrative of secularization, coupled with a progressive sense of the unfolding of history, 
took hold institutionally and in-turn modified and shaped people’s behavior – indeed, 
such narratives continue to do so, conditioning habitus over time.  Insofar as these 
practices are developed culturally through habits over-time, they manifest an 
environment for receiving and transmitting ideas and practices that transcend both 
individuals and generations.  For this reason, I claim that this process works like 
traditional conceptions of metempsychosis or “transmigration of souls.”  
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How do we talk of social “selves”?  What does “American” mean in “American 
Literature”?  How engaged with his or her ethnic and cultural roots ought the 
“cosmopolitan” be?  When we look at an individual like Aldous Huxley as a grand 
theorist for the psychedelic movement, there are definite points of contact where Huxley 
seems to causally shape history.  This is true, for example, in his influence on Timothy 
Leary’s adaptation of The Tibetan Book of the Dead reformulated as a manual for self-
discovery in The Psychedelic Experience.  Current scholars too easily write off Huxley’s 
influences because there is not enough serious attention given to aesthetics.  He is read as 
a “science-fiction” author and public intellectual.  In the United States, Brave New World 
is often assigned as high-school reading material, thus shaping a population that regards 
the writer’s work as immature (if they read him at all, it is likely when they themselves 
were immature).  Occasionally scholars have written concerning bio-politics and Brave 
New World, but with no account of his later psychedelic work.  He is thus often regarded 
as an “armchair” intellectual from a simpler time when being a generalist was acceptable.  
In literary study, Huxley has been artistically outshined by his high-modernist peers like 
Eliot and Joyce, whose attention to language and philology Huxley satirized as archaic 
and limited.  As an attempt to rethink Huxley’s influence, I cast him as not only a theorist 
of the psychedelic but as a political theologian. 
In a way, this work could easily be a monograph on Huxley himself, but it would 
do little to illuminate the disciplinary oversights mentioned above.  My focus on Huxley 
in later chapters will be to show a writer whose work reveals an inter-textual reworking 
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and development of a social philosopher who built his theories, not through armchair 
speculation, but through truly erudite readings of European and Asian religious and 
political histories.  If his later work is written off as too contrived or merely as “self-
help,” it is because his audience lacks the scope worthy of seeing what research he based 
his opinions on.  Huxley is ahead of the discussion with regard to Political Theology and 
a re-imagination of Enlightenment subjectivity, the same way he was ahead of the game 
with regard to the notion of human standardization and pharmaceutically-enhanced 
social-norming and bio-politics in Brave New World.   
 It should go without saying that theories are distorted and must be rethought in 
practice.  Huxley’s theories – like those of his contemporaries such as Herbert Marcuse – 
were not always understood by the people they influenced.  In casting my glance back at 
the psychedelic movement in terms of Political Theology, I am less concerned with 
tracking specific deviations or fulfillments of such theories themselves and more 
interested in showing through philosophical, literary and musical examples the social 
implementation and dispersion of ideas that moved through luminary thinkers.  In this 
sense, there may not be a lot that is historically ‘new’ in this study.  While Kuhn’s idea of 
“paradigm shift” or C. Wright Mills’ early use of “post-modern” are interesting, they are 
so in the context of an entire cultural texture.  I am more interested in examining the 
ethical deliberations and questions aesthetically present in affective works as the 
instantiation of vibrant matter than in a traditional ideological critique that would “adopt” 
a view from the outside.  With this, I turn to the layout of the book.    
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What is to Follow 
Chapter Two traces the idea of subjectivity through what I call the European 
imaginary and demonstrates emerging critiques of subjectivity with thinkers Antonin 
Artaud, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Blanchot, and Herbert Marcuse.  I then relate these 
thinkers directly to psychedelic aesthetics in Abbie Hoffman’s activism. In Chapter 
Three, I address the ongoing theme of a return to nature and the perennial.  I also discuss 
its relationship to conceptions of childhood innocence in the nostalgic “state” of nature 
that permeates so many psychedelic works. I continue to develop the critiques of the 
European imaginary through a discussion of failure present in avant-garde art.  I then 
ground the saturated, multivalent quality expressed by psychedelic aesthetics with 
analysis of material by The Fugs, a psychedelic folk group led by poet Ed Sanders.  
Chapter Four looks at literary criticism and theoretical models of the psychedelic 
experience.  Chapter Five then begins looking at how psychedelic literary works move 
toward a broadened sense of citizenship.  After an in-depth analysis of key novels of the 
era, I come to the conclusion that even after more extreme performances of psychedelic 
aesthetics in the literature of the 1960s, Aldous Huxley remains the psychedelic theorist 
par excellence.  Chapter Six then looks at a large portion of Huxley’s work, both fiction 
and non-fiction, to establish Huxley as a forgotten Political Theologian.  I then conclude 
in Chapter Seven with more contemporary issues in law and Political Theology implied 
by my descriptions of psychedelic aesthetics.   















CHAPTER TWO: EUROPEAN INFLUENCES  
If it is enough to pronounce the words religious or mystic to be taken for a 
churchwarden or an illiterate priest outside a Buddhist temple, at best only good 
for turning prayer wheels, this merely signifies and condemns our incapacity to 
derive the full import from our words and our profound ignorance of the spirit of 
synthesis and analogy. (47) 
 
-Antonin Artaud, The Theater and Its Double 
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The European influences on psychedelic aesthetics are rooted in critiques of 
modern European culture and politics, as well as in commerce and complex interactions 
with the East.  The use of entheogens in religious rituals is as ancient as the Rig Veda, 
and scholars like Paul Devereux in The Long Trip: A Prehistory of Psychedelia make 
compelling use for entheogens in ancient European and English anthropological sites.  
Many scholars and “specialist” writers trace drug use in both sacred and profane forms to 
ancient societies around the world.  In High Society: The Central Role of Mind-Altering 
Drugs in History, Science and Culture, Mike Jay notes that animals used plants for “the 
deliberate use of intoxication” (11-12) before humans existed.  More recently, Tom 
Froese et al. have argued that in early humans 
altered states could have significantly influenced the operation of the nervous sys- 
tem, especially by temporarily decoupling the autonomous activity of the brain 
from the usual environmental influences. This switch from immediate 
sensorimotor sense-making, which is normally directed toward the external here 
and now, to a more internally mediated, decoupled sense-making of mental and 
bodily structures could thereby have facilitated the creation and diversification of 
abstract cognition and symbolic practices. (210) 
 
But in terms of psychedelia, it is really in the nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
social science research that a widespread awareness of those ancient practices became 
available to Europeans.  This occurred alongside deep cultural critique and nostalgia for 
pre-political and pre-alienated human life.  It is thus a received body of knowledge that 
shapes the cultural explosions related to psychedelia in the 1960s.  We can begin looking 
at these influences by tracing the political power of psychedelic aesthetics present in the 
activist literature of the period.   
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While much civil rights activism during the 1950s and 1960s was organized by 
religious leaders and therefore embodies political-theological themes, not all activism in 
the 1960s can be called “psychedelic.”  Abbie Hoffman’s brand of theatrical activism is 
certainly exemplary of the latter.  And while Hoffman is indeed a central figure in the 
1960s, it would be an oversimplification to think of him as an architect of the aesthetics; 
his role was more mercurial and his voice was louder because he was tapping into 
something larger.  His work draws on European aesthetic and social philosophy while 
also using tropes already existing in psychedelic literature.  This chapter traces some 
direct influences of European thought on Hoffman. 
 In Woodstock Nation: A Talk-Rock Album, written just after the Woodstock 
festival in August 1969, Hoffman recounts his role through the narrative trope of an acid 
trip.  The “trip” trope had been popularized by Jack Kerouac’s On the Road in the late 
1950s, inspiring the performed “electric” trips of Ken Kesey and his Merry Pranksters in 
the 1960s, immortalized in Tom Wolfe’s Electric Kool-Aid Acid Tests (1968).  The 
metaphor of a trip – not just “travel” – became a life-performance for the youth during 
the 1960s. The runaway phenomenon was a public issue, even present in the Beatles’ 
“She’s Leaving Home.”  In The Making of a Counter Culture (1968), Theodor Roszak 
referred to FBI reports of “over ninety thousand runaways in 1966,” mostly from middle 
class backgrounds (33).  Many of these youths from advanced industrial countries fled to 
the Far East, resulting in a sense of deterritorialization beyond nation-states.  In this 
lineage, the Woodstock festival in August of 1969 became a destination point for a trip, a 
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pilgrimage for a “spiritual” journey where the journey is as much a part of the process as 
the destination.  Abbie Hoffman’s memoir draws on these existing deterritorialized 
themes, coding the event as a “heavy trip” (5), and setting up a dichotomy between PIG 
NATION and WOODSTOCK NATION.   
Hoffman wrote the book at least partly as a public relations move to support his 
indictment in the Chicago Seven trial, which was to begin a little more than a month after 
Woodstock.  In Woodstock Nation, Hoffman affects the personal tone of an insider, 
directly addressing the reader, as if he is letting the reader in on something, yet the book 
is entirely personal narrative and self-centered.  He presents himself stylistically through 
rhetoric of personal continuity that is deliberately constructed: the more egocentric and 
particular he is, the more ‘real’ he seems.  As Phil Auslander has noticed, continuity is a 
trait among psychedelic rock musicians through their presenting “personae that [sic] was 
not dramatically different from the people one could see on the streets” (14).  No matter 
how elaborately attired one might be, the convention was for there to be continuity 
between who one was both on stage and off stage.  Auslander also notes that  
Psychedelic music, often fueled by LSD and other hallucinogenic drugs, was 
intended primarily as an internal, individualized experience for both musicians 
and audience.  All references to psychedelic rock as theatrical and Dionysian 
aside, psychedelic rock musicians appeared quite introspective on stage.  They 
generally focused their attention on each other or their instruments, especially 
while playing a solo, and did not play to the audience extensively. (16)   
 
Given Auslander’s remarks, it may seem odd at first that Hoffman would call his book a 
“talk-rock album” and have Vintage books, his publisher, stylize the book as if it were an 
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album with liner notes.  But like his fellow Chicago Seven defendant, Jerry Rubin, 
Hoffman was deliberately presenting media theorist Marshall McLuhan’s idea that “the 
medium is the message.”10  Hoffman tells his readers what music he has been listening to 
and says, “If I hear anything good, I’ll get it in somehow, but, dig, it’s hard quotin words 
from records” because of publishing laws (6).  Hoffman’s attention to the demands of the 
publishing business is hardly anarchic, and he seems willing to play the game to get the 
audience he wants.   
Consumption of certain aesthetic products operates as audience-identification for 
Hoffman, and dissemination of cultural knowledge about that material constructs the 
virtual space of the “Woodstock Nation.”  Similarly, Hoffman’s consumption of LSD, 
which frames the book’s narrative, codes him as an insider; and the reader is expected to 
understand the narrative structure itself as insider knowledge in the lineage of the 
“counter” cultural tradition.  Through this process, Hoffman politicizes the event and the 
discursive space around the festival through a friend-enemy distinction, at times calling 
for all out war against PIG NATION, at other times proposing steps toward a truce that 
includes a redrawing of political boundaries and sovereignty.  He attempts to “construct 
the map” (4) through a virtual and cultural awareness (though at times localized in 
different parts of various cities – Haight Ashbury, the East Village, etc.), eventually 
coding this new “nation” by identification with aesthetic products and sensibilities, 
                                                
10 Rubin teamed up with, Quentin Fiore, the designer of McLuhan’s The Medium is the Massage, for his 
books Just Do It and We Are Everywhere.  No designer is given credit in the first edition of Hoffman’s 
book.  
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calling his book a “non-book” and a “talk-rock album.”  He sets up the chapter titles as 
“song titles” – at every point making the book itself a staged cultural performance.  
According to Auslander’s comments about psychedelic rockers, such a performance was 
not hypocritical so long as Hoffman was the same person both on and off stage. 
Hoffman’s book culminates onstage with a battle between Hoffman and The Who 
at Woodstock.  In doing so he disrupts the “internal performance” of the psychedelic 
rockers by making an overt political message.  Pete Townsend of The Who hits Hoffman 
over the head with his guitar because Hoffman had seized the microphone to spread the 
message to the audience to “free John Sinclair,” a man who had been sentenced to ten 
years in prison for being in possession of two joints of marijuana and thus become a 
political prisoner (143).  Earlier in the festival, Hoffman had apparently succeeded in 
getting the microphone long enough to say something like this: 
The Politics of the event is Pot. Dig it! John Sinclair’s in fuckin prison for ten 
years for two fuckin joints.  We ought to bust John or all this peace and music 
don’t mean…CLICK  
Well I didn’t give a shit if they cut the mike off.  I got it out anyway. (142) 
   
Despite getting knocked on the head by Townsend, Hoffman claims to love The Who’s 
music:  
This battle symbolizes my amity-enmity attitude toward that particular rock group 
and the whole rock world in general.  Clearly I love their music and sense in it the 
energy to liberate millions of minds.  On the other hand, I feel compelled to 
challenge their role in the community, to try and crack their plastic dome. (5) 
 
Hoffman’s antics were intentional and planned, despite the narrative frame of his story as 
being fueled by a drug-induced frenzy and a “bad trip.”  The trip is a rhetorical device for 
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audience identification, allowing for a deterritorialized sense of both space and time.  
Hoffman writes: 
Mark Twain once wrote that the only people that should use the word “we” are 
editors, kings, and persons with tapeworms.  Yet there is a way of integrating 
your own ego trip with a sense of community, with a concept of “we.”  I feel a 
sense of this most strongly in these massive events, in what [Antonin] Artaud 
refers to as the “festival in the streets.” (7)  
 
Hoffman also opens his book with a quotation from “Repressive Tolerance” by Herbert 
Marcuse, whom Hoffman had studied under at Brandeis University.  Artaud and Marcuse 
are two direct influences of European continental aesthetic philosophy on psychedelic 
aesthetics.  Both should be treated in detail. 
Marcuse’s 1965 essay, “Repressive Tolerance,” dedicated to his students at 
Brandeis, opens as an examination of tolerance in advanced industrial society with the 
claim that 
the realization of the objective of tolerance would call for tolerance toward 
prevailing policies, attitudes, opinions, and the extension of tolerance to policies, 
attitudes, and opinions which are outlawed or suppressed. In other words, today 
tolerance appears again as what it was in its origins, at the beginning of the 
modern period -- a partisan goal, a subversive liberating notion and practice. 
Conversely, what is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance today, is in many of its 
most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppression. 
 
Two forms of tolerance exist: one subversive, the other oppressive.  Marcuse is then 
quick to assert that 
The author is fully aware that, at present [the mid 1960s], no power, no authority, 
no government exists which would translate liberating tolerance into practice, but 
he believes that it is the task and duty of the intellectual to recall and preserve 
historical possibilities which seem to have become utopian possibilities--that it is 
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his task to break the concreteness of oppression in order to open the mental space 
in which this society can be recognized as what it is and does. 
 
Abbie Hoffman clearly takes it upon himself to carry on Marcuse’s intellectual task and 
duty, but he attempts it as an aesthetic task.  The Marcuse quotation that opens 
Woodstock Nation comes from a point in the essay where Marcuse is laying out the 
aesthetic “origins of the modern period,” – with reference to Baudelaire in particular – 
and the dialectical idea that a “benevolent neutrality” in consumer culture dilutes the 
revolutionary potential of Art in the same way that tolerance11 as a liberal ideal becomes 
a dogmatic mode and, ceasing to resist oppression becomes the tool of oppression.   
Art stands against history, withstands history which has been the history of 
oppression, for art subjects reality to laws other than the established ones: to the 
laws of the Form which creates a different reality--negation of the established one 
even where art depicts the established reality. But in its struggle with history, art 
subjects itself to history: history enters the definition of art and enters into the 
distinction between art and pseudo-art. Thus it happens that what was once art 
becomes pseudo-art. Previous forms, styles, and qualities, previous modes of 
protest and refusal cannot be recaptured in or against a different society. 
 
By invoking Marcuse and setting up his book as an aesthetic object, Hoffman is 
attempting to present a work that resists becoming “pseudo art” through a banal 
appropriation by both the PIG NATION and the ROCK EMPIRE (Hoffman 5).  He reacts 
to Marcuse’s view of tolerance as serving oppression and performs ‘being obnoxious’ 
                                                
11 Marcuse’s discussion here is particularly relevant to Spinoza’s desire for tolerance in the Theologico-
Political Treatise.  Cf. also Hobbes in Leviathan on the State’s interpretive right to scriptural authority.  My 
point being that there is a discussion lurking behind Marcuse pertaining to the role of religion in the public 
sphere. 
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and is at times violently intolerant12 as a new aesthetic.  What is easily masked here is the 
element of history, especially as it relates to European notions of modern subjectivity 
informing Marcuse’s thinking.  Hoffman indeed adopts a European avant-garde aesthetic 
that has a militant tradition of trying to make something new, but his deterritorialized 
aesthetics also allow him to synthesize European thinking (Marcuse and Artaud) with a 
nineteenth-century American liberal tradition (Twain).  Art and culture become embodied 
in the performance of living authentically.  This leads Hoffman by the end of his book to 
the conclusion that many “lefties” took off from the Woodstock after it began raining, 
“still thinking it was a festival, or worse, a concentration camp.  Those that stayed are 
better for it, including me” (133).  He goes on:  
When you learn to survive in a hostile environment, be it in the tear gas parks of 
Chicago or the mud slopes of WOODSTOCK NATION, you learn a little more of 
the universal puzzle, you learn a little more about yourself, and you learn about 
the absurdity of any analysis at all.  It’s only when you get to the End of Reason 
can you begin to enter WOODSTOCK NATION.  It’s only when you cease to 
have any motives at all can you comprehend the magnitude of the event . . . 
nobody knew where the fuck anything was, not even WOODSTOCK NATION.  
Like Pete Seeger said, “If you were gonna join it, you had to join it by yourself.”  
Figuring out how to get in and out of the whole thing was a problem as old as 
Western Civilization and as modern as traffic jam scenes in Jean-Luc Godard’s 
“Weekend.”  You entered the End of Reason to be sure. (133)    
 
Hoffman’s early attempt to construct a map delineating between PIG NATION and 
WOODSTOCK NATION fails as the concept of WOODSTOCK NATION is 
deterritorialized throughout the book.  The avant-gardist aesthetic of newness performs 
                                                
12 I would include here also Hoffman’s conflicted relationship with identity-based civil rights groups like 
the Women’s Movement and the Black Panthers. 
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this failure as a theme by itself exploding beyond a history of the Enlightenment or 
modernity and reaching back to the beginning of Western Civilization.  American folk 
musicians like Seeger collide with French New Wave auteurs.  Comprehension requires 
an initial letting go of analysis, a porous opening to enchantment, and re-entry after the 
“heavy trip” that leaves one with much to process.   
This tension between expansive notions of history and the perennial, present in 
Marcuse’s thinking above with relation to art and history, are made acute in psychedelic 
aesthetics.  In attempts to recover what “happened” in the 1960s, it is easy to forget that 
the ideas inspiring well-known figures like Hoffman were coming from continental 
philosophers, and that in the “End of Reason” there is a return to enchantment.  In his 
1995 “Introduction” to the 1960s classic, The Making of a Counter Culture, Theodore 
Roszak writes, 
In the sixties, psychedelic experience was intended to cleanse the doors of 
perception so that everything might be seen as holy in a culture where it seemed 
that nothing about the human soul or the natural world was any longer sacred.  
This is not a Reality Principle that supports the official objectives of modern life. 
(xxvi)  
 
In his preface to the original edition, Roszak precedes Hoffman, saying that “the interests 
of our college-age and adolescent young in the psychology of alienation, oriental 
mysticism, psychedelic drugs, and communitarian experiments” belong in a tradition of 
radicalism going back to the seventeenth century.  Roszak is “quite aware that this 
constellation has much maturing to do before its priorities fall into place and before any 
well-developed social cohesion grows up around it” (xl).  The aspects of enchantment as 
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they relate to political theology need more attention than has been given in a frame of 
secularization as pushing away from and diluting religiosity.   
By looking at some enchanted aspects of that tradition here, I am seeking to 
recover a discourse of enchantment in order to see how that enchantment plays a role in 
psychedelic aesthetics’ sense of deterritorialized citizenship and reconfiguring of the 
Nation State in an emerging ‘post-secular’ world.  In order to understand where Hoffman 
and the massive youth movement orient toward deterritorialized enchantment, it is 
necessary to look at some European influences.  In what follows, I situate some of the 
European philosophical and aesthetic roots important to psychedelic aesthetics in the 
thinking of Antonin Artaud and Herbert Marcuse.  Beginning with Artaud, I develop a 
description of the European phantasy structure that helps to construct the modern idea of 
subjectivity and self.   
  
Earlier European Roots 
The European roots of psychedelic aesthetics occur in critiques of what 
philosophers call the “subjective turn,” which has been broadly historicized as a turn 
toward accounting for individualism and emerging discussions of human rights and 
liberal nation states.  While tracing such roots is in itself a huge task, my framing falls in 
line with Jerome B. Schneewind’s history of moral philosophy, The Invention of 
Autonomy, and Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age.  Schneewind traces the emergence of the 
concept of self-governance and particularly Immanuel Kant’s original concept of 
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autonomy.  I agree with Schneewind’s claim that “conceptions of morality as self-
governance . . . often thought to result from a major effort by Enlightenment thinkers to 
bring about a secularized society” are highly suspect and overly reductive (8).  I also 
agree with Charles Taylor’s tracing of the development of an “Immanent Frame” as 
characteristic of modernity and his implication that just because God has become for 
humans in post-industrial society merely “one choice among many” does not mean that 
people have given up religious enchantment or are in the process of leaving it behind.  
Religion remains a powerful rhetorical force to be dealt with publicly willy-nilly.  
Secularist frames superimpose an Enlightenment notion of progress, itself informed by 
Christian Protestantism, a fracturing of that culture.  Even in secularist attempts to negate 
religion, they therefore inherently frame it in terms of European religious strife, but 
strictly speaking, enchantment never disappears completely with the advent of 
modernism, despite goals and claims of secularization.  Psychedelic aesthetics purge the 
desire for “enchantment” repressed by narratives of modernization and secularization by 
publicly accounting for excessive aspects of spirituality.   
Despite enchantment’s ongoing critique of modernization, however, and because 
psychedelic works like Hoffman’s above are conscious of cultural history, it does make 
sense sometimes to refer to “re-enchantment,” but only in a ‘post-secular’ frame.  The 
works informed by history reveal a nostalgic “looking-back” to a time before things went 
terribly wrong, but as I will argue, nostalgia is itself a product of modernity.  The purpose 
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of my discussion of European roots here, and the necessity for such broad historical 
coverage, then, is to highlight longstanding versions of enchantment as social critique.   
What emerged as psychedelic aesthetics in the 1960s was not completely new in 
thought; it was just disseminated more widely and with less orthodoxy and austerity.  
Even so, it was still the product of twentieth-century politics.  The two World Wars that 
destabilized European Empires were, as Aldous Huxley theorized in The Grey Eminence, 
the product of political-theological battles in Europe during the Thirty Years War.  
Fascist aesthetics, such as futurism and what Walter Benjamin called National 
Socialism’s “aestheticization of politics,” attempted to overcome history.  Along with 
destruction of political regimes all over Europe, longstanding critiques of modernism and 
autonomous subjectivity came to a foreground as alternative ways to exist socially.  As 
the critique of this largely European social construction moved across the Atlantic, it 
became radicalized in the United States, partly because, despite its status as a modern 
nation state, the United States were never as “disenchanted” as European thinkers like 
Max Weber had claimed.13  The European nostalgia for the pre-political state of nature, 
for a return to un-alienated and un-modern, which characterizes so much of Romantic 
thought, works differently in the United States, where religion and modern subjectivity 
                                                
13 Mark Twain, invoked by Hoffman above, is an excellent example.  Even if The Adventures of Tom 
Sawyer is taken in isolation, enchantment figures into all strata of society in absurd ways, and Tom’s 
mastery of enchantment, his ability to spoof others, is exactly what constructs him as the ideal liberal 
subject.  One need only look to church scenes in The Simpsons to see this social parody alive and well in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.  Parody of enchantment means enchantment is still there.  
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developed a different sort of “Self.”  Aesthetically, however, the forms largely derived 
from Europe, such as the novel, transferred the sociology of Europe to the States. 
As Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus suggests, the representation of Self 
figures a “life lived,” as in a developmental progression; this is aesthetically articulated in 
nineteenth-century literature as the Bildungsroman or experience novel.14  Nineteenth 
century aesthetics had worked to present the image of a “life lived” that culminated in a 
disciplinary model.  In tension with this aesthetic was the ecstatic disruption of that linear 
progression.  The well-known Romantic era aesthetic term for this is of course the 
‘sublime,’ which can be characterized as a particular way of understanding human 
potentiality.  As the ecstatic sublime became hypostasized in the Bildungsroman the 
European ‘self’ became its own subject.15  Similarly, the nineteenth century European 
social science of Durkheim sought to explain the ‘life-lived’ of man from ancient to 
modern times.  It was in accounting for the early part of “man’s life” that the ancients 
became associated with childhood, superstition, and nature whereas civilized, modern 
man became characterized as alienated from it. 
Combined with the development of the autonomous subjectivity, a ‘life lived’ 
could be abstracted and quantified.  In this frame, for example, we could put Sigmund 
Freud into a cultural context where his relegation of the ecstatic to the unconscious 
                                                
14 Bourdieu’s lectures on Flaubert in The Field of Cultural Production exemplify his method in relation to 
literature from this period. 
 
15 For the sake of brevity here I will include England as part of “Europe,” but it should be noted that the 
tradition of Empiricism and Darwin’s impact changed the way enchantment was figured in English 
Literature.  This distinction will be more apparent in later chapters dealing with Aldous Huxley. 
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amounts to the social repression of enchantment in favor of a disciplined ‘self.’  
Everything gets internalized in favor of positing a social construction of ‘self’ and its 
essential features.  Psychedelic aesthetics, then, ultimately articulate revised notions of 
subjectivity against this European phantasy structure by drawing on alternate traditions of 
enchantment.  If psychedelic aesthetics are truly “mind-manifesting,” it is the cultural 
perception of internal subject, of the “prison house of the mind”16 that is manifested 
along with an individual’s temporarily disintegrated ego.  To concretize this, I will show 
how two Europeans: Artaud and Marcuse come to shape the aesthetics in Abbie 
Hoffman’s activism. 
 
Artaud and Enchantment 
Writing in the late 1930s, Antonin Artaud demands in The Theater and Its Double 
that “the modern humanistic and psychological theater” be abandoned, “in order to 
recover the religious and mystic preference of which our theater has completely lost the 
sense” (46).  For him, this “true” mystic preference has been diluted by modern religious 
institutions (as in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter).  In the same way, 
bourgeois culture and modernity has, for him, anaesthetized feeling in Europe.  This has 
resulted in a “plague” which can only be answered by a “theater of cruelty.”  Artaud’s 
                                                
16 David Lovekin, in Technique, Discourse and Consciousness, has pointed out that the well-worn term 
‘prison house’ was a rather poetic translation by Erich Heller of Nietzsche’s concept of the constraint of 
language.  It was picked up by Frederic Jameson and widely disseminated as a meme among scholars 
(209).  I have obviously broadened the term to apply to not just language but the mind to get at the affective 
and extra-linguistic aspects of the aesthetics.  For an updating of language theory in relationship to this, see 
Gunther Kress’s Multimodality.  
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“cruelty” attempts to present a materialized notion of aesthetics as a critique of European 
“culture,” which he sees as overly transcendent, abstract and autonomous.  He writes, 
“What is most important, it seems to me, is not so much to defend a culture whose 
existence has never kept a man from going hungry, as to extract, from what is called 
culture, ideas whose compelling force is identical with that hunger” (7).  In a way, 
Artaud’s is a cultural recovery project that extends pre-culturally, to primordial human 
society.  He has built a narrative of human history upon the sociological solutions that a 
thinker like Emile Durkheim had proposed in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life to 
categorical “apriorism” and positivistic empiricism (21).  Social science, like the 
Bildungsroman, narrates a development of social construction, but anti-modernists like 
Artaud take the idea of essence not as a point of “pure” data on which to build a scientific 
discipline to investigate human life.  Rather, Artaud, takes the “essence” of the 
“primitive” as more original and less diluted human practice.  He turns the idea of 
development on its head.  Although primitivism as an aesthetic sensibility informed the 
surrealists with whom Artaud was briefly involved in the 1920s, Artaud left the group 
partly because of his inability to combine art and communist politics, which was 
becoming increasingly more present among other surrealists like Andre Breton.  Another 
reason for the break was due to an issue of La Revolution Surrealiste that Artaud wrote 
most of himself and themed The End of the Christian Era.  The issue openly attacked the 
Pope and praised the Dalai Lama (though later he was just as critical of Buddhists), 
calling them “filthy Europeans” (Barber 33-34).  But Artaud’s call to return to primordial 
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religion is best captured by his writings about Tarahumara Indians in Mexico, with whom 
he was exposed to peyote rites in the late 1930s, collected under the title The Peyote 
Dance.  According to Artaud’s account of the Tarahumara, under the influence of peyote, 
one meets Ciguri, who helps one to determine his or her true self distinct from God.  He 
says the Tarahumara discuss Ciguri reverence and terror: “the word awakens in them that 
sense of the sacred which European consciousness has lost, and this is the root of all our 
misfortunes, for here people no longer respect anything” (Peyote 22).  Later in the work, 
Artaud associates the ritual with Christ: 
And it would appear that the purpose of the Peyote Dance, originally a Rite 
designed to reveal the teachings of the Plant given to man by Jesus Christ, was to 
invite the human creature to arrive at consciousness.  For without help he cannot 
make up his mind to it. (77) 
 
He associates the ritual with Plato’s discussion of Atlantis and goes on to say, “man today 
is unclean and impure.  He cannot distinguish between the base and the Sublime, between 
eroticism and Poetry.”  From these experiences, and from his experiences with 
Cambodian and Balinese dancers discussed in The Theater and Its Double, Artaud 
develops his aesthetic idea of the Theatre of Cruelty, which would according to him 
perform true poetry.  In order to accomplish his task, Artaud’s theatre must incorporate 
all senses, gestures, and actions.  It must, like the psychedelic aesthetics that emerge 
later, be a theatre saturated with meaning.   
The theatre for Artaud is meant to ward off the “plague” of European culture.  
There is also something almost bio-political in Artaud’s conception of the plague.  It is 
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passed like a disease, but it is constructed by humans.  Moreover, the cure is not found in 
something new.  Rather, Artaud insists on “the idea of culture-in-action, of culture 
growing within us like a new organ, a sort of second breath; and on civilization as an 
applied culture controlling our subtlest actions, a presence of mind” (The Theater 8).  It is 
a matter of something deep in genetic transference, but Artaud collapses biological 
evolution with resurrection.  This ‘second breath’ alludes to a cultural metempsychosis, 
to a return to a more primeval state recovered through an emerging awareness.  The 
primeval state includes one’s spiritual double, which Europeans have lost according to 
Artaud: 
There exists among the Tarahumara Indians the tradition of metempsychosis; and 
it is the loss of their Double which they dread above all.  Not to be aware of what 
one’s Double is, is to risk losing it.  It is to risk a kind of abstract fall, beyond 
physical space, a wandering through the high planetary regions of the 
disembodied human principle. (Peyote Dance 10) 
 
Artaud writes in The Theater and Its Double that in its current incarnation, “a cultivated 
‘civilized’ man is regarded as a person instructed in systems, a person who thinks in 
forms, signs, representations – a monster whose faculty of deriving thoughts from acts, 
instead of identifying acts with thoughts, is developed to an absurdity.”  It is the 
constructed nature of current civilization that Artaud aligns with a distance from the 
divine and from authentic behavior.  Culture is “an exclusively human” faculty that has 
infected and contaminated that which should have remained divine in humans: “far from 
believing that man invented the supernatural and the divine, I think it is man’s age-old 
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intervention which has ultimately corrupted the divine within him.”  For Artaud, re-
enchantment and doubling is necessary. 
At least part of the intervention that Artaud writes of is an apparatus of 
autonomous subjectivity characteristic of Kantian morality and simultaneously Kantian 
aesthetics.  As J. B. Schneewind points out, Kant claims that humans self-impose 
morality, constructing a motive to obey:  
Kant speaks of agents who are morally self-governed.  He took this term from 
political thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in which it was used 
in discussions of the idea of states as self-governing entities. (483)   
 
While Schneewind points out that self-governance conceptually can be traced back as far 
as St. Paul, he also argues that Kant’s take in applying it to an autonomous subject is 
entirely new and original for the late 1700s.17  At the heart of Artaud’s critique of 
bourgeois culture is a critique of an aesthetics of subjectivity whereby an autonomous 
subject acts as microcosm for the self-governed State.  State and autonomous subject, by 
being intimately tied together, occupy the same territory, and it is this ability to imagine 
one’s self as within a State that gives rise to national identity.  Artaud’s critique of 
modern subjectivity is simultaneously a critique of modern political States.  
While this sentiment in Artaud may seem strictly in line with the tradition of 
liberal and Romantic thought – with its emphasis on humans being born in a state of 
nature inherently more innocent and closer to the divine, with the alienation from that 
                                                
17 Thus, in Political-Theological discourse there has been a massive return to examinations of St. Paul’s 
writing.   
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state of nature by industrial progress – it is important to see that Artaud’s critique is not 
simply Marxist or Romantic.  His is a lament for a perceived loss of enchantment, due to 
an economic and instrumental replacing of enchantment by a version of “culture” 
abstracted from life’s motivational force, which he aligns with magic. “No matter how 
loudly we clamor for magic in our lives,” he writes: “we are really afraid of pursuing an 
existence entirely under its sign” (9).  For Karl Marx, the often misquoted line about 
religion being “the opiate of the masses” refers not to the masses being duped by religion, 
but seeking a true solace in it because of their destitute material conditions.  Artaud, 
however, following thinkers like Emile Durkheim, is after something more distant than a 
history of materiality and economic struggle.  Artaud is not getting at something 
humanistic.  He calls for a re-enchantment in the face of the religious “disenchantment” 
and skepticism of the twentieth century, what had been introduced by a twentieth-century 
strain of Marxism in Max Weber’s work as instrumental reason.   
 
Weber and Heidegger 
Basing much of his thinking on a fairly short trip to New England, Weber, in The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905) had argued that a Protestant, and 
particularly Puritan, mode of being, “favored the development of a rational bourgeois 
economic life; [and] it was the most important part, and above all the only consistent 
influence in the development of that life.  It stood at the cradle of the modern economic 
man” (117).  From this he argued that one of the most fundamental aspects of “the spirit 
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of modern capitalism” and modern culture is “rational conduct on the basis of the idea of 
the calling, [which] was born . . . from the spirit of Christian asceticism” (122-123).  He 
ends his book lamenting “the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order,” saying,  
this order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine 
production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born in 
this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, 
with irresistible force.  Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of 
fossilized coal is burnt. (123)   
 
The technical rationality, or to use the term of his critical theorist descendants, 
instrumental reason, out-reasons the modern rational subject.  Instrumental reason as a 
concept develops out of the disciplinary “solutions” provided in the development of the 
social sciences.  As Durkheim had written in his introduction to The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life: 
The point is to know why experience is not enough but presupposes conditions 
that are external and prior to it, and how it is that these conditions emerge in the 
proper time and manner.  To answer these questions, people have sometimes 
imagined, beyond the reason of individuals, a superior and perfect reason from 
which individual reason could emanate and, through a sort of mystic participation, 
derive its marvelous faculty.  This is what we call divine reason. (16) 
 
Instrumental reason is the secularized form of divine reason developed through Weber’s 
less optimistic view of religion in comparison with Durkheim. 
With Weber we see a concern for resources and environment born with the 
German Romantic tradition’s concern with nature, something echoed later in Martin 
Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954) and in his students, most 
notably Hannah Arendt and Herbert Marcuse, both of whom were widely influential in 
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the United States.  Like Abbie Hoffman’s return to the origins of Western Civilization at 
entry into WOODSTOCK NATION and the “End of Reason,” Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenology articulated earlier in the century in Being and Time, had sought a return 
to the question of being or ontology in pre-Socratic thought.  While certainly not as 
reactionary as Artaud’s return to the primordial as social critique, Heidegger’s return 
combined with Weber’s focus on technology was monumental for continental thought 
influencing aesthetics in the 1960s. 
“The Question Concerning Technology” performs Heidegger’s attempt to “get at” 
the essence of technology by overcoming its instrumental use: “So long as we represent 
technology as an instrument, we remain transfixed in the will to master it” (337).  And 
yet this ‘will’ masks the process by which things come into presence, which Heidegger 
traces through an explication of Aristotle’s four causes, leading him back to Plato’s 
Symposium, where Diotima explains to Socrates: “Every occasion for whatever passes 
beyond the nonpresent and goes forward into presencing is poiesis, bringing-forth” (in 
Heidegger 317).  Poetry, then, is the bringing-forth into presencing, but once this is 
formalized, according to Heidegger, it is destined by enframing; and this is the case with 
history. 
History is neither simply the object of written chronicle nor merely the process of 
human activity.  That activity first becomes history as something destined.  And it 
is only the destining into objectifying representation that makes the historical 
accessible as an object for historiography, i.e., for a science, and on this basis 
makes possible the current equating of the historical with that which is chronicled. 
(329) 
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But poetry is the process by which something is brought into objectivity, into presence.  
And the danger in treating technology as something to be mastered, for Heidegger, is that 
technology is “no mere means.  Technology is a way of revealing” and “Techne belongs 
to poiesis; it is something poetic” (318).  But importantly, for Heidegger, “the 
unconcealment itself, within which ordering [history] unfolds, is never human 
handiwork, any more than is the realm man traverses every time as a subject he relates to 
an object” (324).  Humans are called into being through the process of unconcealment: 
“Wherever man opens his eyes and ears, unlocks his heart, and gives himself over to 
meditating and striving, shaping and working, entreating and thanking, he finds himself 
everywhere already brought into the unconcealed.”  He adds, “When man, in his way, 
from within unconcealment reveals that which presences, he merely responds to the call 
of unconcealment, even when he contradicts it.”  This call, which appears to echo 
Weber’s call of the Christian ascetic, has already “claimed” man in his process of 
engagement with nature, into the process of objectification “until even the object 
disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve.”  Technology is not an instrument 
in essence but a ‘standing-reserve’: 
Modern technology, as a revealing that orders, is thus no mere human doing.  
Therefore, we must take the challenging that sets upon man to order the actual as 
standing-reserve in accordance with the way it shows itself.  The challenging 
gathers man into the ordering.  The gathering concentrates man upon ordering the 
actual standing-reserve. (324) 
 
A rather beautiful shift occurs in Heidegger’s essay at this point, as he breaks to the 
image of “gathering” by which mountain ranges are formed, then into the gathering “in 
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which we have feelings of one kind or another we name Gemut [disposition].”  In this 
sentence, Heidegger has subtly passed from speaking of “man” in the third-person to 
speaking in the first-person.  And from this, Heidegger names “the challenging claim that 
gathers man with a view to ordering the self-revealing as a standing-reserve.”  Again, 
from whence does the challenging call come?  To think this is to automatically recede 
into the thinking of subjects and objects.  Nevertheless, Heidegger, like Artaud, hearkens 
back to something primordial, even if it is by way of ancient philosophy, and his answer 
is in poetry as an aesthetic process by which “presencing” occurs.  Process art, 
performance and poetry that explode in the 1960s in the United States, have sources in 
continental thought.  The primordial in Heidegger is subtly enchanted, and precedes 
Kant’s autonomous subject.  It is also for that reason, as in Artaud, essentially nostalgic.            
While Artaud’s thinking is in line with Weber’s analysis, his nostalgia for the 
enchanted makes him unique.  He turns to Cambodian and Balinese theatre as models for 
his own, and while one might write this off as pure European “Orientalism” in its search 
“essence,” this turn itself must be characterized as critiquing the phantasy structure of a 
European self – indeed as that self turned upon itself, not necessarily in a universal move 
to take over the world, but in an enormous state of modern melancholy.  Furthermore, as 
with my analysis of Heidegger, the motivation toward the primal is spiritual and 
enchanted, and in that sense, as we shall see with respect to childhood below, it is not 
simply an objectifying gaze with an eye toward domination, although one can see why 
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those with such agendas might find ways to rationalize their actions by appeals to 
philosophy, especially a philosophy that overcomes “History.”  
In the years before publishing The Theatre and Its Double, Artaud had traveled to 
Mexico and experimented with peyote.  His interest in other cultures, as well as his 
interest in psychedelics, was to critique modern subjectivity.  To put this in Heidegger’s 
terms, Artaud critiques an enframement (Gestell) produced by European culture of the 
subject. Artaud’s answer, like Abbie Hoffman’s, was an aesthetic one; and in a similar 
way, the poetic and aesthetic turns of German thinkers like Heidegger (and Carl Schmitt) 
were cultural recovery projects in the face of depoliticization after the Second World War 
that attempted to reorient the deterritorialized the State by means of poetry.18  
Heidegger’s poetic re-enchantment, via a return to mystical traditions in German 
Romantic poetry, attempted in a literary way to accomplish what Artaud was after in 
theatre.  Heidegger and Artaud in particular challenged both instrumental rationality and 
the “normed” behavior that bourgeois culture exhibited and social sciences coded.  But 
inherently within the challenge is the question of religious enchantment, of accounting 
for a loss of divine reason.   
Artaud, who spent much of his life in and out of asylums, had a special distaste 
for psychology, and his call for re-enchantment is also in tension both with scientific 
positivism and with the rationality of Sigmund Freud.  In Civilization and Its Discontents 
(1930), Freud had argued that the “oceanic” feeling present in religion is something 
                                                
18 We shall also see this with Hermann Hesse’s influence on psychedelic aesthetics in a later chapter. 
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atavistic in modern humans.  This performs in science the same thing the Bildungsroman 
did for literature.  For Freud, progress will continue to move away from religious 
enchantment and humans will no longer need religion.  The healthy and rational man 
(himself being the supreme model) is able to overcome the childish need for superstition.  
For Artaud, it is exactly this idea of “civilized man” that must be overcome.  Stephen 
Barber, Artaud’s biographer, notes that although there is similarity between Artaud’s 
thinking and that of Jacques Lacan, the two men were hostile toward one another, and 
Lacan misdiagnosed Artaud’s case as being “fixed” in the late 1930s, that he would never 
write again (14-15).  Artaud employs madness as critique for a society gone wrong: 
He presents his asylum internment as part of a malicious chain of suppressions 
which extends back from the police, doctors and administrative bodies who were 
directly involved in his arrest, to the theological, familial and political bodies 
which upheld it, and through which the concept of madness had its origin. (Barber 
13) 
 
On the other hand, for Artaud the unconscious was not to be celebrated or given free 
reign, as it was in surrealism’s automatic writing, and Art should not be politicized.  As 
Barber notes, “for Artaud, the unconscious mind could never be applied to political and 
social arenas without, firstly, a drastic anatomical transformation” (17).  For Artaud, “the 
body comes before the word, and before the world.”  Growing beyond both Marxist 
materialism and the unconscious, Artaud critiques the inheritance of this “European 
imaginary,” by looking for mind-expanding possibilities both geographically and 
chemically.  His avant-gardism, however, must be grounded in a general European 
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nostalgia for an enchanted self and a call for its return to replace autonomous subjectivity 
present in a European imaginary.   
I have sought thus far to articulate in detail some major aesthetic ideas coming 
from continental Europe and their influence on psychedelic aesthetics.  What is essential 
to my argument is not just the historical lineage but the mode of thinking by which the 
developmental presentation of “life-lived” became aesthetically and sociologically 
abstracted in the twentieth century, making possible the plasticity of an aestheticized 
“lifestyle.”  It is this abstract and conceptualized shift that affords an a-historic 
conception of being that can transcend modernity through a return to the perennial, that 
psychedelic aesthetics emerge. 
 
The European Social Imaginary 
The European social imaginary, constructed and reified by habitus, is performed 
by many thinkers; and indeed it may be thought of, as Theodor Roszak suggests in The 
Making of the Counter Culture, as part of a larger Romantic tradition.  What is essential 
to this imaginary with regard to psychedelic aesthetics, however, is that the critique 
manifests in an aesthetic answer accomplished by a turn to enchanted poetics.  In the 
Romantic tradition there is a narrative of modern humans developing away from “nature” 
through an estrangement from nature and automation characteristic of much continental 
thought.  That tradition had informed even the scientific positivists and thinkers like 
Freud, who mapped notions of progress onto the narrative of rationality moving away 
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from “nature.” For those critiquing subjectivity, the return became essential and at its root 
balanced on the problem of representation itself.  As the philosopher and literary critic, 
Maurice Blanchot, another student of Heidegger, puts it in the late 1950s, 
Once the gods, once God, helped us not to belong to the earth where everything 
passes away, and helped us, our eyes fixed upon the unperishing that is the 
superterrestrial, to organize meanwhile this earth as a dwelling place.  Today, 
lacking gods, we turn still more from passing presence in order to affirm 
ourselves in a universe constructed according to the measure of knowledge and 
free from the randomness that always frightens us because it conceals an obscure 
decision.  There is, however, defeat in this victory; in this truth of forms, of 
notions and of names, there is a lie, and in this hope that commits us to an illusory 
bond, to a future without death or to a logic without chance, there is, perhaps, the 
betrayal of a more profound hope that poetry (writing) must teach us to affirm. 
(33-34)   
 
These words come from Blanchot’s essay, “The Great Refusal,” which the sociologist 
Herbert Marcuse quotes at length at the end of his enormously influential One 
Dimensional Man (1964).  One must look to Blanchot, Marcuse and other students of 
Heidegger in order to get a sense of the shaping that European theories had on the coming 
psychedelic era.19  
 
One Dimensional Man 
Herbert Marcuse emigrated to the United States in 1934 to escape the Third 
Reich, became a U. S. citizen in 1940, and worked for the Office of Strategic Services 
during the Second World War.  As a member of the Frankfurt School, Marcuse (and 
                                                
19 It is also within these theories that the psychedelic movement owes much to ways National Socialism 
was critiqued in the postwar years. 
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many other students of Martin Heidegger) helped shape countercultural thought in the 
1960s. Though their thought was in many ways misinterpreted by the youth movement in 
the 1960s, this does not diminish the importance of their influence on psychedelic 
aesthetics.  As Marcuse points out in relation to dialectical processes in “Repressive 
Tolerance,” much “pseudo-art” becomes the instrument of oppression.  It is important to 
understand, nevertheless, that the critique of consumer culture presented by these thinkers 
does not mean that aesthetics and poetics were not seen as valuable to political 
deliberation.  Even the work of Theodor Adorno, Marcuse’s companion from the 
Frankfurt School, which casts an entirely bleak view on consumerism, still longs to find 
an aesthetic answer.  In Minima Moralia (1951), Adorno claims, responding to the 
emerging nuclear age and the holocaust,  
what is decisive is the absorption of biological destruction by conscious social 
will.  Only a humanity to whom death has become as indifferent as its members, 
that has itself died, can inflict it administratively on innumerable people.  Rilke’s 
prayer for ‘one’s own death’ is a piteous attempt to conceal the fact that nowadays 
people merely snuff out. (233)   
 
Death itself has no meaning, and Adorno radically critiques subjectivity and poetry in a 
Romantic tradition that would look to a subject for the potential to find liberation.  That 
subject has, for these twentieth-century critical theorists, ceased to matter, despite the fact 
that they are still informed by that Romantic tradition.  Theirs is a critique of liberalism, a 
liberalism that relies on a certain version of subjectivity.  But critical theory itself, in its 
attempt to look at dialectical processes and to claim the ability to theorize at all, risks 
continued reliance on subject-object relations.  What one must keep in mind is that their 
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critique is a critique, and not an erasure, of subjectivity itself.   It is a critique of 
historically constructed subjectivity.  It is within this complex process of critique that 
psychedelic aesthetics informed by critical theory does its work.  
In One Dimensional Man (1964), perhaps his most famous work, Marcuse 
theorizes that, originally, rights and liberties were defined in opposition to existing 
political structures during the Early Modern era.  He seems at first, then, to adhere to a 
Weberian secularization narrative.  Over the course of history, however, Marcuse says 
those rights and liberties lost their revolutionary power because they became 
institutionalized.  As a result, advocating for freedom, which was once considered 
critical, has, by the early 1960s, become purely dogmatic.  The possibility of freedom 
from basic needs that modern industrialized society enables creates the need for a 
different more realized freedom. But because independent thought has been stripped of 
its critical position, society becomes complacent and accepts the status quo.  In this 
system, non-conformity seems useless and irrational.  Marcuse goes on to claim that the 
‘freedom’ prized for individuals to become actors in a market that thrives on business has 
not necessarily always been good: 
If the individual were no longer compelled to prove himself on the market, as a 
free economic subject, the disappearance of this kind of freedom would be one of 
the greatest achievements of civilization.  The technological processes of 
mechanization and standardization might release individual energy into a yet 
uncharted realm of freedom beyond necessity. (2)  
 
Such freedom beyond necessity would, for Marcuse, truly liberate autonomous 
subjectivity, and it is for him well within the possibilities of modern society.  But he says 
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that rather than liberation occurring, the opposite happens because of increasing demands 
on material and intellectual culture.  He argues, “Contemporary industrial society tends to 
be totalitarian.  For ‘totalitarian’ is not only a terroristic political coordination of society, 
but also a non-terroristic economic-technical coordination which operates through the 
manipulation of needs by vested interests” (3).  Bleak as this may seem, Marcuse believes 
that the situation can be reversed and that machines are merely stored human potential.  
Here he is directly echoing Heidegger in “The Question Concerning Technology.”  
Following Heidegger’s view of enframing and human engagement with nature as 
standing reserve, the presence of mind necessary must be one of the processes of poetics 
as bringing forth.  This is a mode of being in a process and not necessarily concerned 
with product; however, Marcuse’s attention to Heidegger’s enframing [Ge-stell] implies a 
future-orientation that would take environmental and resource concerns into account.  
The aesthetics necessary would be inherently politically deliberative.   
What becomes necessary for Marcuse are new modes to realize liberation, modes 
beyond the economic, the political, and the intellectual.  This is not the older liberation 
necessary for the growth of the liberal subject articulated by Kantian aesthetics, which 
inherently rely on a subject – not because Kant was wrong but because that kind of 
freedom is no longer revolutionary; it no longer liberates.  There must be a new kind of 
liberation that moves beyond the autonomous subject.  According to Marcuse, these 
modes must be realized in “negative” ways:  
Economic freedom would mean freedom from the economy – from being 
controlled by economic forces and relationships; freedom from the daily struggle 
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for existence, from earning a living. Political freedom would mean liberation of 
the individuals from politics over which they have no control. (4) 
 
He is quick to point out that “the most effective and enduring warfare against liberation is 
the implanting of material and intellectual needs that perpetuate obsolete forms of the 
struggle for existence.”  For Marcuse, human needs are historical and shaped by society, 
and we must learn to distinguish between “true” and “false” needs: “Most of the 
prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and consume in accordance with the 
advertisements, to love and hate what others love and hate, belong to the category of false 
needs” (5).  True needs, on the other hand, consist of nourishment, clothing, lodging at 
the attainable level of the culture.  Beyond these needs, no tribunal can judge what 
freedom is or how it can be satisfied; it’s up to the individual.  In modern industrial 
society, “the social controls exact the overwhelming need for the production and 
consumption of waste” (7).  The social controls manifest in a “one-dimensional” society.  
Marcuse implies that one must think beyond juridical decisions concerning subjectivity.  
This would also imply a movement beyond a conception of the nation-state based on 
sovereignty and decision-making, or at least a re-oriented view as to what subjectivity 
would look like outside of the subjectivity determined by liberal society.   
It is also not a matter of liberalism versus communism or economic enframing.  
Marcuse wants something beyond that altogether, and that is what eventually leads him to 
end his book with the passage from Blanchot quoted above.  Marcuse says with regard to 
Blanchot’s “Great Refusal,” 
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The struggle for the solution has outgrown the traditional forms.  The totalitarian 
tendencies of the one-dimensional society render the traditional means of protest 
ineffective – perhaps even dangerous because they preserve the illusion of 
popular sovereignty.  This illusion contains some truth: “the people,” previously 
the ferment of social change, have “moved up” to become the ferment of social 
cohesion.  Here rather than the distribution of wealth and equalization of classes is 
the new stratification characteristic of advanced industrial society. (256)     
 
Marcuse is saying, with the same expression of negativity discussed above, that the 
concept of a “people” must be transcended as much as a concept of economics or state. 
Again: “Political freedom would mean liberation of the individuals from politics over 
which they have no control” (4).  Implicit here is an overcoming of European subjectivity 
and an overcoming of the liberal nation-state that relies on that subjectivity.  But Marcuse 
points to Blanchot’s “Great Refusal,” and for Blanchot that task is accomplished by a 
return to “poetics” or “writing”; thus, it is an aesthetics informed by Heidegger’s return to 
ancient philosophy pre-Kant.  In the same way Artaud has called for an acknowledgment 
of the motivating forces beneath culture, “growing within us like a new organ, a sort of 
second breath” (The Theater 8): both are nostalgic returns to enchantment through an 
overcoming of subject-object relationships.   
If one misses this deep critique of European subjectivity in these works, as many 
people who read Marcuse superficially in the 1960s did, they are likely to have a very 
different take on Marcuse’s closing words with regard to “The Great Refusal.”  Consider 
how the following words might read to such a person:  
Underneath the conservative popular base is a substratum of the outcasts and 
outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the 
unemployed and the unemployable.  They exist outside of the democratic process; 
their life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable 
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conditions and institutions.  Thus their opposition is revolutionary even if their 
consciousness is not.  Their opposition hits the system from without and is 
therefore not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force which violates the 
rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals that it is a rigged game.  When they get 
together and go out into the streets, without arms, without protection, in order to 
ask for the most primitive of civil rights, they know that they face dogs, stones 
and bombs, jail, concentration camps, even death.  Their force is behind every 
political demonstration for the victims of law and order.  The fact that they start 
refusing to play the game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the end of 
a period. (256-57) 
 
One could superficially believe that Marcuse here is speaking to the civil rights protests 
occurring in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and he is certainly speaking to that, but with 
a much longer historical critique in mind.  It is helpful to see how he is drawing on the 
same criticism as Artaud. 
Marcuse takes Artaud’s criticism of plague-infested, bourgeois European culture 
and applies it to American consumerism.  He claims, “Free election of masters does not 
abolish the masters and slaves.  Free choice among a variety of goods and services does 
not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain cultural controls over a life of fear 
and toil” (8).  The illusion of choice is a manifestation of false needs.  Such illusions 
mask class differences and nullify class struggle. 
If the worker and his boss enjoy the same television program and visit the same 
resort places, if the typist is as attractively made up as the daughter of her 
employer, if the Negro owns a Cadillac, if they all read the same newspaper, then 
this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of classes, but the extent to 
which the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment 
are shared by the underlying population. (8) 
 
In modern industrial society, people “find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split 
level home, kitchen equipment” (9).  American consumerism for Marcuse becomes the 
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ultimate manifestation of Weber’s instrumental rationality: “In the contemporary period, 
the technological controls appear to be the very embodiment of Reason for the benefit of 
all groups and interests – to such an extent that all contradiction seems irrational and all 
counteraction impossible.”  Preceding Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of habitus, Marcuse 
believes that historical-social forces shape the subject in a way that denies the existence 
of the individual self, and the result of this is an immediate identification with society.  
Identities are shaped to “buy in” to a particular notion of progress.  This identification is 
not an illusion; it actually shapes perceptions of reality, even if the form is false.  The 
numbing qualities of one-dimensional society can feel good: 
It is a good way of life – much better than before – and as a good way of life it 
militates against qualitative change. Thus emerges a pattern of one-dimensional 
thought and behavior in which ideas, aspirations, and behaviors that, by their 
content transcend the established universe of discourse and actions are either 
repelled or reduced to terms of this universe. (12) 
 
This is quite similar to Marx’s conception of religion as the “opiate of the masses.”  Such 
an opiate for Marx numbs the pain of class inequality.  Marcuse sees these trends in 
particular with the growth of positivism and “operational” conduct, and even religion – 
traditional or bohemian – serves the status quo as just another codified behaviorism.  He 
says this is true both in capitalism and in communism.  In both cases, progress is 
determined by the powers that be.  So, “the industrial society which makes technology 
and science its own is organized for the ever-more-effective utilization of its resources” 
(17).  Where is there room for enchantment in Marcuse’s bleak outlook? 
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Marcuse clearly builds his theory out of the German tradition, and particularly his 
habilitation on Hegel and his master-slave dialectic, which he wrote under Martin 
Heidegger.  In the dialectic, the master, by enslaving his subject, creates a relationship 
based on need. The master (or the master’s children) forgets how to perform deeds for 
himself, creating dependency on the slave.  Eventually, the slave realizes this and 
becomes the new master.  Similarly, over time (not instantly) people lose sight of their 
ability to perceive their own freedom as human potential.  They begin to see freedom in 
terms of something like money, which is contractually earned but ultimately invisible. 
Money is a real thing, but it exists invisibly and through a social agreement that that’s the 
way things are going to be. Even though this system is very real in the sense that it 
controls people’s actions, it is a false consciousness.  It is false in the sense that it exists 
in the imaginary and is maintained by a social belief system built over time. It is real but 
false.  The image of this system is ideology.  An ideology, in Marcuse and the Marxist 
tradition, is a social concept, and one does not simply “break free” from the social 
concept by simply “thinking outside the box.” 
Marxist thinking implies that the belief in an ideology is tacit and unconscious.  It 
is not something people think about on a daily basis. People’s actions and deeds, 
nevertheless, contribute to the social manifestation of the ideology.  Like a religion, an 
ideology shapes a perspective for the way the world naturally exists.  But it is the very 
idea of nature that is in question here.  One’s “natural” view becomes shaped by 
ideological forces that get replayed and socially construct reality.  This process of making 
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the imaginary real is called reification.  Marcuse builds on Hegel’s dialectic and Marx’s 
idea that in capitalist society there exists something between the ruling class (master) and 
the working class (slave): the middle class or bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie is made up of 
people who have benefited from the capitalistic society.  In the United States in the early 
1960s, Marcuse implies that individualism is so seamlessly built into the cultural 
ideology that people are fed by an economic machine which sells them their very identity 
and sense of meaning. To not have buying power is to not exist or be whole.  At the same 
time, the idea of a middle class with a limited version of buying power supported by a 
belief in false needs essentially slows down Hegel’s dialectic, preventing both synthesis 
and progress.  The result is an ahistorical and ever “present” society perpetuated by false 
needs.  It is with this idea that I now want to return to Marcuse’s turn to Maurice 
Blanchot’s “Great Refusal” at the end of his book to find what may be left of 
enchantment.   
One-dimensional society is based on the crisis of imagination which cannot think 
its way out of that very system.  Given Marcuse’s suspicion of consumerism, what may 
seem surprising is that, as in Artaud, the basis for Blanchot’s argument is aesthetic, and 
Marcuse had to have been aware of this.  For Blanchot, it is about poetry, not just as 
something merely “made” or constructed, but poetry as a possibility for a different way of 
being.  Blanchot’s sentiment is strikingly similar to that which Artaud articulates – that it 
is not so much about a move toward transcendence, but a return to the materiality of 
presence and “presence of mind,” occupied by an aesthetic practice.  Both Artaud and 
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Blanchot acknowledge the function of poetry as a presence that understands writing not 
as the creation of immortality and memory but as the death that refuses immortality in 
favor of life punctuated and ended and formed.  It is a double refusal: a refusal of life in 
death and also a refusal of immortality after death – a favoring and acknowledgement of 
the form.  This is the heritage inherited by psychedelic aesthetics from European thought.  
It is the “great refusal” re-characterized by Leary’s famous phrase, “tune-in, turn-on, 
drop-out.”  And while it is easy to see the refusal in “drop-out,” the enigmatic and 
aesthetic qualities of the first two imperatives are hazier without this background. 
Artaud writes with respect to the poetry performed by the theater of cruelty that 
language must cover every sense and gesture: 
To give objective examples of this poetry that follows upon the way gesture, a 
sonority, an intonation presses with more or less insistence upon this or that 
segment of space at such and such a time appears to me as difficult as to 
communicate in words the feeling of a particular sound or the degree and quality 
of a physical pain.  It depends upon the production and can be determined only on 
the stage. (46)     
 
For Artaud, such poetry must be embodied in performance.  Like Blanchot’s “Great 
Refusal,” however, and informed by his peyote experiences, such performances invoke 
primeval states and put the performer in touch with his or her spiritual “double.”  It is not 
in the physical performance alone, but in the performance’s gesture toward a re-
enchanted spirit. 
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Manifestations in the 1960s 
Even though Artaud’s book was not translated into English until the early 1960s, 
it had been a major influence on younger thinkers.  Judith Malina and Julien Beck, 
founders of The Living Theatre in New York, had received these ideas and other 
European avant-garde training at the New School for Social Research under Erwin 
Piscator, before he was forced to return to his native Germany under pressure from the 
McCarthy era.  Piscator trained many other activist actors, such as Marlon Brando, who 
attended, along with a young Abbie Hoffman, a protest vigil in 1960 against the death 
penalty at Caryl Chessman’s execution (Sanders 267).   Abbie Hoffman intentionally 
combined Artaud’s theory and The Living Theatre’s public presentation in his activism.   
Artaud and Marcuse’s influence on psychedelic aesthetics was synthesized when 
Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin formed the Youth International Party (Yippies) and used 
avant-garde theatre as protest throughout 1967.  Most notably, they tossed money from 
the balcony to the floor of the New York Stock Exchange and then burnt money in front 
of the building; later in the year they staged an attempt to “levitate” the Pentagon.  
During the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, which erupted in violent 
protest, Hoffman, Rubin and others were arrested and charged with conspiracy to incite 
riot, more famously known as the Chicago Seven trial.  Hoffman wrote Woodstock 
Nation in an attempt to raise funds for his upcoming trial.  During the trial, Hoffman and 
his fellow defendants constantly employed theatrical tactics to undermine the sanctity of 
the court proceedings.  In interviews with The East Village Other, Hoffman attributes 
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much of his inspiration to Artaud’s The Theater and Its Double (Duree 55).  While it 
would be a mistake to confuse the entire protest movement of the 1960s with psychedelic 
aesthetics, the European avant-garde is one root that cannot be denied.  
What is under-recognized in this root is the attention that the European thinkers 
gave to a sense of enchantment.  Because of this, it has been easy to write off the sixties 
activists’ psychedelic tactics as crude mockery without spiritual attributes.  To the extent 
that ludic qualities are expressed in psychedelic aesthetics, they must also take on 
qualities of enchantment, even when the actual performers may have viewed themselves 
as entirely secular.  Another factor in disregarding the importance of enchantment comes 
from the autonomous subject in the European imaginary, which Artaud and Marcuse had 
been critiquing.  From a twenty-first century vantage point, as we shall see, we can 
employ terms like ‘re-enchantment’ and ‘postsecularism,’ which were unavaible to these 
thinkers.   
Hoffman, being an avid student of Marcuse and Artaud, tried to generate a 
theatrical kind of activism that would not perform a dogmatically liberal version of 
tolerance that had lost its revolutionary potential.  It was therefore a more active rather 
than passive resistance, and he used the aesthetics of rock and roll as a platform.  In doing 
so he risked falling into the consumerist traps that Marcuse had warned against with 
regard to the relegation of Art to banal ‘pseudo-art.’  And indeed, many have seen the 
1960s as having become just that – another demonstration of the success of one-
dimensional consumerism expressed by an uncritical mass of youth.  Marcuse himself 
   101 
was at times critical of this, and remained skeptical about whether or not a “world 
revolution” was even possible.  Revolution was not, for Marcuse, inevitable.   
In trying to bring about a revolution, Hoffman’s activism turned toward 
psychedelic aesthetics.  He drew on figures such as Ken Kesey and in Woodstock Nation, 
stylistically mimics Tom Wolfe’s The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Tests.  In the book, Wolfe 
clearly distinguishes between the psychedelic activism inspired by Kesey at the Vietnam 
Day rally in 1965 and that of the earlier civil rights movement.  Wolfe notes that Kesey’s 
message (which did not go over well at the event) was to say “everybody just take a look 
at it, look at the war, and turn your backs and say…fuck it!” (224).  Wolfe also notes that 
in the New Left at that time, to call someone ‘Martin Luther King’ was about the worst 
thing you could call anybody” because people felt King had “turned back at the critical 
moment on the bridge at Selma” (225).  Hoffman, in Woodstock Nation writes a list of 
points of agreement to start “peace talks” with PIG NATION saying that the pigs must 
understand that they must have separate negotiations with the BLACK NATION (111).  
So, while there are points of overlap, psychedelic aesthetics should not be too easily 
conflated with 1960s civil rights activism in terms of tactics, although the goals may be 
very similar.  Nor should psychedelic aesthetics be overly conflated with hipsters or “new 
bohemians.”  As Hunter S. Thompson pointed out in 1965, 
Social radicals tend to be "arty." Their gigs are poetry and folk music, rather than 
politics, although many are fervently committed to the civil rights movement. 
Their political bent is Left, but their real interests are writing, painting, good sex, 
good sounds, and free marijuana. The realities of politics put them off, although 
they don't mind lending their talents to a demonstration here and there, or even 
getting arrested for a good cause. They have quit one system and they don't want 
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to be organized into another; they feel they have more important things to do. 
(qtd. in Lee and Shlain) 
 
But what exactly are these “more important things”?  It is here that the missing 
connection falls into the realm of enchantment.   
The inability to see psychedelic aesthetics as motivated by enchantment is due to 
multiple factors.  In this chapter I have attempted to trace historically the abstract 
secularization of instrumental reason from the earlier divine reason.  This may of course 
also be articulated as part of a large disaffection with metaphysics in general during the 
early twentieth-century.  In this frame, the alignment of a secular narrative is a “natural 
move” away from “superstition.”  This amounts to more than the rather banal claims that 
positivism or science or liberalism are their own “religions” or that they replace religion 
with a different belief system.  Enchantment maintains presence through an excess of 
symbolic material that cannot be accounted for in binaries between rational and irrational.  
Nor can the term “culture” account for such excess.  The concept of technology as a 
“standing reserve,” as something that exceeds intentional utility, couches within it the 
idea that poetry as making (poiesis) occurs as divination within enframing.  It is with this 
sentiment that Heidegger wrote his famous late essay, “Only a God Can Save Us,” and in 
this context, to study aesthetics would be to study the possibility of the generation of the 
sacred.  This very possibility is undermined by a secular frame that on the one hand 
defines religion in terms of large European and American institutions which are 
implicitly atavistic according to the narrative; on the other, the consumer critique that 
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American commodity culture co-opted the “true” potential of social and spiritual 
experimentation in the 1960s.  Possibility remains just that.  That aspects of enchantment 
reveal themselves in Heidegger’s philosophy or Hoffman (and others’) plans to levitate 
the pentagon is not to say that they are secretly “religious.”   
But a problem remains: In the secularist view, the work of poets and activists like 
Allen Ginsberg, Gary Snyder, Anne Waldman, the San Francisco Diggers and the New 
York Motherfuckers can be easily dismissed as “counterculture,” as “New Agey” or 
political performance art.  Simultaneously, more mainstream religious enchantment such 
as the Martin Luther King, the American Friends Service Committee, Dorothy Day and 
the Catholic Workers (not to mention Vatican II) that motivates much of the 1960s civil 
rights movement can maintain an austere and respectable place in public memory.  As 
James J. Farrell has written in The Spirit of the Sixties, the major religious activists 
“appropriated the religious languages of the churches and the democratic language of the 
civil society – including language about the sacredness of persons – and articulated its 
radical implications” (18).  Farrell also points to scholarship such as Robert S. Ellwood’s 
The Sixties Spiritual Awakening and Robert Wuthnow’s The Restructuring of American 
Religion, citing their claims that the 1960s offered “the restructuring of American 
religion” through a “spiritual awakening.”  But Farrell’s analysis goes on to describe 
American Personalism and its fusion with these developments.  What is de-emphasized 
with Farrell but present in the European influences on psychedelic aesthetics are the 
intersubjective aspects present in symbolic excess.  It is not enough to stress antinomian 
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individualism in psychedelic aesthetics.  There may indeed be an inward retreat but there 
is a merge with a timeless perennial space that becomes the place from which poetic 
comportment is formed and made politically viable.  As Raschke has argued in The 
Interruption of Eternity, the perennial created a generation of ahistorical superficial 
emptiness.  In terms of “strong” religion, Raschke is correct.  In terms of poetics and 








CHAPTER THREE: THE RETURN TO ‘NATURE’ AND THE PROBLEM OF THE 
PERENNIAL 
I think I’m goin’ back to the things I knew so well in my youth. 
I think I’m returning to the times when I was young enough to know the truth.  
 
- Carole King and Gerry Goffin, “Goin’ Back” 
 
When I was a child, I had a fever.  My hands felt just like two balloons.  Now I’ve 
got that feeling once again. I can’t explain; you would not understand…this isn’t 
how I am…I have become… 
 
- Roger Waters, “Comfortably Numb” 
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 In the last chapter, I focused on a European cultural imaginary out of which a 
certain construction of subjectivity arises, along with the philosophical and aesthetic 
critiques of that subjectivity.  I attempted to show how such critiques informed the 
psychedelic aesthetics in the 1960s activism of Abbie Hoffman through elements of 
enchantment.  Rather than seeing psychedelic aesthetics as something completely new, I 
argued that the aesthetics tap into deep-seated critiques of modernity.  For this reason, I 
have intentionally strayed from distinctions between modernity and postmodernity in 
order to focus on modern subjectivity as a poetic figure or a social construct.  Constructs 
exist and change over time; they are dynamic and hazy, but they necessarily impact social 
thought and political decisions over time.  The inherent critiques of modernity inherent in 
psychedelic aesthetics challenge the notion of temporality.  At a certain point, then, to get 
at the aesthetic study one must have a flexible approach to historical periods.  Even if we 
could track material history precisely, we would have a hard time integrating the way 
imaginative figures work generatively and as affective inspiration for political decisions 
past and present.  The “1960s” exist as a cultural texture from which new myths and lore 
arose in the later half of the twentieth century.  They are still recent in cultural memory, 
and witnessing the 1960s becomes its own lore.  “If you remembered them, you weren’t 
there” becomes a mantra, and for those who repeat such phrases, there is an element of 
pride, of insider status.  Similarly, psychedelic aesthetics are evangelical in this regard.  
They also present as having transcended temporality, and if one is “experienced” one is 
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an insider, just as the affective claims about the 1960s invoke an insider status of 
witnessing.      
Psychedelic aesthetics draw on a narrative of displaced, modern subjectivity.  
They take the figure seriously no matter the historical accuracy of it, and they pulse 
between the human being in particular and the human being in general.  The associative 
qualities accompanying a psychedelic experience – the ‘interconnectedness’ of all things 
– deterritorializes the self by framing the ‘self’ in a cultural trajectory of alienation.  In 
the European imaginary I have been describing, modern humans are separated from 
nature, and thinkers like Artaud seek to get back to a more essential or natural state 
through a process of re-enchantment.  It is rather easy to critique this essentialism that 
disseminates so easily into “human in general” as a byproduct of European culture, but it 
is not enough to only say that it is a byproduct of arrogance, privilege or power.  For 
Artaud, European society is sick, having strayed too far from the divine; the return to 
nature is therapeutic.  His answer arises as aesthetics in his emphasis on poetics in his 
theater of cruelty, but it is nevertheless a political-theological answer in its attempt to 
undermine European society itself. 
In order to see the political-theological nature of Artaud’s work and the 
psychedelic aesthetics that follow it, however, one must take enchantment seriously.  
Artaud’s poetics do not call for a poetics of transcendence.  Because of this, Jacques 
Derrida argues in “The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation,” 
The theater of cruelty expulses God from the stage.  It does not put a new atheist 
discourse on stage, or give atheism a platform, or give over theatrical space to a 
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philosophizing logic that would once more, to our great lassitude, proclaim the 
death of God.  The theatrical practice of cruelty, in its action and structure 
inhabits or rather produces a nontheological space . . . The stage is theological for 
as long as it is dominated by speech, by a will to speech, by the layout of a 
primary logos which does not belong to the theatrical site and governs it from a 
distance. (235) 
 
Derrida is not wrong here, but he is overly monotheistic and a narrative of secularization 
informs his idea of the nontheological.  In Artaud’s account of the Tarahumara people, a 
man explains to Artaud the “precise elucidations of the way in which Peyote revives 
throughout the nervous system the memory of certain supreme truths of which human 
consciousness does not lose but on the contrary regains its perception of the infinite” 
(Peyote Dance 21).  The man tells Artaud, under the influence of Ciguri in the peyote 
rite, 
‘The nature of these truths,’ this man told me, ‘it is not my business to show you.  
But it is my business to reawaken them in the mind of your human existence.  The 
mind of man is tired of God, because it is bad and sick, and it is up to us to make 
it hungry for Him. But as you see, Time itself refuses the means.’ 
   
Derrida, writing in 1966, points out that Artaud’s theater of cruelty “is still to be born” 
(232).  But it is not born originally; rather, it is reborn: “Rebirth doubtless occurs through 
– Artaud recalls this often – a kind of reeducation of the organs.  But this reeducation 
permits the access to a life before birth and after death . . . and not to a death before birth 
and after life” (“The Theater” 233).  Artaud’s work points to a reeducation through re-
enchantment that informs psychedelic aesthetics.  This involves a return to the primordial 
that moves beyond time – not just the linear time of history and witnessing, but beyond 
the concept of a human life as ‘life lived,’ as a totality that can be figured, and as a being-
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toward-death.  Psychedelic aesthetics informed by Artaud imply a concept of human life 
based on metempsychosis; the poetics accomplish this through a return to nature, a trip of 
disseminated ego, and a re-entry.  In the process, the concept of citizenship and the 
relationship with the state and sacrifice are redefined, and in this the implied critique of 
psychedelic aesthetics is a political-theological one rather than being anarchic or 
nihilistic. 
 In the European imaginary, a return to nature – to the more primordial state – is 
also a return to childhood.  In a complex interweaving, the return mixes with the aesthetic 
sense of the ‘life lived,’ which operates as a metaphor for progress of the self.  These 
concepts fuse in the Romantic concept of childhood as innocent.  This concept is 
constructed during the same period as western nation states.  Citizens are fashioned and 
made from the empty potential of the child.  As scholars of children’s literature have 
noted, the Romantic conception of childhood works as a social construct in distinction to 
earlier ‘Christian’ constructs of humans being born in sin, inherently evil, and in need of 
being saved.  The idea of autonomous subjectivity, accompanied by John Locke’s idea of 
tabula rasa and Jean Jacques Rousseau’s descriptions of how to make a citizen, helped to 
construct the English and European image of humans apart from nature.  Importantly for 
Rousseau, a man and a citizen are not the same thing.  The “natural” man is sacrificed in 
order to make a citizen: 
The natural man lives for himself; he is the unit, the whole, dependent only on 
himself and on his like. The citizen is but the numerator of a fraction, whose value 
depends on its denominator; his value depends upon the whole, that is, on the 
community. Good social institutions are those best fitted to make a man unnatural, 
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to exchange his independence for dependence, to merge the unit in the group, so 
that he no longer regards himself as one, but as a part of the whole, and is only 
conscious of the common life. (Emile 4)  
 
A secularization narrative combines the idea of the blank slate with the move away from 
religious “primitivism,” which is essentially childlike.  To approach essence in Artaud’s 
fashion was a deeply critical act at the time, which, over time perhaps lost its 
revolutionary potential or its critical edge.  But when enchantment, taken seriously, is 
added to what may be called Artaud’s primitivism, the critical edge reappears, 
challenging the secularization narrative.  
In a narrative of secularization, enchantment is left behind by the notion of 
progress.  Progress is necessary in order for the citizen to be constructed.  The citizen 
must be “developed” as the nation is territorialized.  It makes sense, then, in times of 
political crisis for liberal nation states that youth, nature and religious enchantment are 
potential sites for the incendiary.  The psychedelic experience in the 1960s was an easy 
way to bundle up all of the critique in one act.  With this in mind, it is not hard to see 
connections between psychedelic drug-use and citizenship, nor is it difficult to imagine 
why CIA had projects of behavior modification like MK-ULTRA. The real question 
consists in asking what comes after the behavior modification: What were the protesting 
youth making themselves into? What happens at the end of the trip, at re-entry?  The 
illegalization of LSD was partly due to a threat to citizenship.  How could a nation 
function with a generation of youth more interested in tripping than working?  These are 
questions with emerging scholarly answers as the period is historicized.   
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During the 1960s, as citizenship was questioned at the level of one’s biology 
through legislation of controlled substances, the particularized act of protest became a 
politicized friend-enemy distinction with the State, as we saw explicitly in Hoffman’s 
rhetoric.  What began as legislation to protect citizens from bad pharmaceutical practices 
became a question of individual rights (Langlitz).  In this sense, movement, travel and 
uprooted-ness accompany the psychedelic experience as the acting out of freedom of the 
body.  They also act to deterritorialize the Self, and one particular result of this is 
nostalgia.   
Nostalgia, as Robert Hemmings has written, was first coined as a disease by 
Johannes Hofer in 1688 as literally “homesickness” for one’s native land.  It accompanies 
the depression suffered by European colonialists and diasporas.  Nostalgia accompanies 
deterritorialization.  Hemmings writes, 
At its very roots, nostalgia is linked with the trauma of deprivation and loss. By 
the late eighteenth century, [Jean] Starobinski argues, the nostalgic yearns not so 
poignantly to return to the place of one's childhood – a treatment favored by 
Hofer – but to childhood itself . . . In other words, nostalgia is a function of the 
imagination, steeped in temporal and spatial longing, and the illusive object of 
that longing is childhood. (55)  
 
At the cultural level, the European imaginary that accompanied modern subjectivity 
provokes a sense of nostalgia for the spiritual.  Nostalgia relies on a past at the same time 
it feeds on what is lost.  A symbolic displacement occurs as the desired homeland one is 
sick for transfers into a textured state.  As Hemmings argues above, the loss of the places 
of one’s personal childhood becomes a desire for the texture of childhood itself.  The 
poetics at work in this transfer exist in psychedelic aesthetics as an attention to texture 
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itself.  Texture or webbing is virtual and made (poiesis).  To the extent that nostalgia is an 
“imaginary” disease, like that of melancholia, it does not that make it any less real.  The 
“temporal and spatial longing” that accompanies nostalgia appears with vehement force 
in psychedelic aesthetics as a shift toward the perennial, a disruption of narrative, what 
Maurice Blanchot called the disaster.20  
 
The Problem of the Perennial  
Psychedelic works constantly point toward the perennial, disrupting citizenship 
through a return “to nature” that is prehistoric and pre-political.  These appeals transcend 
those directed toward maintaining “childlike innocence.”  Appeals to the perennial can 
seem anti-intellectual, overly-naïve and reductionist.  Critics suspect the perennial 
because it is always there, and to invoke it seems overly essentialist.  The perennial also 
disrupts attempts to account for development, adding a kind of dementia or amnesia.  It 
therefore disrupts cultivation and citizenship.  During the 1960s, a “culture” of the 
perennial emerged; the psychedelic or “mind-manifesting” became psychedelia, a 
recognizable style and attitude.  In doing so, it perhaps lost its revolutionary potential and 
became reduced to one-dimensionality, to use Marcuse’s terms.  Yet even this frame of 
critiquing the perennial implies progressive linearity and dialectic, a narration of ordered 
accretion.  The eye that historicizes the narration reduces to the particularity of its own 
testimony, and ethics underwrite the criticism.  The ideal in psychedelic aesthetics is to 
                                                
20 I will return to this concept in connection with Carl Schmitt later.  
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break from this totalizing hold of ego over the eye, and through synesthesia and 
associative thinking to re-inhabit the body in the world.  The perennial becomes the space 
in which this occurs.  
The perennial gives plenty of inspiration as a space of associative transfer.  This is 
why people feel may feel “more creative” on psychedelic drugs.  What happens 
physically to their brain happens through saturated synaptic firing is a flood that 
deterritorializes a sense of positioning in the physical world.  The process itself breaks 
down the ability for the symbolic to act as such, as if the fourth wall of being breaks.  
When transferred into aesthetic works, the perennial is closer to poetry than narrative.  In 
writing, the most clichéd way to project a psychedelic state is to move to line breaks and 
“verse,” which really amounts to a kind of listing of images through sentence fragments.  
Here is Timothy Leary, for example, recounting his first mushroom trip as a return to the 
perennial in High Priest (1968): 
Plummeting back through time, 
snake time, 
fish time, 
Down through the giant jungle palm time, 
green lacy ferny leaf time. 
Watching first life oozing, 
writhing, 
twisting up.  
Watching first sea thing crawl to shore 
Lie with her.  Sand-rasp under cheek 
Then float sea-thing, down 
Deep green sea dark 
I am first living 
Thing I 
Am 
       (26) 
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The absence of verbs collapses subject and object while affording a list of fragmentary 
images.  To the extent that the reader imagines a subject he or she implicitly identifies 
with the absent present ‘I.’ This sets up the shift to the imperative: “Lie with her.”  This 
merge with ‘life’ personified as ‘her’ accomplishes the death and rebirth of the ‘I am’ but 
as completely new and primordial.    
Narrative in psychedelic aesthetics must overcome its own temporality, just as 
narrative in experimental fiction during the late-modern or postmodern period is 
concerned with the boundaries of narrative itself as opposed to the nineteenth century 
novel’s dependence on the ‘life lived’ aesthetic.  The figure of the trip in fiction and the 
element of process in much 1960s poetry are both devices employed to overcome 
temporality through appeal to the perennial through textural dissemination.  But because 
of this, the perennial constantly risks superficiality on the one hand and ignorance of 
material historical forces on the other.  It is frustratingly shapeless for criticism relying on 
a theory of the eye, on an unsaturated poetic sense.   
Poetics in the perennial can be superficially represented structurally with an axis: 
vertical, mythological time and horizontal, the horizontal being linear, historical time.  
Such a figure is reminiscent of Mircea Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane.  While 
Eliade has been criticized for the tendency his sacred-profane binary had to oversimplify 
and fetishize exotic “otherness” in search of “essential” meaning, in this context the 
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thinking exemplifies the same critique of modernity that Artaud employed.21  Eliade 
contributes to the European imaginary that has had real-world consequences both good 
and bad.  In The Sacred and the Profane, Eliade writes:  
Above all, we understand this: the man of primitive societies has sought to 
conquer death by transforming it into a rite of passage.  In other words, for the 
primitives, men die to something that was not essential; men die to the profane 
life.  In short, death comes to be regarded as the supreme initiation, that is, as the 
beginning of a new spiritual existence. (196)   
 
This of course is similar to Artaud’s idea of rebirth and theater.  Turning away from the 
transcendent theology of the stage while simultaneously calling for a poetics where every 
gesture is saturated with meaning enacts a process that redraws the distinction between 
same and other, ego and id, and also sacred and profane.  Desiring to escape the confines 
of modern colonial thought and its alienating conditions, thinkers like Artaud and Eliade 
point toward “primitivism” as a way to move toward the perennial.   
In the last section of The Sacred and the Profane, Eliade gives a brief survey of 
the history of religion and adds an important element to the move away from the 
transcendent.  First off, Eliade claims that over western history there has been a long 
process of desacralization.  In modern Europe, since the time of the subjective turn, this 
                                                
21 If I do not delve deeply into criticism of Eliade here, it is to preserve some semblance of the thinking of 
the period.  Structuralism and what became post-structuralism is historically simultaneous to and congruent 
with psychedelic aesthetics.  Poststructuralism as I will argue in later chapters, is psychedelic.  Like 
postmodernisn, however, it should not be thought of temporally, but in a dialectical process with 
structuralism.  That is: structure undoes itself, as Derrida’s work famously synthesized in the term 
Deconstruction.  I use the term poetics and poesis as making to get at both the generative and the re-
constructed involved in this process.  The reason why I feel it necessary to gesture toward psychedelic 
aesthetics is because of the potential inherent in them to expand the use of poetics beyond the linguistic.  
Affective decision-making does not work in a strictly sequential logic, and if we are to understand the 
political implications of psychedelic aesthetics, I must reroute traditional discourse here. 
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has been characterized by narratives of secularization.  Even so, Eliade points out that 
even in the mid twentieth-century, clear distinctions between homo religiosis and 
“modern nonreligious man” are rarely occupied fully in either category by individual 
people (203).  It is hard to find one who is completely one or the other.  Nevertheless, in 
Eliade’s view, modern nonreligious man “descends” from religious man.  This is indeed a 
shift from the more ethnocentric views Durkheim expressed a half century before.  But 
there is more: “After the first ‘fall,’ the religious sense descended to the level of the 
‘divided consciousness’; now, after the second [the advent of the modern era], it has 
fallen even further, into the depths of the unconscious; it has been ‘forgotten’” (212).  In 
this double state of amnesia, the external forgotten religious past is intensified by the 
internal repression of spiritual longing, and the desire to return to the state of nature and 
the perennial emerges.  And so the imagined landscape of the perennial is an historical 
event shaped by a narrative of secularization itself.  I have tried to address this narrative 
in figural form with the concept of the “European imaginary.”  The difficulty is partially 
resolved by aesthetic study over socio-historical methods.  As I argued in the previous 
chapter, the European imaginary has long been critiqued throughout the modern era, and 
many philosophers and artists in the mid twentieth century sought poetics as a place for 
movement.  It is best to look here with regard to the problem of the perennial. 
To focus only on the perennial distorts temporality and either removes causality 
altogether in favor of some sort of divine channeling, or it places responsibility for causes 
on departed deities or prime movers.  More recent scientific research on psychedelic 
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drugs suggests that DMT, and to a lesser extent closely related molecules like psilocybin 
and LSD, literally turn the human brain into an antenna to receive massive amounts of 
information beyond the consciousness.  This would be similar to divine channeling.  The 
prime mover or the designer of the experience of the source is then relegated to 
conceptual reflection after the fact.  It is here that concepts of gods appear, and depending 
on one’s perspective, it is either extremely fatalistic or completely relativistic.   
In twentieth century European philosophy, human lives are determined by a 
necessary being-toward-death.  This projection toward the unknown situates the 
subjectivity of a human.  Mortality provides a context for what Heidegger called care, 
because mortality gives us a sense of loss, lack or want.  Linear, causal time is 
constitutive of a being distinguished from the world, experiencing self as different from 
Other, creating an experience of life as desire, need or lack, in both a material and an 
emotional sense.  The human is traumatically flawed.  Differing answers to this problem 
of desire and human motivation arise in the twentieth century, attempting to give 
meaning to a being-toward-death, some finding authenticity in the taking up arms against 
life’s sea of troubles.  But that authenticity would be an overcoming of self-
consciousness, a return to a more ‘animalistic’ state of being, of pureness of experience 
so characteristic of early twentieth-century literature (D. H. Lawrence especially so), or 
something with rationale features as well, like Nietzsche’s Overman.  This would be the 
Romantic push toward the perennial and accounts for much recreational drug use, where 
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the ‘experience’ itself is fulfilling because of an overcoming of bad faith and a lack of 
false consciousness.   
But, as I have been arguing, this “Romantic” thinking exists in the productive 
space of the European imaginary, where, accompanied by a narrative of secularization 
that sees a move away from religion as socially progressive, it operates on a being-
toward-death as a life model.  A ‘being-toward-animal’ here creates an inversion of 
secular progress while also asserting another kind of progress.  The difference between 
nineteenth century ‘life-lived’ aesthetics and twentieth century aesthetics would be the 
central question of the unknown but inevitable end, made only more inevitable by the 
development of humanity’s ability to destroy itself.  Paul Kahn calls this the ticking time-
clock trope in television and film (“Torture and the Dream of Reason”).  For him, the 
ticking time-clock that protagonists are constantly trying to stop is always ultimately the 
nuclear countdown.  The desire becomes to stop the inevitable march of time.   
In psychedelic aesthetics, which are informed by critiques of Romantic 
subjectivity, the turn toward the perennial is this desire informed by the doubleness of 
Blanchot’s characterization in “The Great Refusal” and Artaud’s return to enchantment.  
For Blanchot, after moving away from the gods, humans replaced them with Reason.  
Again, he writes in the 1950s: “Today, lacking gods, we turn still more from passing 
presence in order to affirm ourselves in a universe constructed according to the measure 
of knowledge and free from the randomness that always frightens us because it conceals 
an obscure decision” (33).  We replace one form of faith with another when the gods 
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retreat, and for that reason there is  “defeat in this victory; in this truth of forms, of 
notions and of names, there is a lie.”  This lie is in a kind of human godlike immortality 
of instrumental reason that simultaneously stores our supernatural power.  Moreover, “in 
this hope that commits us to an illusory bond, to a future without death or to a logic 
without chance, there is, perhaps, the betrayal of a more profound hope that poetry 
(writing) must teach us to affirm” (34).  What poetry must affirm in regard to this is the 
double-refusal of the inability to accept death on the one hand and the apotheosizing of 
human reason on the other hand.  The “hope” is in a return to enchantment that poetry 
can help to bring about.  ‘Writing’ in 1960s French thought becomes the site of death, 
and of working out this hope.  This writing turns toward the enchantment of mysticism as 
accessed through the perennial.  But it is a writing that must overcome representation and 
form itself; and so, like Artaud the work dies and overcomes death simultaneously 
through the process of the performance itself.  Or, like the American composer and writer 
John Cage’s work, poetry becomes aleatoric or chance-based, which comes from his 
interest in eastern religion and the I-Ching. 
While differing in their use of enchantment, Cage and Artaud were on the same 
wavelength regarding performance.  Teaching at Black Mountain College in the early 
fifties, Cage found that his interest in Zen led him to a general interest in eastern 
philosophy, which greatly affected his aesthetics.  He arranged one theater performance 
at Black Mountain as follows: 
Nobody wore costumes; everybody played themselves.  Cage had an idea 
of what each performer had decided to do.  He never made specific 
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assignments because he didn’t want to be a traditional western composer, 
“someone who tells other people what to do.”  He used I Ching coin tosses 
to determine when each person would perform, and how long they would 
do it.  He was trying, he later explained, to find a way “to let sounds be 
themselves rather than vehicles for man-made theories or expressions of 
human sentiments.” (MacAdams 164) 
 
Cage makes by negating poetry as “making,” or at least making with intention.  Thus, the 
loss of inner and outer, of subject-object, was one aspiration of his aesthetic that sought 
to make the very being of the performer an individual site of artistic transcendence.  The 
result then is a loss of self.  There are obviously resonances with Hoffman’s psychedelic 
activism here as well in terms of performance, and like Hoffman, Cage saw a collapse of 
aesthetic medium and personal being as helping to bring about something new.  This 
newness was a model for the new poetry and characteristic of psychedelic aesthetics and 
mysticism. 
In his August 1959 lecture-poem, “Lecture On Nothing,” Cage exemplifies more 
clearly the collapse between being and the aesthetic work.  The body becomes a formal 
quality of the work, but this happens in the temporal space of the perennial.  In section 
five of the lecture Cage states: 
What I am calling poetry is often called content. – I myself have called it 
form.  Is is the conti – nuity of a piece of music.  Continuity today, - when 
it is necessary, is a demonstration of dis – interestedness.  That is, it is 
proof that our delight – lies in not pos-sessing anything.  Each moment – 
presents what happens.  How different – this form sense is from that which 
is bound up with – memory: themes and secondary themes; their struggle; 
– their  development; the climax; the recapitulation (which is the belief – 
that one may own one’s own home).  But actually, – unlike the snail, we 
carry our homes within us, – which enables us to fly or to stay –, -- to 
enjoy each. (829)      
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The poem exemplifies the emerging psychedelic aesthetic with form becoming localized 
in the body, but also in the reversal of form and content, suggesting the subject-object 
collapse associated with mystical experience.  Continuity in the musical sense is thus 
likened to a continuity of being.  Cage’s description of poetry and its relation to existence 
is similar to Artaud but less overtly interested in an enchanted return to something 
primordial. 
 In his collapse of subject-object distinction, Cage also presents his art and his 
criticism as the same, just as he collapses mediums of writing and music through 
performance.  By existing in a temporality like music, which must unfold in a time of 
constant presence, Cage emphasizes performance to push toward the perennial, where 
repetition can repeat, but never be the same and never be original.  Derrida, in his essay 
on Artaud, points to the same: “Because it has always already begun, representation 
therefore has no end.  But one can conceive of the closure of that which is without end.  
Closure is the circular limit within which the repetition of difference infinitely repeats 
itself” (“The Theater” 250).  This kind of thinking is of course characteristic of Derrida’s 
thinking in the 1960s. 
Writing and Difference and Of Grammatology, Derrida’s most influential texts of 
the late 1960s, firmly established him as a leader in French thought, but the work he does 
is in the tradition set-up by earlier continental thinkers.  Derrida takes Blanchot’s “Great 
Refusal” seriously and connects it with Artaud’s thought.  Derrida’s argument in Of 
Grammatology is that grammatology, or writing, should replace speech if one is to 
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understand the essence of language (164).  The implication reverses the idea that writing 
mimics or re-presents speech.  Embedded here is a critique of transcendent western 
religion similar to Derrida’s account of the non-theological stage in Artaud’s theater of 
cruelty.  Secularist liberal thinkers like Jurgen Habermas praise Derrida’s expulsion of 
the theological without paying significant enough attention to Derrida’s mystical 
overtones or poetic enchantment.  In The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity, 
Habermas writes, 
Derrida passes beyond Heidegger’s inverted foundationalism, but remains in its 
path.  As a result, the temporalized Ursprungphilosophie takes on clearer 
contours.  The remembrance of the messianism of Jewish mysticism and the 
abandoned but well-circumscribed place once assumed by the God of the Old 
Testament preserves Derrida, so to speak, from the political-moral insensitivity 
and aesthetic tastelessness of a New Paganism spiced up with Holderlin. (166-7) 
 
Habermas claims that a messianic relationship informs Derrida’s hermeneutics, not 
because he is religious (and Derrida himself asserts that that is not his interest here), but 
because of the metaphor of “the book of nature or the book of the world, which points to 
the hard-to-read, painstakingly to be deciphered handwriting of God.”  Derrida claims 
that we never have God’s original text, only fragments of it, which have been 
lost.  Habermas concludes,  
Modernity is in search of the traces of a writing that no longer holds out the 
prospect of a meaningful whole as the book of nature or Holy Scripture had done. 
. . . the signification remains upon even unintelligible texts, the signs last – matter 
survives as the trace of a spirit that has vanished. (165) 
 
What this amounts to, for Derrida, is a critique of western logocentrism.  It is not simply 
that the sign differs from the signified, that the word (logos) is different than the sound, 
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but that the word inscribes and preserves signification.  This is a preservation of a 
process, not of an isolated or fixed artifact, and so while difference must be noted, the 
connection should never be forgotten or extinguished, hence Derrida’s famous neologism 
differance – a difference which maintains and performs its instantiation of deferring over 
time.  But despite Habermas’s praising of Derrida in contrast to Heidegger, it is 
enchantment which powers this deferring.  Derrida remains optimistic about the potential 
for writing to preserve the trace:  
Because writing mortifies the living connections proper to the spoken word, it 
promises salvation for its semantic content even beyond the day on which all who 
can speak and listen have fallen prey to the holocaust. (166) 
 
Writing affirms life because it mortifies.  It is not just that writing is death, but the 
“salvation” of meaning transcends all individual hermeneutic ability.  Derrida’s gesture is 
ethically informed not because, as Habermas claims, it one-ups neo-pagan accounts of 
Romantic poetry, but in the sense that it imagines writing as potential for later meaning, 
later deciphering, and later communication.  Rather than returning to nature or the pre-
political, Derrida points to the post-political of the inescapable futurity of death, not just 
of the individual, but of the community.  And yet, there is apparently someone to do the 
deciphering after.  The writer’s subjectivity is lost in that deciphering – he or she only 
remains through a trace of a signifying process, but it is not relocated into a reader.   It 
stands in reserve for future political deliberation, as if archived as soft law.  This requires 
a view toward futurity, and deliberation is inherent in the action of writing.  Writing is 
deliberation slipping away while storing potential of standing reserve.  This is the 
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ultimate critique of the European imaginary’s reliance on subjectivity – a deliberate 
aesthetic attempt to produce what is both pre and post-political, that which, in Artaud’s 
terms goes beyond life as coming from death and returning to it; it is the presence of 
mind of human subjectivity capable of metempsychosis through a return to the perennial.   
In light of this thought, where enchantment does not give itself over to a 
secularization narrative, psychedelic aesthetics suggest that what must be accomplished 
on the return from the political in terms of writing is a redefinition of human subjectivity 
the transcends being-toward-death, that writes into human law – a law that transcends 
nation states – the human subject as capable of reincarnation.  The difficulty of this task 
of writing is to exceed representation itself.  As Derrida closes his essay on Artaud: “it is 
to think why it is fatal that, in its closure, representation continues” (250).  The difficulty 
of describing psychedelic aesthetics is metonymic of the legal problems inherent in 
representation, subjectivity and citizenship, and analyzing them in terms of political 
theology becomes a question of human rights.  If a writing that escapes being-toward-
death is to become law, it would be something akin to soft law in terms of international 
human rights.  This is a law without the ability to be enforced but nevertheless that by 
which political decisions are made “with regard to.”  Unassumingly, psychedelic 
aesthetics point to this. 
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Analyzing Psychedelic Literature 
The perennial is the space of poetic transfer in the psychedelic experience, but 
contrary to superficial accounts of the psychedelic experience, it does not end there.  
Within the perennial, Heidegger’s ‘care’ as being-toward-death is diminished in favor of 
an ongoing hum; it is expanded into a greater “love” in its non-distinction between 
things, a love that transcends eros as defined by lack.  To the extent that one remains 
embodied as a subject in the perennial, there is ongoing presence in the moment as 
cypher between past and future.  The body becomes the cypher just as writing becomes 
both death and stored potential.  ‘Care’ gives way to what some Buddhists call 
mindfulness.  In psychedelic literature, Aldous Huxley’s last novel, Island (1962), makes 
this clear as the birds – nature itself – of mythical island Pala continually call out the 
command, “Attention!” reminding people of the importance of mindfulness.  Huxley, 
whose literature I will return to in later chapters, performs psychedelic aesthetics as he 
theorizes them.  
Psychedelic experiences give one the sense of encountering the perennial, but the 
trouble in trying to account for any “experience” exists in temporality’s necessity to 
separate a person from what he or she tries to convey.  Aesthetically then, nostalgia 
becomes one method of addressing the perennial and a trip becomes a metaphor for what 
cannot be conveyed in time: ‘I am in some way the same being I was as a child, and also 
not the same being.’  Accounting for such an experience is what the conventional body of 
psychedelic literature attempts to track by representing ecstatic experience and inviting 
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audience participation in that experience.  In its appeal to the ecstatic, the rhetoric of the 
psychedelic maintains an evangelical appeal to mystery, to accounting for the unknown.  
The opened self exists in an “expanded” state where the boundaries of self become 
porous and capable of merging with other entities, physical or not.  The world is all at 
once saturated with intensified meaning.  One can think into things; objects drip into you.  
It is harder to tell where the light ends than where the world begins.  But importantly, one 
also returns to a temporality of lack: history, and that return is where psychedelic 
aesthetics and Political Theology meet – in the history of the founding event that binds 
people together.  Similar to Blanchot’s account of poetry, the psychedelic return is a 
‘presence that is at once a refusal.’ 
Many of the features of psychedelic aesthetics precede the psychedelic “era.”  In 
the Early Modern era, as Aldous Huxley frequently accounts, towns were temporarily 
taken over by the hysteria of St. Anthony’s Fire through ergot poisoning, leaving their 
inhabitants to encounter horrible images.  In the sixteenth century, witches are burned.   
Within Romantic aesthetics, as a Coleridge poem tells us, an old man stops us on our way 
to a wedding, holding us in rapture.  The reader is changed by the experience. Thomas 
Jefferson encounters a ‘natural’ land bridge.  Romantic aesthetics are full of the sub-
luminous, of what cannot be adequate to ideation and formal beauty.  What accompanies 
Romantic conceptions of nostalgia and the sublime is profound spatial and temporal 
displacement. 
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Because of this non-adequacy, to interact with the sublime is always an aesthetic 
of failure.  But there is something in the spectacle of the failure as a concrete matter-of-
fact-ness – “You failed!” – that presents a moment of witnessing and re-orientation, a 
kind of sacred cleansing.  And of course in the Christian tradition, the failure of life 
accomplishes the transcendence – through the dying body, but also through betrayal – the 
failure to recognize the divine that constitutes the human in need of salvation. 
Often, psychedelic works perform a more extreme version of the drama of failure 
through an awareness of their own performance, like tragic actors.  The works perform an 
awareness, as Artaud says, that “the actor has taken a form that negates itself to just the 
degree it frees itself and dissolves into universality” (Theater and Its Double 25).  That 
universality is the perennial.  But simultaneously, psychedelic works often also display an 
awareness of history that strategically grounds the immersion into the perennial as a 
reaction to history.  Vertical and horizontal times are both simultaneously present.  The 
engagement with history disseminates into an encultured past, relying heavily on the 
imagination of the person doing the figuring.  
Take an excerpt from the song, “Homage to Catherine and William Blake” by the 
psychedelic folk group, The Fugs.  The song begins with images of Blake and his wife 
playing out the Genesis story naked in their garden: 
William Blake, won’t you come into our brain, brain, brain, brain, brain apertures. 
Tell us, tell us about a nation gone nuts with nuts-nuts, // 
with the eating blood, Egyptian priests gaze the harvest by watching a stick in the 
river Nile, while galaxies are spinning in the sullen quasar spew.  
Demeter wants to tell her lovers all the Eleusinian secrets.  
Ooh William Blake lay down in the Rosicrucian coffin.   
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The apostrophe invokes Blake, channeling him into the present situation (the Vietnam 
War protest, to which there are other references in the song).  The channeling occurs as a 
homophonic ambiguity between the organ of the “brain” with the aperture of the seventh 
chakra at the top of the skull and ‘brane,’ short for membrane which in physics can 
embody any number of dimensions.  The vocals occur over the harmonic structure of a 
blues progression with a heavily cadenced ‘turnaround’ (which even a listener with no 
musical background can recognize).  A break in the music at the turn in the blues form 
establishes a new cycle through the form, but the vocal phrasing carries over the two 
cycles, thus suturing the harmonic form and effecting enjambment of the line (signified 
above by //).  The enjambment and the break accompany the shift to imagery of ancient 
Egypt and specifically to the Demeter myth.  As the musical form builds in tension 
toward another turn, Blake is addressed in the imperative: “lay down in the Rosicrucian 
coffin.”  This coffin invokes the mythological, occult and masonic tradition of the 
resurrection of the king.  According to images in Alexander Roob’s Hermetic Museum of 
Alchemy and Mysticism, the image of the coffin doubles as a floor plan for masonic 
orders and maps the path of an initiate from the foot of the coffin up to the head or 
position of Grand Master, symbolized by a throne (222).  In an allegorical piece entitled 
Work-table for the 3rd degree (master) c.1780, the throne is replaced with a budding palm 
freshly sprouting, with the coffin / floor plan under the earth (223).  In this context, we 
can return to the song’s reference to Demeter wishing to release her secrets.  Blake, being 
told to “lay down in the coffin,” disseminates with the help of Demeter into the mysteries 
   128 
and infuses the aperture of the speaker’s brain / brane with the answer to the nation’s 
crisis.  The psychedelic aesthetics here obscure temporality by invoking mythological 
tropes and contextualizing them in a given historical situation in an epideictic fashion of 
the ceremonious moment of the channeling.   
The psychedelic aspects of “Homage to Catherine and William Blake” perform 
something similar to Artaud’s “theater of cruelty” – Artaud’s  answer to the “plague” in 
European culture: 
This very difficult and complex poetry assumes many aspects: especially the 
aspects of all the means of expression utilizable on the stage, such as music, 
dance, plastic art, pantomime, mimicry, gesticulation, intonation, architecture, 
lighting, and scenery. (39) 
 
As the break in the music (marked by // above) that establishes the enjambment of the 
line also takes on the transcendence into mythological time above, polysemus gestures 
are layered on top of each other, creating a saturated metaphor.  This is characteristic of 
psychedelic aesthetics in both themes of death and resurrection, as well as gestural 
punning.  Jesting, invoking the occult or the mysterious obfuscates and de-temporalizes 
meaning, invoking the perennial and ultimately creating a space where ironic distance 
overcomes itself.  This jesting, however, is enchanted, and exists in the representation of 
closure: “The movement is the movement of the world as play,” as Derrida says (“The 
Theater” 250).   
Now, I want to suggest that it is in the ludic presentation of irony overcoming 
itself that that psychedelic aesthetics has something to offer more current critiques of 
subjectivity and liberal citizenship.  To get at this, I will use another example by the 
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Fugs, this time accompanied by Allen Ginsberg, as they perform an “Exorcism on the 
Grave of Senator Joseph McCarthy.”  
The exorcism has about eight parts: mixed parts of Tibetan and Zen chants to 
clear the air, a channeling of the senator’s spirit, a woman who has offered to have sex 
with the spirit followed by a performance of “My Country ‘tis of Thee.”  All of this 
seems quite tongue-in-cheek, and on the recording one can hear giggles from people in 
the group.  The giggles interrupt Ginsberg as he begins the ceremony, and he stops to say, 
“Can we have quiet, like formal, religious, ceremonial thing? For seriousness it will 
work.”  The posturing is completely self-aware, but at the same time, this is more than a 
joke.  It takes a certain degree of dedication to do it, and the recording of the event makes 
the gesture a performance for a broad and unknown audience.  Over and over in 
psychedelic works, the elaborate jesting performs exhaustion and saturation.  Moreover, 
the profane humor is overcome by cleansing the deeds of the Senator who persecuted 
leftists in the 1950s (including Erwin Piscator, who was responsible for introducing 
Artaud’s theories of performance in America).  As the performers overcome time, they 
invoke the perennial so as to have access to the spirit.  Invoking the spiritual here has 
implications for the historical moment of the performance.22 
                                                
22 An oddly similar “forgiveness” occurred later between Timothy Leary and Gordon Liddy.  Liddy had 
persecuted Leary at the Millbrook estate in the late 1960s only to find himself later the subject of public 
scorn with his involvement in the Watergate scandal.  The two men gave public appearances that were a 
kind of shoulder-shrugging about morality and law during the late sixties and early seventies. 
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The saturated psychedelic aesthetic overcoming irony performs a critique of 
modern subjectivity as derived from European culture.  Access to this critique involves 
some sort of initiation into an experience.  This notion of experience is deeply rooted in 
the European Romantic tradition, and it offers both justifications and critiques of 
liberalism upon return from the experience itself.  Such a tradition is of course not static.  
It depends on what information an individual has and with which to figure he or she 
invokes the tradition.  It operates as a cultural imaginary and individuals’ levels of 
engagement will differ in accuracy according to their respective performances.  
Nevertheless, the ability to recognize the shared experience of “the Romantic tradition” 
or to William Blake points to a site of cultural binding.  A ritualized experience of Blake 
reinforces that bond.  Being critical does not come at the expense of traditional culture. 
The return from the ecstatic experience produces the “truth” and the inclination to 
tell others about it.  The one who is properly ‘experienced’ becomes a special individual, 
not only because of participation in the ritual act, but because the experience affords 
access to a special truth, to a commitment that is capable of binding.  These themes occur 
over a broad swath of aesthetic material and mediums during the 1960s.  Many popular 
psychedelic works – from Timothy Leary’s manual, The Psychedelic Experience, to Jimi 
Hendrix’s Are You Experienced? and The Jefferson Airplane’s Volunteers of America, to 
Ken Kesey’s acid tests – overtly perform such initiations.  In their early account, 
Psychedelic Art (1968), Robert E. L. Masters and Jean Houston write of the broad range 
of psychedelic works,  
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These different works of art do have a unity, common meanings and intentions 
that keep them within the framework of psychedelic art.  However, the unity may 
not in every case be apparent to the viewer who has no first-hand experience of 
altered states of consciousness and who is not otherwise knowledgeable about 
psychedelics. (87) 
 
The first-hand experience offers exclusivity here, and the rhetoric is alluring.  Again, the 
aesthetics are evangelical.  Psychedelic experience here gives access, not just to a special 
understanding, but the ability to differentiate critically among a variety of works, to see 
connections where others cannot, essentially to have gnosis following initiation.  
Part of that gnosis critiques an existing social European imaginary (and politically 
of course its American descendants).  With regard to the psychedelic era, the fantasy 
structure of psychedelic experience must be situated historically as a critique of the 
European Enlightenment and the notion that immersion into “nature” and a return from it 
not only brings truth but a kind of purification.  The hope or expectation for such 
purification is present in psychedelic works, and ideologically those works attempt to 
reform liberalism.  Representationally, this reform took place through refiguring 
subjectivity and governance.  In order to articulate, let me provide a brief historical gloss 
with some important features of liberalism and its relationship to subjectivity. 
 
Liberalism and Subjectivity 
In the great political thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries – Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau – humans are born “in a state of nature.”  Civilization, especially for Rousseau, 
corrupts this initially innocent state, and in Emile: Treatise on Education, Rousseau 
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suggests that the best way to raise a child is to allow him or her “to experience,” not just 
haphazardly but through the tutor’s unseen hand setting up learning situations.  In this 
fantasy structure, women and children are inherently closer to nature, more innocent, and 
less capable of rational decision-making, while men are more corrupt by the evils of 
civilization and the manufacturing of morality and justice.  Any desire for a man to return 
to a state of nature is an inherent critique of civilization, to become childish and 
effeminate.   
To the extent that Romantic men immersed themselves in “nature” was both a 
social critique and an advancement of liberalism.  On the one hand, one would experience 
immersion into the sublime as a way to broaden subjectivity and then conquer it through 
re-integration.  Freedom allows for this growth, so freedom is an important value as a 
motivational force.  On the other hand, a kind of Freudianism is at work (if I may be a bit 
ahistorical here) in the desire to merge with effeminate constructions of nature and 
childhood.  One is tempted to “go native.” As colonization began to flourish, and 
nostalgia along with it, a perceived lack of civilized political structures by European 
colonists made indigenous people who tended to live in “natural” environments seem to 
be “primitive people” for Europeans.  In the confusing metaphor of the European 
imaginary, autochthonous “others” were generally seen by Europeans as childish, 
necessitating the moral responsibility for colonization.   
Land, women, children and “primitives” then become commodities in this 
structure, not just as property but also as a perceived moral responsibility in a cultured 
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lineage.  For example, the desire for the pastoral setting, the country house, which 
English men of the Enlightenment inherited from their own nostalgia for the Roman 
Empire, acquired part of its relaxed status from its ability to reconcile control with 
comfort.  Interestingly, as Quentin Skinner has argued in Liberty Before Liberalism, the 
Roman pastoral balance is disrupted by commercialism and growing liberal markets: 
With the extension of the manners of the court to the bourgeoisie in the early 
eighteenth century, the virtues of the independent gentleman began to look 
irrelevant and even inimical to a polite and commercial age.  The hero of the neo-
roman writers came to be viewed not as plain-hearted but as rude and boorish; not 
as uptight but as obstinate and quarrelsome; not as a man of fortitude but one of 
mere insensibility. (97) 
 
It is possible to see two later literary examples of this figure in the ineffective landlord, 
Arthur Brooke, from George Eliot’s Middlemarch, and in the more lovingly portrayed 
Mr. Toad in Wind in the Willows.  The “insensibility” that Skinner refers to aligns with 
the emergence of moral “sensibility” pervasive in the nineteenth century, largely explored 
in the bulky novels of the period.  More recent critics like Michel Foucault and Alasdair 
MacIntyre have shown the emergence of morality as the product of a dissemination of 
values in a public and secular sphere.  In their view, the rise of moralism in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries accompanied liberalism and emergent “secular” 
nation-states.  This “sensibility” was to be accomplished by the individual capable of 
self-transcendence.  To Carl Schmitt, the twentieth-century German legal theorist and 
critic of liberalism, the same occurrence happened in legal writing of the period: “All 
significant concepts of the state are secularized religious concepts” and the state of 
exception (under which the Third Reich came into power in Schmitt’s time) is analogous 
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to the “miracle” in theology (Political Theology).  In the European imaginary then, the 
return to nature and the pre-political is accomplished in twentieth-century states of 
political exception as a return to enchanted, pre-transcendent theology.  
Deterritorialization and depoliticizatin throughout the twentieth century creates the 
religious conditions for a return to immanent spirituality – a return to the miraculous.23    
In this context, commerce and consumption appear to perform the inherent ability to 
produce sacrifice rites through the force of the economy.  But according to a secularist 
narrative, this dissemination of traditional religiosity into “secular” morality would 
logically eradicate the necessity for religion in any institutional sense or religio as 
binding.  The nature of “freedom” and “liberalism” is to unbind, but the frame in which 
these terms make sense must simultaneously reinforce something that acts as an 
oppressive force from which to inscribe subjectivity.  Without that oppressive force, the 
values, as Marcuse argued, lose all revolutionary potential.  However, if Schmitt was 
right and at their roots all significant political concepts are really religious, then 
secularization never really completed itself as a project and a political theological mess is 
at hand.  What frightened Schmitt about twentieth century liberalism was the easy 
slippage away from political entities that could be defined internationally in terms of 
friend-enemy distinction into an amorphous and uncontrollable global economy.  
The various economic problems of the twentieth century, the necessity to think in 
terms of international and world economies, outstripped even advanced industrial 
                                                
23 The work of Hent De Vries on miracles has significance here. 
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governments’ abilities to frame an individual citizen’s sacrifice in geographical terms of 
nation-states.  In the depoliticized transference of state power to the world economy, the 
“self” had to be buffered by economic consumption.  One only needs to think of nuclear 
proliferation after World War Two to see that technology and the economy combined 
into the desperate attempt to regulate international state power that still occurs regarding 
nuclear weapons today.  During the early half of the twentieth century, not only had State 
moral authority disseminated into the economic sphere, the entire western conception of 
self and how to transcend it became vacuous, and it is from this de-territorialized space 
that the ideas of “self help” and new ageism characterized in the mid-twentieth century 
by the psychedelic movement derived its exigency.  But this return to self in the United 
States drew on enchanted aspects of subjectivity from both European and American 
aesthetic traditions.  Enchantment saturates American aesthetics and politics from the 
Antinomian controversy in the 1630s on.  Psychedelic aesthetics, however, draw on this 
tradition of enchantment while continuing to critique versions of subjectivity derived 
from the European imaginary.  While seen in the 1960s as countercultural or 
revolutionary, psychedelic aesthetics in the 1960s often drew on the tradition of 
American enchantment to conserve an idea of liberal subjectivity – a preservation 
attempt.  One need only think of freak flags flying and Peter Fonda’s motorcycle in Easy 
Rider.  Many works displaying psychedelic aesthetics in this regard were anything but 
anarchic – in their attempts to preserve liberalism they were quite conservative too. 
   136 
A more specific example of this attempt to redefine liberal subjectivity shows up 
in the critique of masculinity as it came to occupy the effeminate, natural, and childlike 
qualities as refuge while the expanded notion of self came to allow a broadened sense of 
citizenship.  Such emasculation broadened liberal citizenship, allowing for the extension 
of civil rights to those previously left out of the cultural imaginary.  As bleak as it seems, 
much civil rights progress is made out of the motivation to preserve state power.  As we 
shall see below, emasculation is an important theme in psychedelic works, but the more 
important point here is that this also entailed the questioning of the necessity of existence 
of the entire imaginary.  Crises in liberalism are crises of self, subjectivity and 
transcendence.   
General as this historical gloss may be, it is a necessary reminder in order to find 
a way into the psychedelic experience because “the psychedelic” – at least in the 1960s –
largely manifests many aspects of the European fantasy structure.  In doing so, 
psychedelic experiences (and the way they have been written about since the 1960s) 
perform an inherent social critique of a fantasy structure, and only in juxtaposition to 
such a fantasy structure do psychedelic experiences convey their whole meaning.  In 
performing the critique, of course, psychedelic experiences also often affirm the power of 
such fantasy by relying on the critique, no matter what that structure’s flaws may be and 
no matter how radical the turn to the perennial was in the 1960s.  Many psychedelic 
artists were aware of this at the time.   
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Some luminary writers were able to articulate the difficulties of the return to the 
perennial and psychedelics during the1960s.  Marcuse himself had said that nothing 
indicated that a revolution had to happen.  As a literary example, Tom Wolfe’s The 
Electric Kool-Aid Acid Tests recounts Ken Kesey’s unwelcomed reception at an anti-war 
rally in Berkeley where he tried to tell the crowd that activism only affirmed the authority 
of the existing powers-that-be.  This incident evidences a different approach to the use of 
psychedelics, the perennial, and 1960s activism in contrast to my earlier examples.  At 
the rally, Kesey told the crowd of demonstrators: 
We’ve all heard all this and seen all this before, but we keep on doing it…I went 
to see the Beatles last month…And I heard 20,000 girls screaming together at the 
Beatles…and I couldn’t hear what they were screaming, either…But you don’t 
have to…They’re screaming Me! Me! Me! Me!...I’m Me!...That’s the cry of the 
ego, and that’s the cry of this rally!... Me! Me! Me! Me!...And that’s why wars get 
fought…ego…because enough people want to scream Pay attention to Me…Yep, 
you’re playing their game . . . 
There’s only one thing to do…there’s only one thing’s gonna do any good at 
all…and that’s everybody just look at it, look at the war, and turn your backs and 
say…Fuck it…(224) [Wolfe’s italics] 
 
What sets psychedelic aesthetics here apart from other examples of social activism in the 
1960s such as Hoffman and The Fugs is that the theory of the psychedelic experience 
aspires to participate by situating a new subjectivity or citizenship, not in a state of 
expanded consciousness, but rather in their return from that state.  Whereas The Fugs and 
Hoffman invoked ludic ceremonies for public crises, Kesey at this point had given up on 
exigency as determined by existing politics.  Whereas general civil rights protests may 
have been about more inclusivity for citizenship, the formulaic nature of the psychedelic 
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ultimately had to impose a limit.  Not everyone could be a prankster.  The bus was not 
big enough, at least not so long as it inhabited real space.  
In other words, the psychedelic is not just an argument for more inclusivity into a 
larger social frame; it is also a tactic for exclusivity.  Because, it employs enchantment to 
achieve the redrawing of citizenship, the psychedelic enacts political theology.  The ego-
broadening experience collects more, accounts for more, and often gets what it asks for – 
an overcoming of individuality, of ego, of self, etc.  But then what?  The psychedelic 
experience does not remain in Dionysian ecstasy or in Beatlemania. Such overcoming of 
ego is an inherent critique of European notions of selfhood and a therapeutic 
rehabilitation of the concept, but only in the return from the psychedelic experience can 
the newly (re)-incarnated ‘self’ account for the trip.   
Kesey’s recommendation to say ‘fuck it’ is socially motivated by an ethical 
perspective that has transcended the authority of the nation-state.  In this sense it is 
different than Timothy Leary’s more evangelical invocation to “Turn on, tune in, drop 
out.”  For Kesey, all one needs to do is reject the entire frame of states, nationality, or an 
ego.  He has no answers. 
The problem of accounting for this transcendence beyond nation states manifests 
as an aesthetic concern with process and the difficulty of presenting works as open or 
transcending historical facticity.  As seen with the Fugs’ song above, Kesey’s 
performance at the Vietnam Day rally, and the Merry Pranksters’ trip across the United 
States in the legendary bus “Further,” psychedelic aesthetics perform polysemus layering 
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at the level of poetics and story.  It is a collapse that cannot be easily parsed out by a 
hermeneutic system distinguishing between gradated levels of reality – literal, allegorical, 
etc. since part of the point is to create the collapse of distinction.  The collapse of 
distinction overcomes the ego while simultaneously invoking a failure.  As The Electric 
Kool-Aid Acid Tests exemplifies, Ken Kesey fails at being an outlaw as well as at his 
Tom Sawyer-like attempt to fake his own death.  Kesey and the pranksters also 
importantly fail in their attempt to make a movie documenting their trip across the 
country.  Nevertheless, what the film attempted to track is the progress itself.  Once the 
trip was over, the attempt to edit dissipated as the pranksters lost the momentum of the 
trip.24   
Because of the importance of failure and limit-experiences, the notion of 
reincarnation as an aesthetic quality is perhaps a better way to analyze psychedelic works.  
Inherent in failure is a refusal of immortality and a recognition of presence.  Within the 
notion of reincarnation, we account for the return from the “death” of the perennial.  We 
can also overcome the linear trajectory of narratives based only on causality.  The 
‘progress’ of the psychedelic experience is accomplished by an intentional redrawing of 
the border between self and world, perhaps with a deeper sense of one’s place in the 
world or connection to other things; nevertheless, the recovered self is an embodied self 
verified in aesthetic works.  This is no appeal to pure transcendence.  The failure remains 
                                                
24 While a movie version, The Magic Bus, was released in 2011, ten years after Kesey’s actual death, it 
seems to miss the point of the original failure – all of which culminated in Kesey’s idea of a graduation 
from acid, which many people failed to do. 
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essential because the Clear Light of the Void was not achieved.  One is here on earth, in a 
body – not with Atman, not with Oversoul, not with God, but separate and different from, 
like any good liberal subject.  Re-embodiment is failure itself, not just because the 
emergence of consciousness is simultaneously the emergence of consciousness-as-
different-from the divine, but because such a consciousness wills a kind of bodhisattva-
like compassion.  Failure broadens a definition of death.  It becomes the “great 
equalizer.”  The problem of the perennial and dehistoricization arises from a conception 
of being-toward death where responsibility cannot easily account for what comes before.  
One could certainly claim: “this is pure fiction!”  But as political theology shows, we 
have many fictions already – it is a matter of good fiction.  The end of any substantive 
rhetoric, as Socrates tells Gorgias, is to use myth for directing toward the Good.   
The trope of death and rebirth permeates psychedelic works, but taken seriously 
we come up against a wall here.  One does not will re-integration; reintegration happens.  
Not everyone is a bodhisattva who “chooses” to come back.  Art struggles historically 
with relationship to religion because art appears to be consumed with corpses.  With 
regard to a fiction of reincarnation, we remain here precisely because of the fact that true 
enlightenment was not achieved.  The ego-death experience affords a temporary vantage-
point, the ability to “hear behind the music,” so to speak, while an immersion takes place 
with nature in the raw.  It is this aspect that affords psychedelic criticism with the ability 
to cover wide swaths of time and culture, to merge with the perennial.  We never get the 
whole picture, but with the psychedelic experience we certainly get more of it.   
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Despite the ethical concerns one may have of such a method – for example, the 
seductive tendency for psychonauts of privileged means to superimpose their subjective 
experience onto “humanity” – it is important to see these critical affordances as part of a 
structured social critique of liberal subjectivity and not just naïve sentiment.  Certainly 
lots of people during the 1960s and since have uncritically used psychedelics and made 
psychedelic art, but they have also uncritically gone to church, voted, etc.  Early pioneers 
of the psychedelic movement did indeed have theories and plans to change the human 
condition.  
Perennialism manifests in psychedelic works, but the critical problem remains, 
especially if we are considering how psychedelic works might give a context for 
deliberating about subjectivity currently.  How can we trust such works?  What 
disclaimers should we make from the outset so as to not seem naïve?  Where does this 
paranoia about who to trust come from?  Paranoia is the doubling of the mind – 
superficiality, above the face: the decentering of subjectivity already occurring in these 
states establishes an appeal to truth, to justice, and to the sacred.  It is helpful here to turn 
to attempts to critically analyze and even theorize the psychedelic experience.  In the next 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THEORIZING THE PSYCHEDELIC EXPERIENCE 
 
R. A. Durr’s Poetic Vision and the Psychedelic Experience (1970) is a model text 
for the period with respect to theorizing psychedelic aesthetics.  Durr uses a perennial 
approach to literary criticism, focusing on the interrelatedness of all poetic experience 
from Plotinus to Eckhart to Blake to Wordsworth to Traherne to Yeats and Huxley…the 
list is expansive and exhaustingly inexhaustible.  Durr’s focus on poetry allows him to 
discuss his subject matter over time, and it allows him to make claims about mysticism 
and writing.  There certainly are features of poetics that cannot simply be situated in a 
period study.  More importantly, Durr’s book offers a glimpse at an earnest acceptance of 
the value of psychedelic experience.  He is not writing from a “Woodstock-became- 
Altamont” or post Charles Manson perspective.  In addition, the sense of failure that 
psychedelic aesthetics inherit from the European avant-garde is not apparent in his 
entirely optimistic criticism.  Durr’s book, therefore, works better as an historical artifact 
than a detailed literary-aesthetic study.  The book presents a native disposition from the 
late 1960s with all its seeming naïvete.   
Durr arranges the book beginning with a description of the imagination; then he 
moves onto ego-loss, cosmology and the usefulness of “play.”  His basic structure begins 
by making observations about the psychedelic experience, usually citing contemporary 
psychological studies, and then delving into broad citations in no particular historical or 
geographical order.  What is assumed is a kind of “Great Books” mentality where Human 
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culture, established by tradition, automatically takes on sacred spiritual qualities.  Durr is 
fairly ecumenical and he enchants the secular.  The poets he cites have as much spiritual 
authority as any religious figure – Walt Whitman appears alongside gospels and The 
Upanishads.  It is all one: perennial.   
A similar approach to literature appears as a bibliographic appendix to Ram 
Dass’s classic Remember Be Here Now (1971), which is an extensive “further reading 
list.”  Like Hoffman’s attempt to spread the gospel of good music along his journey, Ram 
Dass spreads the gospel of good literature.  There is even a kind of hierarchy implied by 
various section titles: “Books to Hang Out With,” “Books to Visit Now and Then,” and 
“Books It’s Useful to Have Met” (126). The first section is largely filled with books from 
the world’s major religions accompanied by Theosophical literature and, of course, 
Aldous Huxley’s Perennial Philosophy.  The second section contains mystical poetry, a 
few novels by Hermann Hesse, Aldous Huxley and Christopher Isherwood as well as 
numerous books from the American New Thought tradition.  The final section is more of 
the same, but more western philosophers are included and more literature – Isaac 
Asimov, Jorge Borges, John Fowles, Henry Miller, Ken Kesey and J. D. Salinger among 
them.  Although Ram Dass and R. A. Durr both refer to authors ancient and modern from 
all over the world, they maintain a level of optimism with roots in American New 
Thought movement, an attention to self-help through thinking positively and caring for 
the spirit and soul. There is less overt social critique than in the sociological and activist 
literature and poetry.  In both Durr and Ram Dass, the perennial works to transcend both 
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time and national territory. The space of the perennial is where one accomplishes spiritual 
“progress.”  The critical move expands globally. 
It also accounts for the newly emergent.  In High Priest, Timothy Leary is 
perfectly comfortable interweaving Genesis and the I-Ching with The Magus by John 
Fowles, published in 1967 and R. G. Wasson’s writings on hallucinogenic mushrooms.  
Always the trickster, Leary is to a certain extent being intentionally “sacrilegious.”  But 
his use of paratext or marginalia literally frames his personal narrative with perennial 
accounts of culture.  One of the more charming aspects of psychedelic critical literature, 
however, remains the complete openness to accepting emergent aesthetic work as part of 
the discussion, yet even this is historically loaded.  Many of the writers Ram Dass 
suggests, for example, spent time with Vedic philosophy.  Philip Goldberg, in American 
Veda, discusses some of these writers’ relationships to Vedanta, which arrived in the 
United States in 1893 with Swami Vivekananda – a student of Sri Ramakrishna – at the 
World Parliament of Religions in Chicago (Goldberg 67).  With regard to any theory of 
the psychedelic experience, perennialism must be understood within the contexts of 
Vedanta and New Thought. 
According to the Vedanta Society of California, where Aldous Huxley, Gerald 
Heard and Christopher Isherwood studied with Swami Prabhavananda and Isherwood 
edited the collection Vedanta for the Western World, 
the word “Vedanta” is revealing: “Vedanta” is a combination of two words: 
“Veda” which means “knowledge” and “anta” which means “the end of” or “the 
goal of.” In this context the goal of knowledge isn’t intellectual—the limited 
knowledge we acquire by reading books. “Knowledge” here means the 
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knowledge of God as well as the knowledge of our own divine nature. Vedanta, 
then, is the search for Self-knowledge as well as the search for God. (“A Brief 
Overview”) 
 
Psychedelic aesthetics inherit this approach to knowledge, which then affords a perennial 
approach.  Vedanta also generally refers to the study of the Upanishads as closing 
commentary on the knowledge of the Vedas.  Accompanying the knowledge itself is 
really a kind of disposition or attitude, easily written off as naïve and overly general, 
especially when the attitude is applied, as in Durr’s case, to literary study.  Psychedelic 
aesthetics are Vedantic in the sense of using knowledge toward its end, and such 
knowledge is not determined necessarily by period or culture.  This can easily be 
confused with an overly humanistic epistemology.  This disposition, present in Durr, 
Leary and Ram Dass, gives many psychedelic works a “how to” quality, as well as 
particularly notable degree of earnestness.  It is perhaps easier to accept when a book like 
Ram Dass’s advertises itself as a self-help manual and more difficult to accept in Durr’s 
book, which advertises itself as an academic survey.   
Durr’s book is certainly not the only one of its kind; in fact, structurally it owes 
much to Aldous Huxley’s prototypical Perennial Philosophy (1944) – another broad 
collection of citations from various sacred sources around the world, accompanied by 
brief commentaries by the author.  Huxley wrote it in the context of the Second World 
War and it builds upon his defense of pacifism in Eyeless in Gaza, Ends and Means, An 
Encyclopedia of Pacifism, and The Grey Eminence as well as his self-help book The Art 
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of Seeing. The difference between Huxley and the others is that Huxley is all too aware of 
the problem of superficiality.  He writes in his introduction to the Perennial Philosophy:  
Unfortunately, familiarity with traditionally hallowed writings tends to breed, not 
indeed contempt, but something which, for practical purposes, is almost as bad – 
namely a kind of reverential insensibility, a stupor of the spirit, an inner deafness 
to the meaning of sacred words. (vii)   
 
Huxley is warning of the dangers of perennialism, and he intentionally tries to sidestep 
such insensibility by categorizing his examples according to a critical distinction used by 
the 9th century Indian philosopher, Shankara.  He distinguishes between Shruti and Smriti 
texts.  Shruti “depends upon direct perception [while Smriti] plays a part analogous to 
induction, since, like induction, it derives its authority from an authority other than itself” 
(Shankara in Huxley vi).  This seems similar to common distinctions between primary 
and secondary sources in literary study.  As above, Ram Dass’s book presents itself as a 
primary text insofar as it is a “how to” guide, but R. A. Durr’s survey loses some of its 
authority by being primarily a secondary source, passing as merely inspired commentary.  
What lies behind Durr’s book more than Ram Dass’s, however, is the perennial Vedanta 
model more articulately expressed in Huxley: 
Philosophia Perennis—the phrase was coined by Leibniz; but the thing—the 
metaphysic that recognizes a divine Reality substantial to the world of things and 
lives and minds; the psychology that finds in the soul something similar to, or 
even identical with, divine Reality; the ethic that places man’s final end in the 
knowledge of the immanent and transcendent. Ground of all being—the thing is 
immemorial and universal.  Rudiments of the Perennial Philosophy may be 
found among the traditional lore of primitive peoples in every region of the world, 
and in its fully developed forms it has a place in every one of the higher religions. 
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If we read Durr and Ram Dass with this attitude in mind, we begin to see how the move 
toward perennialism distorts linear, historical time intentionally and makes the author a 
kind of guide to the divine, a vertical move.  In psychedelic aesthetics, the speaker 
occupies the space of a guide.  This secularization of the priestly role certainly has 
precedent in liberal mystical religion, most notably Quakerism, where every member has 
the authority to speak.  
But the “guiding” author is also personalized in a particular way in psychedelic 
works.  Durr, citing Alan Watts’ Joyous Cosmology (1962) and Malden Grange Bishop’s 
The Discovery of Love (1963), writes:  
most of the personal accounts of the psychedelic experience relate in various ways 
this sense of joyousness or happiness, the certitude that life is at its heart 
purposeless play, ‘joy for the sake of joy,’ however many and apparently 
disparate – or desperate – the games of human composition. (195)   
 
A kind of eudaimonia is at work here.  In his introduction to Malden Grange Bishop’s 
book, Dr. Humphry Osmond comments on the necessity for psychedelic therapy to 
include personal history: “The background here is the whole of the author’s life and 
unless we know what manner of man he is, we cannot hope to follow, let alone 
understand, his account of the mind manifesting experience” (Bishop 8).  So, just as with 
Masters and Houston argue in Psychedelic Art, the personal “experience” of the initiated 
author is necessary.  This is indeed the liberal “personalism” Farrell discusses in The 
Spirit of the Sixties.  The evangelical impulse of psychedelic aesthetics is present here as 
a defense of liberalism. 
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The tradition of Enlightenment “experience” formulated in a liberal subject who 
can account for his or her actions also remains essential.  The experience itself conditions 
the subject, which is why the psychedelic experience must include a return from an 
expanded ego.  During the merged, perennial part of the experience, however, subject-
object distinction breaks down.  The evangelical aspects of psychedelic aesthetics merge 
the audience with the work or the artist as “guide” for that work, as in the earlier example 
of Leary’s listing description erasing first-person and avoiding “to be” verbs.  The 
English language’s heavy reliance on subject-verb-object syntax lends itself to easy 
poetic clichés here, but it also matched Leary’s emerging concepts of collaborative 
experiences between patient and therapist in the late 1950s.  The personal aspects here 
point to medicinal conceptions of the psychedelic experience.  In theorizing psychedelic 
aesthetics, one cannot forget that the entire concept of the psychedelic experience arises 
as therapy – whether in Artaud, Eliade, Huxley or Leary – and early models are usually 
in one way or another entrenched in psychoanalytic theories.  Eliade’s narrative of the 
double “fall,” first as a fall away from the state of nature and then as a repressed desire 
for return is useful here as a reminder that early psychedelic theory is steeped in critiques 
of the European imaginary.  
In psychoanalytic theories of the European tradition there is almost always a 
locating and recovering of self from past trauma.  The frame implies a fallen condition, 
and certainly there is an overlap with the avant-garde aesthetic impulse toward failure 
here.  The value implied by early psychoanalytic models is a stable individual, a person 
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who is “normed” to some sort of social system in tension with the trauma that necessarily 
warps life; that is, the “normal” has necessarily and successfully overcome some sort of 
initial trauma, implying that trauma of some sort is fundamental not just to the person 
psychologically injured but to any normal person.  Artaud’s antipathy for Lacan in the 
late 1930s rejected all of this, even though Lacan does not present nearly as “normed” a 
paradigm as Freud.  For Freud, the steps toward well-adjustment appear as “stages,” 
which even he admitted to C. G. Jung were more stably structured and argued for the 
sake of founding the discipline rather than as a presentation of truly fixed stages.  In other 
words, one cannot simply write-off the discipline as being overly “rationalistic” – though 
one is tempted to when Freud, in Civilization and its Discontents implies that the 
“oceanic,” sublime feeling of religion is for those who, unlike him, are rationally weak – 
but the very idea of the unconscious, founded in an aesthetics of the sublime, assumes 
that we gain something through the analytic process.  Structural and post-structural 
accounts, across disciplines, merely perform a dialectical pattern collapsing subjectivity 
and objectivity, form and content, analyzer and analysand, ethnographer and people – 
State and citizen.  Both Freud and Jung transfer care for the individual into care for the 
State.    
For Jung, what is gained through psychoanalysis is a particular kind of care for 
the liberal individual. In a passage from a late essay (1957), Jung’s remarks seem 
prescient for the coming 1960s: 
Happiness and contentment, equability of mind and meaningfulness of life – these 
can be experienced only by the individual and not by a State, which, on the one 
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hand is nothing but a convention agreed to by independent individuals and, on the 
other, continually threatens to suppress the individual. (60) 
 
Following this passage, Jung suggests that the role of the psychologist is to enable the 
individual to be free from “illusions,” a guide of sorts.  For him, these illusions are the 
fantasy structures of European society itself, which traditionally attempted to present a 
fully realized rational person.  In this sense, Jung might agree with Antonin Artaud, 
whose avant-garde aesthetics rail against psychology: “Psychology, which works 
relentlessly to reduce the unknown to the known, to the quotidian and the ordinary, is the 
cause of the theater’s abasement and its fearful loss of energy, which seems to have 
reached its lowest point” (The Theater 77).  Normed culture anaesthetizes art, in other 
words, and according to Artaud makes way for the necessity of a theater of cruelty. 
One cannot downplay the importance that psychology as a discipline had to 
pervasively critique the idea of a homogenized culture in the 1950s.  Perhaps the most 
widely known articulation of such a critique appeared in David Riesman’s The Lonely 
Crowd, which characterized two fundamental human revolutions: the first taking place 
with the advent of European markets in the Early modern era and the second being a 
“shift from an age of production to an age of consumption” (6).  Riesman was by no 
means a lone voice, but when coupled with Jung’s take on the psychologist’s role as 
being to help the individual rather than society or the State, we can begin to see the 
climate in which the theorists of the psychedelic experience were working and from 
which they built their critiques of subjectivity.  This was indeed serious academic study 
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for the period.  The discipline of psychology was a fertile ground for theories of the 
psychedelic experience, but there were literary and philosophical counterparts as well. 
It was in a letter in 1957 to Aldous Huxley that the term “psychedelic” was first 
coined by Humphry Osmond.  Following Huxley’s own positive experiences with the 
Vedantic society and his personal experimentation with drugs, first with mescaline and 
later with LSD 25, which provided the grounds for The Doors of Perception (1954) and 
Heaven and Hell (1956), Huxley came to see the potential social benefits of drug-use for 
intentionally expanding consciousness.  In their correspondence, Huxley and Osmond 
tried to find a less pejorative name than the term “psychotomimetic” for the drugs, 
implying an artificial production of a state of psychosis.  This term largely derived from 
the development of psychoactive drug research into finding a “truth serum” to use on 
enemy soldiers during World War II in concert with the Office of Strategic Services, 
which after the war became the CIA.  The central theory of psychotomimetic drugs was 
established in a paper by Dr. Paul Hoch, which “reported that the symptoms produced by 
LSD, mescaline and related drugs were similar to those of schizophrenia: intensity of 
color perception, hallucinations, depersonalization, intense anxiety, paranoia, and in some 
cases catatonic manifestations” (Lee and Shlain 20).  Just a year before The Doors of 
Perception was published, “Allen Dulles, director of CIA, lectured at Princeton that the 
Soviets had started a ‘sinister’ battle for “men’s minds.”  To deal with the problem in the 
emerging Cold War, Dulles authorized MK-ULTRA, (although it was Richard Helms’s 
idea) (27).  MK-ULTRA became the umbrella project that provided funding for 
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widespread behavioral modification research, often involving unwitting subjects (and 
sometimes unwitting researchers), surreptitiously tested on all demographics of United 
States citizens.  One cannot explore the psychedelic without excursions into State bio-
politics, both at the philosophical and material-historical level. 
The term “psychotomimetic” aligns with the research development goals for the 
State.  The CIA was so paranoid about the Soviets developing mind-control techniques 
before the United States that it “authorized the purchase of 10 kilos of LSD in 1953 for 
$240,000 from Sandoz Laboratories because ‘a CIA contact in Switzerland mistook a 
kilogram for a milligram’” (24).  Despite the hilarious mistake which probably had a 
significant role in production and distribution of LSD 25, this reveals CIA’s interest in 
keeping the drug in their control, which of course did not work.  Huxley and Osmond had 
different research goals. 
Although Huxley’s Brave New World had presented a dark view of a drug-
induced society in the early 1930s, a view that seems to be explored implicitly by MK-
ULTRA, Huxley had changed his mind about the drugs’ potential for social liberation by 
the early 1950s.  Even so, Huxley’s characteristically sardonic take on consumerism 
remained intact throughout both periods.  For example, employing his propaganda 
slogans made famous in Brave New World in the 1930s, Huxley suggested to Osmond the 
verb ‘phaneroein’ “to make the visible manifest” compounded with “thymos” for soul as 
a replacement for psychotomimetic (Moksha 107).  Huxley ends his letter: 
“Phanerothyme – substantive. Phanerothymic – adjective. To make this trivial world 
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sublime, take half a gramme of phanerothyme.”  Eventually, Huxley and Osmond settled 
on “psychedelic,” literally mind-manifesting, as a replacement.  And while psychedelic 
was a less pejorative term, Huxley’s rhetorical agenda was also based on his aesthetic 
sensibilities. 
Huxley saw his role as a “literary man” (he had wanted to become a doctor but his 
problems with his eyesight prevented it) as being able to keep scientific specialists aware 
of the ethical concerns surrounding their work.  While the bioethical concerns are clear in 
Brave New World, he also lectured heavily at conferences on psychology and 
parapsychology, as well as at the Vedanta Center.  Ultimately, Huxley believed that 
giving public access to psychedelics with entheogenic properties could help bring in a 
new stage of human civilization by giving people the opportunity control their own 
minds.  In this, Huxley is the premiere theorist of psychedelic experience and its political-
theological ramifications.   
Huxley built his agenda out of scientific, philosophical and psychological thought 
current at the time.  In 1953, trying to obtain the mescaline with which he planned to 
experiment on himself, Huxley wrote to Osmond: 
It looks as though the most satisfactory working hypothesis about the human mind 
must follow, to some extent, the Bergsonian model, in which the brain with its 
associated normal self, acts as a utilitarian device for limiting, and making 
selections from, the enormous possible world of consciousness, and for canalizing 
experience into biologically profitable channels.  Disease, mescaline, emotional 
shock, aesthetic experience and mystical enlightenment have the power, each in 
its different way to varying degrees, to inhibit the functions of the normal self and 
its ordinary brain activity, thus permitting the “other world” to rise to 
consciousness.  The basic problem of education is, How to make the best of both 
worlds – the world of biological utility and common sense, and the world of 
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unlimited experience underlying.  I suspect that the complete solution to the 
problem can only come to those who have learned to establish themselves in the 
third and ultimate world of ‘the spirit’, the world which subtends and 
interpenetrates both of the other worlds. (Moksha 29-30) 
 
Huxley presents a good glimpse at his metaphysics here.  Humans, by the nature of their 
limited consciousness, have limited access to reality.  Through a myriad of ways, both 
good and bad, the limits can be expanded, at least temporarily.  However, what is 
“outside” the limit is not necessarily “more real” than the inside.  The “other world” in 
this passage seems to account for both the physical world and the unconscious.  The 
“ultimate world of ‘the spirit’ fuses both.  Optimistically, humans can learn “to establish 
themselves” in this world.  This, it seems, would require a certain degree of self-control, 
however.  One must consider this view of spirit in tandem with the cosmology presented 
in The Perennial Philosophy. 
Huxley’s letter goes on to lament the poor state of learning in the world and 
especially the United States, where Huxley believes education destroys “openness to 
inspiration” outside of the Sears-Roebuck catalogue “which constitutes the 
conventionally ‘real’ world” (Moksha 30).  In order for human society to progress in such 
a state, Huxley believes that people’s minds must be opened, even if by artificial means.  
Although it was a decade before Herbert Marcuse would publish One Dimensional Man, 
Huxley, one might say that Huxley thought of drugs as a potential way out of one-
dimensional society.  He goes on: 
In such a system of education it may be that mescaline or some other chemical 
substance may play a part by making it possible for young people to ‘taste and 
see’ what they have learned about at second hand, or directly at a lower level of 
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intensity, in the writings of the religious, or the works of poets, painters, or 
musicians. (Moksha 30) 
 
Young people, students, are particularly situated to benefit from drug use here, but they 
benefit from aesthetic enhancement that helps them better understand art.  For Huxley, 
consciousness may be expanded both intentionally and unintentionally, internally through 
self-reflection and externally through drugs, but not to infinity and not for long periods of 
time.  Consciousness is a non-static form, but it is still a form, and the process of limiting 
it is necessary to survival.  Embodiment is necessity because form coincides with the 
ability to perceive form.  A theory of psychedelic experience begins to take shape 
proceeding from the notion that consciousness is dynamic and expandable, but at the 
same time a limiting shape of consciousness heuristically establishes itself.  It is not 
necessarily through the willed-act of the individual that consciousness takes shape – that 
seems to be a ‘natural’ ordering property of the brain – but the will can have an affect on 
the size and shape of consciousness.   
Although Huxley seems optimistic about the will and self-determination in 
relation to consciousness, he is simultaneously deeply critical of subjectivity.  One of the 
benefits of drugs is the ability to transcend selfish solipsism.  In Huxley’s 1958 essay, 
“Drugs that Shape Men’s Minds,” an article commissioned by The Saturday Evening 
Post (Horowitz 146), he claims that human society is moving closer to the one he 
described in Brave New World, faster than he ever could have imagined.  Like many 
other thinkers at the time, Huxley begins by lamenting the trap of modern subjectivity, 
going on to say, 
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Correlated with this distaste for the idolatrously worshipped self, there is in all of 
us a desire, sometimes latent, sometimes conscious and passionately expressed, to 
escape from the prison of our individuality, an urge to self-transcendence.  It is to 
this urge that we owe mystical theology, spiritual exercises, and yoga – to this, 
too, that we owe alcoholism and drug addiction. (9) 
 
Huxley is echoing William James’s Varieties of Religious Experience here, in which  
James argues that  
the sway of alcohol over mankind is unquestionably due to its power to stimulate 
the mystical faculties of human nature, usually crushed to earth by the cold facts 
and dry criticisms of the sober hour. Sobriety diminishes, discriminates, and says 
no; drunkenness expands, unites, and says yes. (387)  
 
Later in the article, Huxley takes his discussion to the level of the State, particularly 
addressing Cold War issues and Russia.  He predicts the availability of drugs to help men 
find happiness and the complex relationship between drugs and personal liberty.  He 
says, “it may soon be for us to do something better in the way of chemical self-
transcendence than what we have been doing so ineptly for the last seventy or eighty 
centuries” (10).   As his burgeoning theory suggests, Huxley’s concerns rest on an 
evolutionary anthropology in which humans move toward “spirit” as the realm into which 
an individual may situate him or herself to find a balance between subjectivity and 
objectivity, where objectivity includes both the physical world and the latent 
unconscious.   This accounts for Huxley’s interest both in physical science and the 
paranormal, and he was not alone in this interest. 
Although more sinister in both agenda and execution of their agenda, CIA was 
also experimenting across the board during the 1950s, and it was keeping tabs on Huxley 
too.  Admiral Stansfield Turner’s (then Director of CIA) testimony before the Senate 
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Subcommittees on Intelligence, Health, and Scientific Research of the Committee on 
Human Resources explaining project MK-ULTRA, Turner mentions research on 
hypnosis, as well as  
aspects of magicians’ art useful in covert operations . . . developing, testing, and 
maintaining biological agents for use against humans as well as against animals 
and crops . . . electro-shock, harassment techniques for offensive use, analysis of 
extrasensory perception, and four subprojects involving crop and material 
sabatoge. (Project MKULTRA 11-12).  
 
CIA was interested in enchantment at all levels.  The paranoia was so great that the 
American government was willing to transplant and hire many Nazi scientists to break 
the Nuremberg Treaty it helped set up that prohibited testing on human subjects without 
consent.   
The surreptitious testing by CIA had a direct impact on the dissemination of 
psychedelic drugs in the three largest artistic centers in the United States during the 
1950s: New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.  Lee and Schlain note 
George Hunter White “rented an apartment in New York’s Greenwich Village, 
and, with funds supplied by the CIA he transformed it into a safehouse complete 
with two-way mirrors, surveillance equipment and the like.  Posing as an artist 
and a seaman, White lured people back to his pad and slipped them drugs.”  
Transferred to San Francisco in 1955, White opened two more safehouses and 
initiated project Midnight Climax, where drug-addicted prostitutes were given 
$100 a night to bring johns back, have sex with them and drug them while CIA 
agents secretly observed. (32-33)              
 
There is simply no way to extract the cultural aesthetic developing out of the use of 
psychedelics from the CIA’s involvement in disseminating and testing the drugs.  
Science, the paranormal and magician’s art were all areas of exploring enchantment.  
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Further, one cannot extract these scientific and aesthetic studies from Huxley’s inherently 
political-theological critique of the State from his interest in Vedanta.   
In CIA research, agents were at times dosed with drugs so that they could be 
aware of the effects if captured by an enemy.  In addition to testing the effects of drugs 
on people without their knowing, it was a practice among CIA agents in competing 
projects within the agency – all of which ultimately came to fall under the MK-ULTRA 
umbrella – to surreptitiously drug each other.  Agents were expected to develop 
knowledge of the symptoms of having been drugged so they could recognize the 
symptoms early on and hopefully avoid giving over information in interrogation.   
Not all agents, however, saw drugs as being merely “psychotomimetic,” and such 
experiences created converts to the therapeutic use of LSD within the CIA.  In fact, 
Captain Al Hubbard, a former OSS officer known as “the Johnny Appleseed of LSD,” 
was responsible for both distributing LSD across the US and Canada as well as helping to 
develop therapeutic uses for LSD.  Hubbard had a mystical experience on his first trip, 
leading him to be an outspoken proponent of its use.  Hubbard worked with Dr. Humphry 
Osmond in Canada developing psychedelic therapy; “using religious symbols to trigger 
psychic responses, he attempted to assist the patient in forming a new and healthier frame 
of reference that would carry over after the drug wore off” (Lee and Shlain 49).  These 
sessions were “geared toward achieving a mystical or conversion experience. The 
procedure involved high dosages of LSD, precluding any possibility that the patient’s ego 
defenses could withstand psychic dissolution” (56).  Hubbard was responsible for turning 
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Bill Wilson, founder of Alcoholics Anonymous, on to LSD.  Wilson believed in the 
drug’s religious potential as well as in its treatment potential for alcoholics.  Hubbard was 
also responsible for acting as guide for Aldous Huxley’s first LSD trip in 1955.  Huxley 
had already written The Doors of Perception based on his first mescaline experience in 
1953.  Like many universities and researchers in the 1950s, unwittingly, both Huxley and 
Humphry Osmond were surrounded by CIA agents overlooking their work.   
At the same time, Huxley’s status as a public intellectual was allowing his writing 
to set the tensions for the entire debate surrounding the term “psychedelic” that was to 
develop in the 1960s.  In the process, Huxley’s theory of experience and his metaphysical 
notions are carried over during a period that demanded behavior adjustment regarding 
citizenship.  This adjustment depended on a revaluing of the individual’s relationship to 
the State.   Both Aldous Huxley and the agents of the MK-ULTRA project explored to 
what extent an individual’s conscious use of drugs might influence and redraw notions of 
citizenship.  It is in this respect, and no mere conspiracy theory, that much of the 
psychedelic movement was a planned social experiment – not just in behavior 
modification, but also in citizenship modification, and the best way to analyze this is in 
the aesthetic artifacts produced at the time.  
After coining the word “psychedelic,” Osmond used it in a research paper 
entitled, “A Review of the Clinical Effects of Psychotomimetic Agents” (“Psychedelic”).  
It came into wide use within a decade of its introduction to the language.   While it was 
originally both a substantive and an adjective given to name and describe certain 
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pharmaceuticals – almost always with relation to LSD 25 – it later became a term for the 
experiences of a drug-induced state, and finally a catch-all term for a cultural style.  By 
1967, the Oxford English Dictionary reports the introduction of “psychedelia” to the 
language.  A synthetic drug thus became metonymic for cultural products and attitudes by 
offering some degree of controlling ego-expansion and retraction, of controlling 
experience itself.  Even an overdose in this respect is an attempt at controlling one’s 
liberal subjectivity.  The entire debate around the illegalization of psychedelics centers on 
the question of citizenship in a liberal nation-state, on subjectivity itself. 
Because of Huxley’s public intellectual status, his influence spread far and wide.  
Huxley’s 1954 Doors of Perception profoundly impacted new age gurus like Alan Watts, 
as well as Harvard psychologists Timothy Leary, Richard Alpert, and Ralph Metzner, 
who would build off Huxley in their reworking of Evans-Wentz’s translation of The 
Tibetan Book of the Dead, which they titled The Psychedelic Experience (Lopez).  This 
book tapped into a cultural longing that Huxley had already identified.  Religious 
scholars such as Huston Smith and Mircea Eliade too were also influenced by Huxley, 
and of course also popular bands like The Doors in the mid 1960s.   
But it was the Harvard psychologists: Timothy Leary, Richard Alpert and Ralph 
Metzner who employed Huxley’s ideas most deliberately in early psilocybin tests and 
later research in the sixties.  Increasingly indiscriminate use of test subjects and political 
enemies within the institution, combined with controversy over how scientific their 
methods were, forced the removal of Leary and his cohorts from the university.  In Leary 
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and company’s view of the psychedelic experience, the therapist and the patient tripped 
together. The question became, how could the therapist maintain a scientifically 
“objective” stance to conduct research?  Going solo, first to Mexico and then, with the 
financial help of Billy Hitchcock, to the Millbrook estate in New York, Leary founded 
the International Foundation for Internal Freedom (IFIF).  Along with Alpert and 
Metzner, Leary produced The Psychedelic Experience: A Manual Based on the Tibetan 
Book of the Dead (1964).  The book is a “how to” manual for achieving a psychedelic 
experience, thus performing a step towards Huxley’s vision of democratizing mystical 
experience.  For Leary, building on Huxley, “a psychedelic experience is a journey to 
new realms of consciousness,” and although drugs are not necessary for such an 
experience LSD, psilocybin and mescaline have the democratic importance of “making 
such an experience available to anyone” (11).  The therapist-patient model reveals the 
influence of psychoanalysis in its descriptions of a guru, or guide, through the experience, 
but also the monks’ role in the death experience as described in The Tibetan Book of the 
Dead.  The monk is to guide the dead person to enlightenment, but Leary, et al., 
emphasize the coupling of this with therapeutic methods used by psychologists in the late 
1950s, methods that combined administering LSD with many hours of psychoanalysis 
before the acid trip.  This is no small amount of screening.  Such experimentation was not 
only in practice at Harvard.  Interest was wide all over the psychological community. 
In his 1958 article, “Psychotomimetic Drugs,” Henry K. Beecher uses the term 
“psychedelic” in a list of a “new class” of drugs used to treat – incredible as it may sound 
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now – schizophrenia (254).  He particularly associates “psychedelic” with LSD, asserting 
that LSD has had “more profound changes in the results of Rorschach testing than any 
other drug studied in this laboratory,” and it was more useful treating alcoholism than 
schizophrenia (280).  If the literal definition of psychedelic means to manifest the psyche, 
the early usage of the term may seem accurate on the surface, but it is philosophically 
convoluted in its assumptions about what the psyche is – assumptions rooted in European 
conceptions of subjectivity and selfhood, in the European imaginary.   
As LSD was used in psychoanalysis with the Rorschach test, the “latent” psyche 
made “manifest” reveals a Freudian influence.  It is only one step away to say 
psychedelic drugs make the unconscious manifest.  Huxley’s theory had the effect of 
reconciling the scientific and religious or occult aspects of the psyche by combining 
Freudian and Jungian conceptions with the Evans-Wendtz translation of The Tibetan 
Book of the Dead, which, as Donald Lopez has shown in Prisoners of Shangri-La: 
Tibetan Buddhism and the West, was inspired by the theological-political agenda of 
Theosophists like Helena Blavatsky, Henry Steel Olcott, and Annie Besant.  Jung, of 
course, also wrote an introduction to the Evans-Wendtz translation, and so the tensions of 
politics and of a conception of self that is not merely contained within one individual’s 
unconscious but rather in a collective sense of unconscious come to be in concert with 
Theosophy’s global and ecumenical spiritual and political concerns.  All of this is to say, 
the neologism “psychedelic” is itself a cultural product with metaphysical assumptions 
inherent in it, every bit as much as psychotomimetic, and perhaps even more so, as it 
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comes to symbolize a re-incarnated liberal citizenship.  In order to parse this out more 
clearly, it is important to see how psychologists built upon Huxley’s theories. 
 
The Professional Discourse of Psychedelics in the 1960s 
In Tripping: An Anthology of True-Life Psychedelic Adventures, Charles Hayes 
reports, “by 1965 there were more than two thousand scientific papers describing the 
treatment of up to forty thousand patients with psychedelic drugs.  Success was 
commonplace” (9).  Looking at psychotherapy and psychology journals in the late 1950s 
and 1960s, it becomes clear that the “psychedelic” experience refers to only one part of a 
larger process, or “trip.” In “Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD 25) and Behaviour 
Therapy,” C. G. Costello uses “psychedelic” in reference to only later stages of an LSD 
experience. He says, “the psychedelic experience [occurs when] the experience is 
stabilized and the patient establishes ‘order and organization to the unhabitual 
perceptions’” (119).  In this theory, the experience is one of recovery, not of having one’s 
mind blown.  We can read into the term “psychedelic” a cultural tendency to intentionally 
produce consciousness expansion, but also the inherent return from a perennial state of 
nature or ecstatic experience.  
During the administered LSD trips, suggestions and affective music were also 
used during controlled sessions.  Costello’s studies document the use of “soothing music” 
in LSD sessions.  Offenbach and Mahalia Jackson apparently qualified as suitable music 
early on – although in one case the patient was “agitated” by Jackson’s music, and the 
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therapist “suggested” the psychedelic stage to her saying, “to face whatever ideas, 
thoughts or pictures were presenting themselves to her” (119).  The article reports: “she 
was told that life was a beautiful though sometimes awesome pattern which we spoiled 
by turning away from it.”  The use of suggestion, itself arising from mesmerism and 
trance therapies in the nineteenth century, along with its use in American New Thought, 
has not been emphasized enough in popular conceptions of the psychedelic experience.  
When accompanied with the “guide,” taken from the role monks traditionally played in 
the Bardo Thotol, Costello’s work reads like a direct application of Leary, Alpert, and 
Metzner’s Psychedelic Experience.  Yet he is also critical of using LSD in certain 
environments: “The effects have apparently been harmful when LSD has been 
administered in a party atmosphere embellished with beatnik and occultist jargon” (128).  
Unfortunately, he offers no citation for such circumstances, but his attitude illustrates an 
attempt at controlling the superficial through scientific expertise, something that is 
recurring in the literature and historical documentation of the field, especially with regard 
to Timothy Leary.  For many later psychiatric and psychological professionals, Leary’s 
outlandishness single-handedly has had the effect of stalling almost all “respectable” 
scientific research on psychedelics between the late 1960s and the 1990s.  During the 
1960s, Costello and others were quite optimistic about LSD’s therapeutic uses, a 
sentiment generally echoed in much of the professional psychological journals in the 
1960s, even when professionals show antagonistic attitudes toward Leary and his crew. 
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In “The LSD Controversy” (1964), Jerome Levine and Arnold Ludwig emphasize 
benefits of LSD in therapy for alcoholics addressing the LSD controversy by noting 
journalists’ interest in Leary and the Harvard school. The authors are quite critical 
though, claiming that Leary and his cohorts helped create “an aura of sensationalism”: 
“neither critical scientists nor laymen could see very much therapeutic or scientific value 
in the ‘educational’ hallucinatory flights or voyages taken by the mental astronauts of 
IFIF” (316).  Remaining positive about the therapeutic value of LSD, Levine and Ludwig 
provide a more balanced approach while relying, perhaps naively, on the power of 
scientific method to sort out the controversy.   
By 1966, perhaps through the public attention gained by Leary, the meaning of 
“psychedelic” clearly broadens in professional journals.  In “Some Psychological Aspects 
of Privacy,” Sidney M. Jourard, writing in the journal, Law and Its Contemporary 
Problems, uses both Freudian language and the all-pervasive language of David 
Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd (inner and outer-directed personalities) to describe the 
social dangers of pressures to conform.  Jourard argues that repressed desires help 
maintain the individual in society, but he attaches “psychedelic” to transformative 
experiences and healing: 
Each time a man reveals himself to another, a secret society springs into being.  If 
the healer sees himself in the role of teacher or guru rather than as a further agent 
of socialization, he will aim at helping the sufferer gain a perspective on the social 
determiners in his existence and how he might transcend them.  Just as drugs, like 
lysergic acid and marijuana, have a kind of releasing effect upon the 
consciousness of the user, so teachers and gurus have a “psychedelic” (mind-
manifesting) effect upon those who consult with them.  True consciousness-
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expansion (education) yields a transcultural perspective from which to view one’s 
usual roles and the society within which one enacts them. (313) 
   
Jourard’s take on the psychedelic evidences a kind of liberal logic: psychedelic drugs are 
like teachers; they help people distinguish their roles in society by liberating them from 
the repressive social structures blocking their potential.  The psychedelic experience, for 
him, not only releases one from the shackles of social conformity, it potentially increases 
liberal innovation by reforming subjectivity.  To take part in the psychedelic experience 
is to be active in the sense of social activism during the early sixties, to make oneself 
accountable through a civic gesture, to become a politically responsible citizen.   
No matter how superficial the drug scene may have become by the end of the 
decade, the underlying intellectualism in the action of participating coded a civic stance.  
At the same time Jourard’s statements are a reminder that the psychedelic experience 
through drug use is merely one of many methods to attain a sublime and spiritual 
experience.  This is of course a sense of the spiritual as integrating subjectivity and 
objectivity, which as Huxley describes, owes its lineage to enchantment and mystical 
experience.  The drugs merely democratize access to the experience.  Jourard also echoes 
the sentiments that Ken Kesey expressed in the post-trip return with regard to 
“graduating” from acid tests.  The psychedelic experience carries with it political 
concerns relating to education, citizenship and personal liberty in tension with 
governmental control; it is a means toward a political end.  
The articles here exhibit the tension in the public air at the time.  With them, one 
may speculate that, with the illegalization of LSD in 1966, illicitly taking psychedelic 
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drugs became seen as an assertion of self against governmental control, and that such an 
assertion was coupled with an intention to seek out a mystical experience.  This was a 
civic gesture, and state control over drug-use establishes enmity between self-
determination as an act of social progress and “institutional” authority.  The state here 
becomes the enemy of the liberal agenda by imposing an authority that appeared to limit 
access to even something as undetermined as “happiness,” but more accurately here as a 
revised version of subjectivity itself.  State authority was something to be transgressed, 
and that transgression was a civic act.  Psychedelic aesthetics perform this transgression. 
Works of art displaying psychedelic aesthetics ideologically express the notion 
that seeking an “inner experience” promotes both individual freedom as well as social 
action.  One need not take drugs to achieve it, but to do drugs so was to make public 
one’s transgression.  In post 1960s decades, this transgression became ritualized (and 
trivialized) in the United States.  But in its early ideology, the psychedelic created a 
“better” citizen than the “conformist.”  Overcoming of mere subjective interiority through 
a psychedelic return to the perennial also out-moralizes the State.  Beyond the state, in 
the European imaginary, the psychedelic experience produces a communion with the 
divine lost in the modern era.  This is a return to enchanted space of the pre-political 
begging the following questions: When we consider the deep critique of modern 
subjectivity in the psychedelic experience, are the affective responses of the individuals 
who intentionally seek mystical and psychedelic experiences more civically useful than 
the Enlightenment rationality that founds the modern state? Moreover, in the civic 
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transcendence of the State, does the psychedelic experience end with a revised 
subjectivity that is akin to globalized cosmopolitanism?  American civic foundations 
certainly occurred in a literal state of nature, giving American politics a long history of 
enchantment. 
The theory of the psychedelic experience applied to aesthetic works, and we can 
now begin noting some ideological and ethical characteristics present in psychedelic 
aesthetics.  The term “psychedelic” applied to aesthetics signifies a collection of 
tendencies among artistic works which each exhibit an attempt to represent either 
something metaphysical in a unique form, or to represent an expansion in consciousness 
– in other words, artistic attempts to represent the outside, exterior, and the infinite in 
necessarily finite circumstances.  The psychedelic, in this sense, relates to a cultural 
condition where consciousness, which has been rapidly expanded and destabilized, 
begins to re-orient itself in light of what it has seen.  There is a therapeutic quality in the 
aesthetics, a recovery attempt from both individual and cultural trauma.  In this recovery 
attempt there is inherent critique of the past coupled with an attempt to distance the past 
or even transcend it.  Insofar as there is an overlap with avant-garde aesthetics, like those 
present in Artaud’s “theater of cruelty,” which he presents as anodyne for the state of 
emergency brought on by the “plague” affecting European culture in the late 1930s, 
psychedelic aesthetics in the United States generally express a more optimistic view, but 
there is more to the picture.   
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Aesthetically, the inherent violence of avant-gardism remains the “Hell” of the 
psychedelic experience – a hell that saturates the work of avant-gardists like William 
Burroughs’ seedy and junky global consumerism, the films of Kenneth Anger with his 
nods to Aleister Crowley, and articulated in the depense of Hunter S. Thompson’s work 
as “fear and loathing.”  The flipside to such hell is the “soma state” or “moksha” 
experience of re-attunement and return to enchanted consciousness.  Articulations of 
soma and moksha are where psychedelic aesthetics and political theology meet beyond 
crass representations of a globalized free-for-all.  I will return to such issues in a later 
chapter.   
The well-worn “Heaven and Hell” and the less known Soma state / globalization 
binaries are discursively helpful and aesthetically identifiable at times, but they are both 
at work in the same experience.  Psychedelic aesthetics, as Huxley would suggest, 
include both of Blake’s “Heaven and Hell.”  In terms of ego-death and return to a revised 
notion of liberal subjectivity, I have chosen to characterize the entire experience along the 
theme of metempsychosis or reincarnation as a way to broaden the aesthetic cosmology.  
There are violent and starry-eyed representations in psychedelic aesthetics.  I make no 
allegiance to either.  What is more important is that in the process of these aesthetics, a 
kind of sacred violence is imposed on the State.  Such violence accompanies the fantasy 
return to the “state of nature” attained through dissimulation of the ego during the 
psychedelic experience, and this is what accounts for much of the use of sacrifice, 
religious and mystical symbols in psychedelic works.  It also accounts for the evangelical 
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nature of psychedelic aesthetics and the aestheticized figure of the exploding citizen or 
“terrorist” in the post-psychedelic era.  It is at this point that the psychedelic experience 
aestheticized produces political deliberation and where psychedelic aesthetics and 
political theological meet.  The eruption of the perennial operates through 
deterritorialization of both subject and State in order to produce a primordial space for 
rebirth and poetic making. 
    
In the previous three chapters, I began by describing the critique of modern 
subjectivity at the heart of the European imaginary and pointing specifically to the work 
of Artaud as calling for a return to a primeval state of being.  I then described a trajectory 
of continental philosophy that, like Artaud, sought an aesthetic answer to political crises 
in the form of poetry.  Combining Artaud’s concept of an oversaturated poetry with 
Heidegger and his students’ call for poiesis, I argued that each in its own way points 
toward a poetics of re-enchantment.  Psychedelic aesthetics, drawing on these ideas, then 
performs this poetics of re-enchantment through the use of the perennial as a device to 
overcome the problem of linear time and narrative reflection.  I explicated Abbie 
Hoffman’s Woodstock Nation to show the direct impact of Marcuse and Artaud on his 
activism.  Drawing on Maurice Blanchot’s “Great Refusal” and Artaud’s call for a poetry 
of metempsychosis, I claimed that psychedelic aesthetics attempt to figure human life in 
terms of reincarnation.  In this chapter, I have explored how theories of the psychedelic 
experience use models based on perennialism and reincarnation to provide therapy for 
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human development.  The result of such theories in practice is the re-drawing of the 
boundaries of subjectivity and citizenship as the result of re-entry from a psychedelic 
experience, which indicates that psychedelic aesthetics present political-theological 
answers to crises in liberalism.  In the following chapter I will explore how some of these 
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CHAPTER FIVE: PSYCHEDELIC CITIZENSHIP AND RE-ENCHANTMENT: 
AFFECTIVE AESTHETICS AS POLITICAL INSTANTIATION  
 
Profounder things had also passed.  It was a completely secular age.  Of faiths 
that had existed before the coming of the Overlords, only a purified form of 
Buddhism – perhaps the most austere of all religions – still survived.  The creeds 
that had been based upon miracles and revelations had collapsed utterly. (66) 
 
- Arthur C. Clarke, Childhood’s End 
  
In Faith of The Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology (2012), Simon 
Critchley writes that in the early twenty-first century, “what is lacking is a theory and 
practice of the general will understood as the supreme fiction of final belief that would 
take place in the act by which a people becomes a people or by which a free association is 
formed” (92).  Critchley essentially calls for a fiction on which to base a new citizenship.  
Like the continental philosophers in the mid twentieth century, his work turns to poetics 
or “making” as a mode of engagement and resistance for dealing with liberal-democratic 
crises.  In this chapter I suggest that psychedelic aesthetics and religion can provide a 
discursive ground for Critchley’s “supreme fiction” in the United States, because the 
making of the sacrificial figure in the psychedelic experience presents itself as capable of 
more ethically aware citizenship.  The poetics already exist, but it is a matter of both 
aesthetics and spirituality being taken seriously in public and political life. A brief 
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historical look at religions founded in the 1960s gives insight into the instantiation of a 
certain citizenship.  
In classic representations of the psychedelic experience, citizenship is “re-
enchanted” through a broadened commitment transcending the authority of nation-states.  
A critique of modern subjectivity is performed as an allegory through ego-death and 
rebirth – metempsychosis or reincarnation.  One’s body becomes the site of sacrifice 
through ingesting a psychedelic “sacrament,” disseminating ego into the material world 
while a perception “behind” subject-object relationships emerges.  Such experiences 
prompted groups to start their own religions in the 1960s as governmental forces 
criminalized psychedelics, causing friend-enemy distinctions with the State to be 
determined at a biopolitical level.   
It is an oversimplification to write the psychedelic movement off as either 
vacuous New Ageism or sinister cultism, but I am not presenting the period as a panacea 
either.  There is a more current exigency here.  With the current re-introduction of 
psychedelic therapy into end-of-life care in the early twenty-first century, there are 
implications for discussions of “citizenship” as bios or qualified life and the boundaries 
of “bare life” (zoe).  These tensions exist as analogues between state-recognized religion 
as the qualified life of citizenship and re-enchanted attempts to found New Religion or 
“spirituality” as emergent zoe.  Psychedelic aesthetics thus offer a discursive zone for 
both bare and qualified life.  The main implication is that in an expanded ego state there 
is more room for “bare life” to become qualified life.  
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Emerging legislation made psychedelic substances illegal during the 1960s 
originally as an extension of consumer protection attempts from pharmaceutical 
companies.  As Nicolas Langlitz has written in Neuropsychedelia, 
In 1961, the thalidomide disaster came to the fore: 8,000 children with gross 
anatomical malformations, an unknown number of abortions, and many patients 
suffering from peripheral neuropathy. The US Congress passed the Kefauver-
Harris amendments in the following year, giving the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) control over all investigational drugs (Daemmrich 2004: 
60– 69). LSD happened to be such an investigational drug just like thalidomide. A 
drug safety study on Hofmann’s problem child, also published in 1962, warned 
against the risks of suicide and prolonged psychotic reactions (Cohen and Ditman 
1962). Regulations were tightened. Consequently, researchers could no longer 
mail a form to Sandoz, receive LSD in return, and administer it to patients without 
even informing them about the experimental nature of their treatment. (Kindle 
Locations 670-676) 
 
These concerns are the backdrop for growing suspicions about researchers like Timothy 
Leary, Richard Alpert and Ralph Metzner, as well as their student, Walter Pahnke, who 
developed the famous Marsh Chapel Good Friday experiment in 1962.  As Langlitz 
notes, hallucinogen research was actually in decline before Leary and his cohorts began 
working with them, especially in relation to religious and spiritual experiences.  Langlitz 
concludes, 
What was at issue when scientific applications of hallucinogens were subjected to 
a strict regulatory regime in the early 1960s was not spiritual liberation through 
consciousness-expanding drugs and their association with the politics of the 
counterculture, but medical paternalism and pharmaceutical marketing practices. 
(Kindle Locations 683-685)  
 
When one imagines the practices of CIA with regard to MK-ULTRA along with the 
medical establishment’s indiscretion with regard to pharmaceuticals, regulations do not 
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seem so unreasonable. This would become a political theological issue in the mid 1960s.  
Leary and Pahnke were conducting experiments in neurotheology, another term coming 
from Aldous Huxley’s recently published novel, Island.  The growing public concern, 
however, was with a damaged perception of medical authority to begin with, and this 
concern paralleled the political concerns with the Cold War and the Far East.   
As the Vietnam War’s legitimacy was debated, many citizens saw participation in 
the psychedelic movement and illegal drug-use as a way to assert moral authority and 
self-determination over a morally corrupt nation-state of “experts.” (This is an empty but 
almost ubiquitous rite of passage continuing for young Americans today).  By the time 
LSD was made illegal in 1966, proponents of psychedelics had turned to rhetoric of 
religion in order to claim psychedelics as sacred entheogens or “god-infused” substances.  
Such rhetoric often employed the aesthetic language of the occult and secret societies as 
obfuscation, as exemplified earlier with my explication of The Fugs’ “Homage to 
Catherine and William Blake.”  In the late 1960s, Timothy Leary, psychedelic guru 
psychologist, was facing a thirty-year prison sentence for a small amount of marijuana 
police found in his daughters’ underwear.  As Leary’s legal trouble intensified, he 
adopted more and more of a quasi-guru status, claiming he was a “Hindu,” and the 
substance was sacral.  Religious enchantment became a rhetorical safety net for Leary’s 
case.  We may be right to question his sincerity, but what is especially interesting is that 
he thought it would work as a defense plea.  His rhetoric claimed allegiance to the 
founding principles of the United States with regard to religious freedom.  Inventing 
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himself as guru and performing pseudo-mystical and occult experiments created a public 
persona with which to challenge the nation-state in terms of political-theology.  The most 
overt claim regarding this was the call to “start your own religion,” which is exactly what 
some of his followers did. 
In contrast to Leary, psychologist Art Kleps, founder of the Neo-American 
Church was no fan of gesturing toward occultism or Eastern religion for justifying his 
“spiritual” practice.  Initially promoting Leary as prophet of the church, Kleps 
excommunicated Leary in 1973 for his excessive “horse shit” (his religion’s motto, after 
all, is “victory over horseshit”). In Kleps’s account of the Millbrook estate in the late 
sixties, where Leary and others of the League of Spiritual Discovery researched 
psychedelics and spirituality after being kicked out of Harvard, Kleps writes: “I found 
nothing in my visionary experience to encourage me to believe in any occultist or 
supernaturalist system . . . Instead, dualism of every variety was blown out the window, 
never to return” (Millbrook 8).  Following Leary’s advice, Kleps started his own religion 
of “Boohoos” in 1965, attempting – by analogy to the Native American Church’s use of 
peyote – to claim the legal right to use psychedelic substances as religious sacrament.  As 
Martin A. Lee and Bruce Shlain summarize, “Not surprisingly, the Boohoos lost their 
case in court when the judge ruled that an organization with ‘Row, Row, Row your Boat’ 
as its theme song was not enough to qualify as a church” (105).  
Kleps’s church is truly the product of a kind of Yankee dim-witted accutezza. 
Kleps spoofs, but he spoofs with seriousness.  He put together the puzzling Boo Hoo 
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Bible: The Neo American Church Catechism during the years following Millbrook’s 
collapse.  The catechism is a mixed-media psychedelic performance of identification and 
participation, requiring its reader to transcend the personal in an act that simultaneously 
simulates and dissimulates, establishing and overcoming the ironic – all features of 
psychedelic aesthetics.  Like a psychedelic Mad Magazine, integrating selections from 
Henry Miller, pulpy comics, news clippings, senate testimonies and political-religious 
diatribes, the text presents a cosmology of simultaneity, which Kleps considers essential 
to psychedelic experience. A radical solipsism emerges that sees all conscious and 
unconscious life as part of one dream where meaning-making becomes completely 
associative.  Was “Row, Row, Row Your Boat” an appropriate theme song after all? 
Despite his solipsism, Kleps longs for transformation of citizenship, for a “new” 
American.  At first this seems like standard antinomian individualism – a longstanding 
American tradition.  Critical of Leary’s “translation” of The Tibetan Book of the Dead 
into the manual The Psychedelic Experience, Kleps writes: “It’s great stuff for the social 
control of ignorant peasantry, and that’s about it.  A first-class horror show to terrify the 
kiddies into mindless obedience” (Millbrook 12).  Kleps broke away from early models 
of psychedelic therapy that employed a guide and forty hours of prior, one-on-one 
psychoanalytic therapy, as well as the convention for the therapist to trip with patient.  
This model had been encouraged by Aldous Huxley and Humphry Osmond as ways to 
democratize mystical experience in order to create more engaged citizens.  Leary’s view 
of democracy was much less controlled than Huxley’s and called for a collective change 
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in consciousness of all citizens.  By the early seventies, both Leary and Kleps encouraged 
novice users to trip alone from differing rationales.   
For Kleps, individuals are to determine their own spiritual progress.  When he 
actually sounds serious in The Boo Hoo Bible, he says (riffing on Martin Luther) that 
“Acid is not easier than traditional methods, it’s just faster, and sneakier.  If there is shit 
in the way, it has to be disposed of, and the veritable explosion of shit is, in many ways, 
an even more disagreeable experience than a constant dribble over a period of years” 
(19).  Instant enlightenment is a shit-storm.  One can reasonably expect that a large group 
of people’s mind-manifestations will be messy.  For Kleps, enlightenment overcomes 
individuation through a return to abject substance.  
And so Kleps also presents a goal for tripping that is social in nature. The church 
will eventually offer accreditation sources for psychedelic therapists.  But this requires 
some preliminary work:  
one of our most important objectives should be to drive the crack-pot faddists and 
the simple-minded occultists out of the temple and replace them with intelligent, 
literate, professional psychologists who know the meaning and use of the 
psychedelic experience. (20) 
    
To do this, Kleps must invoke criteria for measuring a kind of liberal elitism.  In 
measuring those criteria, a global civic quality arises: 
To attempt to separate our cause from that of the millions starved, robbed, 
corrupted and killed abroad by the industrial military robot masters of the U.S. is 
nothing but cowardice and hypocrisy.  Their suffering may buy our leisure, but 
never our freedom.  Our religion grows here because it is needed, not because it is 
welcome . . . You cannot expand your consciousness without joining the great 
task of expanding the consciousness of mankind.  I do not propose this as a moral 
rule, but as a physical law.  Anyone who supposes his spiritual ‘motion’ can be 
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measured relative to a static world, or to the motion of others, as if this were some 
sort of million mile dash, has missed the point of the psychedelic experience. (21) 
 
The psychedelic experience for Kleps then, in its inability to be separated from human 
plights around the world, is not a nihilistic unveiling of our solipsistic nature, but an act 
of citizenship that transcends the authority of the nation state.  While successful trips are 
to be measured on a personal level, he simultaneously maintains the Vedic phrase 
repeated in Huxley’s writing over and over: tat tvam asi or “thou art that.”  Kleps ends 
one article for The Psychedelic Review stating, “the object is to become what you are” 
(124).  As potentially empty as this may sound, Kleps cannot be summed up as naïvely 
unaware of one-dimensionality.  He charges his readers to fight “phony attempts to make 
psychedelia look like just one more swindle that can be blended into all the other 
swindles and controlled by the super-swindlers in Washington” by dropping “our own 
forms, our own language and our own standards, as every genuine religious novelty has 
done in the past” (24).  Kleps invokes “genuine religious novelty” as a method of 
resistance.  As critical of occultism as Kleps is, he still adheres to some kind of 
enchantment. 
Spoofing with language is part of the method.  Kleps’s statements are congruent 
with Giorgio Agamben’s claim that “[l]aw is … constitutively linked to the curse, and 
only a politics that has broken this original connection with the curse will be able one day 
to make possible another use of speech and of the law” (The Sacrament 66).  From 
Kleps’s spoofy Boo Hoo Bible, to the famous testimonies of Abbie Hoffman and the 
Chicago Seven, to attempts to levitate the Pentagon and exorcisms of Senator 
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McCarthy’s grave, psychedelic aesthetics perform the collapse of oath and law in an 
effort to redefine citizenship through enchanted speech, with extra-ordinary qualities as 
Agamben and Derrida call for, beyond the definition of human as the rational speaking 
animal. 
The courtroom antics of Kleps and the later Chicago Seven do not merely rebel 
against authority; they rebel against the mode of language as law in a state of emergence.  
We see in psychedelic literature and art a collapse of image and text and attempts at 
visual and auditory representations of boundary-less states, and we can see intentional 
implementation of these aesthetics in Kleps’s own Senate testimony from 1966.  For 
example, Senator Burdick asks, “Mr. Kleps, would you mind telling me if you are really 
called Chief Boo Hoo?”: 
Mr. Kleps: I am afraid so. It is difficult to explain this. That is always the first 
question that comes up. The reason we do it is to distinguish between the church 
and the religion. We think it is very important not to take ourselves too seriously 
in terms of social structure, in terms of organizational life. We tend to view 
organizational life as sort of a game that people play. 
 
Later in the testimony, after threatening that making LSD illegal will prompt civil war in 
the United States, Kleps claims that LSD “puts you in the mind of God, and . . . God is 
not a verbal being as we are to such a large extent.”  Kleps argues that current scientific 
and legal views of psychedelics are atheistic and “fundamentally erroneous.”  
Consciousness for Kleps is not sequential or an aggregation.  Rather, consciousness 
works, as in a psychedelic state, by analogy, and feels experientially more anagogical.  
Speech and gesture collapse.  In questioning the boundaries of modern subjectivity, 
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psychedelic works open up a broadened way of thinking about what personhood is and 
what citizenship is, particularly in their attempt at re-orienting of the subject’s moral 
center.  The shit-storm opens the possibility for gestural poetics beyond speech.  
Kleps attempts to disestablish governmental authority by a return to “genuine 
religion” of double entendre through a collapse of sacred and profane.  This cannot be 
written off as empty spiritualism.  Rather, we should look here to “free association” of 
Critchley’s  “faithless” congregation.  The 1960s nostalgia for a return to the pre-
political, to nature, and to early religion is certainly the product of modernity’s long-
standing narrative of alienation from the state of nature, but psychedelic works situate 
that nostalgia through a journey to the timeless, mythological expanded ego and a return 
to the temporal or historical.  In studying the psychedelic, we re-introduce time into the 
shitstorm of consciousness expansion.  This blurs the distinction between transcendent 
and immanent religion with appeals to more fundamental language of law and requires 
needs thorough evaluations of both the “spiritual” and the “religious.”   
In a narrative of secularization, the 1960s appear as a massive blow to the 
theocracy of the State, a decline not in religious morality but in the already-secularized 
morality that developed as a move away from religiosity a century prior.  The revolution 
of the 1960s was then, perhaps unknowingly, a revolution against secularization itself.  
The revolt used enchantment as a critique of the State.  Such enchantment appears secular 
as a spoof, but like Kleps it is a serious spoof.  Enchanted objects, deifying personhood, 
New Ageism makes use of enchanted aesthetics as the profane to secular authority.    
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This does not necessarily mean that such a revolt was lasting, that somehow 
people became “more religious,” but emergent religion was used to protect lifestyle.  
Lifestyle and belief were one and the same, but according to Kleps’s metaphysics, 
because the church and religion ought to be kept separate, the performance of daily 
lifestyle became more openly ludic.  And just as Kleps, Huxley and Leary used the 
rhetoric of religious enchantment to assert the moral authority of their citizenship over 
the State, citizens appealed to spiritual growth as a way to redefine their selves.  The 
culture of “play” or performance here, reveals a spiritual quality, for what play attempted 
to distort was the sense that reality – social or otherwise – was ordered.  Everything 
became a game.  Here the appeal to religion makes an important entry into the “public” 
sphere; as lifestyle itself was performed citizenship changed. 
 
What’s for Tea, Mum? 
Perhaps nothing seems so mundane and so simultaneously sacred as that which 
we ingest and put into our bodies.  The United States Food and Drug Administration had 
attempted to keep one version of American citizenship safe while psychedelic citizenship 
attempted something different.  This tension appears in William Burroughs’ writing as 
the binary between the junky state and the soma state.  The Drug Enforcement 
Administration was created in 1973 by Richard Nixon, “in order to establish a single 
unified command to combat ‘an all-out global war on the drug menace’” (United States 
Department of Justice).  In a way, this was a heavy blow to aspirations of a soma state, 
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but perhaps the true nature of the conflict inspiring the war on drugs – which still 
continues today – is that the spiritual qualities underpinning the lifestyle choices that 
motivated performance culture are unable to be discussed within the public frame of a 
secularization narrative. Ironically, Nixon’s “unified command” occurred just before the 
public became widely aware of CIA’s MK-ULTRA projects.   
In 1978, discussing ways to solve the problem of addiction, William Burroughs 
told Victor Bockris and Raymond Foye, referencing Gordon Taylor’s The Biological 
Time Bomb, “Any sort of selective distribution of a medication to prolong life would run 
into, uh, social difficulties . . . our creaky old social system cannot absorb the biologic 
discoveries that are on the way” (106).  When Bockris points out that this “points toward 
a much more controlled society,” Burroughs counters, saying he agrees with Timothy 
Leary, “Washington is no longer the center of power.”  Because the government cannot 
compete with private wealth, Burroughs believes the government will have no 
“monopoly on scientific discovery.”  He predicts, “they’re going to legalize marijuana, 
and sooner or later they’re going to come around to some sort of heroin maintenance” 
(107).  He points to growing feelings of futility within drug enforcement and says, that 
the sooner there are less restrictions, the necessity for the DEA will be eliminated.  But 
how does this fit into arguments appealing to religion? 
In “Testimony Concerning a Sickness,” an addendum to Naked Lunch (1959), 
Burroughs says,  
I have heard that there was once a beneficent non-habit-forming junk in India. It 
was called ‘soma’ and is pictured as a beautiful blue tide. If ‘soma’ ever existed 
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the Pusher was there to bottle it and monopolize it and sell it and it turned into 
plain old time JUNK.25   
 
Burroughs associates junk with the crassest of globalized consumerism, and his 
characters, William Lee and Clem Snide move through differing personas in and out of 
being agents of the State and deliriously high junkies…his narratives move 
geographically around the world, broken and cut-up spatially and temporally.  Junkies 
clearly detorritorialize the world.  Yet toward the end of the book, Naked Lunch is itself 
referred to as a “blueprint, a How-To Book” (203). The reader “can cut into Naked Lunch 
at any intersection point,” essentially becoming a manual for divination in 
deterritorialized space: 
Black insect lusts open into vast, other planet landscapes….Abstract concepts, 
bare as algebra, narrow down to a black turd or a pair of aging cajones…. 
 How-To extend all levels of experience by opening the door at the end of a 
long hall….Doors that only open in Silence…. Naked Lunch demands Silence 
from The Reader.  Otherwise he is taking his own pulse…. 
 
Appearing in ficto-poetic form years before either Leary’s version of the Tibetan Book of 
the Dead, Kleps’s catechism, or Ram Dass’s Remember Be Here Now, Burroughs 
presents his own avant-garde psychedelic guide.  Like Artaud, Burroughs had traveled to 
South America to experience Yage and Ayahuasca.  He describes the drugs as producing 
“blue flashes” in the appendix to Naked Lunch (230).  Earlier in the novel, Burroughs, in 
a rare moment of almost reverence strews images: 
Pictures of men and women, boys and girls, animals, fish, birds, the copulating 
rhythm of the universe flows through the room, a great blue tide of life.  
                                                
25 I provide a more thorough enquiry into soma in my discussion of Aldous Huxley. 
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Vibrating, soundless hum of deep forest – sudden quiet of cities when the junky 
copes.  A moment of stillness and wonder.  Even the Commuter buzzes the 
clogged lines of cholesterol for contact. (74) 
           
Again the list avoids the syntactic completion by avoiding “be” verbs.  Here Burroughs 
aligns the silence of “The Reader” with the experience of “Blue Tide” through a 
collapsed, perennial space of humans, animals and cities and the “Commuter” – Sloan 
Wilson’s “man in the grey flannel suit.”  This associative performance, like Kleps’s 
performance in The Boo Hoo Bible, is psychedelic aesthetics in action.  Collapsing 
identities of reader and author and character and State, Burroughs pushes toward a new 
citizenship beyond geography, time and space, but he masks his Soma state well with 
seedy digressions and soupy plotlines.  As a narrator explains: 
The President is a junky but can’t take it direct because of his position.  So he gets 
his fix through me….From time to time we make contact and I recharge him.  
These contacts look, to the casual observer, like homosexual practices, but the 
actual excitement is not primarily sexual, and the climax is the separation when 
the charge is completed. (66) 
 
The necessity for the sexual encounter is because, if it were done by “Osmosis Recharge, 
. . . it will put the President in a bad mood for weeks, and might well precipitate an 
atomic shambles.”  The president has formed “an Oblique” habit.  He has sacrificed all 
control, and is dependent as an unborn child ”(66).  As a result, the “Oblique Addict” 
ingests and consumes and “suffers a whole spectrum of subjective horror, silent 
protoplasmic fury, hideous agony of the bones.”  The bones of the skeleton, the inside 
kills the addict, “straining to climb out of his unendurable flesh.”  The State at this point 
is preserved by the sacrifice of the junky in communion with the President. 
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Burroughs’s narrative performs a collapse of subjectivity and objectivity typical 
to mysticism and psychedelic aesthetics.  Like Artaud, it is presented through the extreme 
materiality of biology, sex, bones and junk.  Later in the novel, a narrator recalls a trip 
saying,  
And I don’t know what I am doing there nor who I am.  I decide to play it cool 
and maybe I will get the orientation before the Owner shows….So instead of 
yelling “Where Am I?” cool it and look around and you will find out 
approximately….You were not there for The Beginning.  You will not be there for 
The End….Your knowledge of what is going on can only be superficial and 
relative….(199) 
   
Here Burroughs pushes to a state of exception: to life, death and knowledge.  But he also 
converges the first and second persons, establishing the evangelical effect typical of 
psychedelic aesthetics.  This state of exception where boundaries between personas 
collapse is the state that produces the writer or poet:   
There is only one thing a writer can write about: what is in front of his eyes at the 
moment of writing….I am a recording instrument….I do not presume to impose 
“story” “plot” “continuity.”… Insofar as I succeed in Direct recording of certain 
areas of psychic process I may have limited function….I am not an 
entertainer….(200) 
 
Here the writer becomes an object, an instrument – a machine.  But this quickly 
establishes a different communion. 
“Possession” they call it….Sometimes an entity jumps in the body – outlines 
waver in yellow orange jelly – and hands move to disembowel the passing whore 
or strangle the neighbor child in hope of alleviating a chronic housing shortage.  
As if I was usually there but subject to goof now and then….Wrong! I am never 
here….Never that is fully in possession, but somehow in a position to forestall ill-
advised moves…. 
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The narrator turned reader turned writer turned machine turned possessed body is 
repositioned as an advisor…as a new subject.  That subject enacts interstitially with the 
State, but is positioned outside: 
Patrolling is, in fact, my principle occupation….No matter how tight Security, I 
am always somewhere Outside giving orders and Inside this straitjacket of jelly 
that gives and stretches but always reforms ahead of every movement, thought, 
impulse, stamped with the seal of alien inspection…. 
 
The passage moves on to distinguish writers from junkies over the smell / lack of smell of 
death: “the death smell is unmistakably a smell and complete absence of smell.”  The 
absence of smell is the death of organic life (201).  What is the end of all of this 
associative transfer?   
Burroughs has described Carl Schmitt’s democratic nightmare, where public and 
State are completely indecipherable and left with no sovereign decision-maker.  Rather 
there has been an orgy of consumption at every level.  Burroughs describes this in 
perhaps the most well-known image and story from Naked Lunch: The man who taught 
his asshole to talk.  The talking asshole develops its own personality and teeth, eventually 
consuming the rest of the body from the bottom up and the inside out.  This becomes 
Burroughs’ figure for bureaucratic democracy, and we get a slight glimpse of another 
way he’d like to be.  The character Dr. Benway, to whom agent Lee has been assigned in 
Mexico, lectures the younger Schaeffer, justifying their work as “Pure scientists” (119).  
Benway says, “Democracy is cancerous, and bureaus are its cancer.  A bureau takes root 
anywhere in the state, turns malignant like the Narcotic bureau, and grows and grows, 
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always reproducing more of its own kind, until it chokes the host if not controlled or 
excised” (121).  As an aside, Benway then throws in,  
A cooperative on the other hand can live without the state.  That is the road to 
follow.  The building up of independent units to meet needs of people who 
participate in the functioning of the unit.  A bureau operates on opposite principle 
of inventing needs to justify its own existence. (122) 
 
While not necessarily throwing democracy completely out the window, Burroughs’s 
character suddenly sounds quite a bit like Herbert Marcuse with perhaps a tinge of 
Edward Abbey.  In any case, the vision requires a more balanced and shared reciprocity.  
But how to determine between true and false needs with this new citizenship?  Burroughs 
has suggested more implicitly and more powerfully that this would be a poetics that 
disrupts existing narratives, that in doing so a new poetics moves beyond the birth-death 
or being-toward-death narrative.   
Burroughs often seems so irreverent that it is difficult to see anything like religion 
or spirituality in his work.  This is partly because, for him, drawing on Artaud and the 
perennial, he presents the world of spirit as being closer to immanence than 
transcendence.  It is necessary for both Artaud and Burroughs to intensify the grotesque 
and the body as their spiritual practice.  This is easiest to see in Burroughs’s invocation 
and critique of the European imaginary, which he does in Naked Lunch by way of 
reference to the anthropologist, Franz Boas.  Occurring through a globalized montage of 
non-industrialized societies that Burroughs calls the “Yage state” (99) and sounding much 
like Artaud, he writes: 
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“All medicine men use [yage] in their practice to foretell the future, locate lost or 
stolen objects, to diagnose and treat illness, to name the perpetrator of a crime.”  
Since the Indian (straitjacket for Herr Boas – trade joke – nothing so maddens an 
anthropologist as Primitive Man) does not regard any death as accidental, and 
they are acquainted with their own self-destructive trends referring to them 
contemptuously as “our naked cousins,” or perhaps that these trends above all are 
subject to the manipulation of alien and hostile wills, any death is murder.  The 
medicine man takes Yage and the identity of the murderer is revealed to him.  As 
you may imagine, the deliberations of the medicine man during one of these 
jungle inquests give rise to certain feelings of uneasiness among his constituents. 
(100)  
 
And so similarly, Burroughs seems to suggest, the yage ingestion or psychedelic trip 
creates in its perennial and deterritorialized state the possibility for determining social 
justice.  In the matrix of Naked Lunch, the perpetrator has been identified by the 
bureaucratic state through a sacrificial and excessive consumption of junk. 
It makes sense to put Burroughs into more current anthropological findings 
regarding to Psychedelic aesthetics.  Michael Taussig’s early work on shamanism in 
South America was followed by The Myth of the State, in which his ficto-criticism uses a 
genre collapse as participant-observational writing method that transcends subject-object 
distinction, as well as establishing a quasi-magical relationship between a colonial state 
enchanted by and inextricable from, native religion.  In more recent work, Taussig 
connects drugs, consumption, color and global commerce, pointing out hidden enchanted 
aspects of things typically thought of as completely mundane.  Taussig notes that drugs 
and dyes were for years commercially equivalent: 
If historically color has been categorized as a spice, as in the phrase, “the spice of 
life,” a phrase suggestive of a “rush” that takes us out of ourselves, like a drug, it 
is exceedingly curious that this association with color should have been forgotten 
in our usual understandings of the rise of the West to economic and military 
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prominence.  Color was every bit as important as so-called spices, if not a great 
deal more so, and indeed could be as highly valued as gold and silver.  (What 
Color is the Sacred? 146)  
  
Methodologically, Taussig has an implicit debt to psychedelic aesthetics.  His associative 
figuring allows him to see global economic relationships in strikingly new ways, ones the 
complicate more traditional readings of colonial and post-colonial.  Without the lineage 
of psychedelic aesthetics’ playing on critiques of the European imaginary, Taussig may 
seem pretty far out there.  Within it, he makes good sense. 
Another more contemporary thinker dealing with these issues is Giorgio 
Agamben in his reading of Marcel Mauss on gift-giving in The Kingdom and the Glory: 
For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government.  Agamben’s work shows an 
important relationship between the divine and sacrificial rites.  He notes that Mauss was 
deeply influenced by the anthropologist Sylvain Levi, whose work on early Brahmin 
religion and sacrifice in The Rig Veda (which is the soma sacrifice) suggests that, “Indian 
sacrifice is not simply an effective action, as are all rites; it does not limit itself to merely 
influencing the gods; it creates them” (226).  Rites are essentially poetic in the sense of 
making.   
Through ingesting the divine one not only becomes divine, the act determines and 
makes the divine.  It is a relationship similar to the economy Burroughs suggests as 
cooperative.  Agamben says that “both sacrifice and prayer present us with a theurgical 
aspect in which men, by performing a series of rituals – more gestural in the case of 
sacrifice, more oral in that of prayer – act on the gods in a more or less effective manner.”  
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This leads Agamben to an  aesthetic notion that has been de-emphasized in politics – a 
fundamental relationship to “glorification over glory”: 
Perhaps glorification is not only that which best fits the glory of God but is itself, 
as effective rite, what produces glory; and if glory is the very substance of God 
and the true sense of his economy, then it depends upon glorification in an 
essential manner and, therefore, has good reason to demand it through reproaches 
and injunctions.       
 
We begin to see here the importance of understanding psychedelic aesthetics in 
relationship to not only citizenship but to a citizenship of re-enchantment.  It is not 
merely nostalgia for religion or spirituality left behind by narratives of secularization, but 
the very substance of economic process itself.  The affective qualities of poetic works are 
at the heart of politics and the economy.  Insufficient attention to them is what creates 
Simon Critchley’s call for a return to poetry as a new foundation of “supreme fiction.”  
Because of their enchanted qualities, works like Naked Lunch and The Boo Hoo Bible 
that display psychedelic aesthetics are fundamentally political-theological in nature and 
useful to Critchley’s call.  Besides Burroughs and Kleps, a similar process was present, 
although to a lesser extent, in other writers’ work dealing symbolically with different 
aspects of the economy. 
 
Narrative Comparisons 
It is well known that drug culture had awful affects in the United States by the end 
of the 1960s, and common historical accounts of the 1960s narrate the decade itself as a 
kind of trip.  In these accounts, the open possibilities articulated at the end of the 1950s in 
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the United States end with violence and destruction, a breaking down of a national 
identity center as well as the dispersing of activist movements into different factions that 
cease to communicate with each other.  The end of the decade is often characterized as 
the political inefficacy of progressive movements, government scandals, murderous cults, 
and the loss of some sort of moral fabric.  While some will claim that the magical time in 
San Francisco ended well before the decade’s end, with the Diggers’ public funeral for  
“Hippie – Son of Media” in 1967, the performative nature of the funeral still expresses 
psychedelic aesthetics both in attention to its own construction and to its death and rebirth 
overtones.  No matter the narrative’s location of nostalgia, for many the chaos of the 
1960s returns to order – even if it is a morally corrupt one – and most children eventually 
grow up.  And so another narrative often superimposed on the 1960s in the United States 
is one of growing up, coming of age, and losing innocence.  More microcosmically: 
Woodstock became Altamont.   
But it is important to know, as groups like the San Francisco Diggers certainly 
did, that the construction of the supreme fiction of the 1960s as an exceptional era was 
present in criticism before the decade even happened.  At the end of the 1950s, across 
discursive media, people seemed to be looking for something new.  Anthologized in 
Gerald Howard’s The Sixties, an article from Esquire in 1960 by Arthur Schlesinger 
characterized the “rise of the Beat Generation” as “the result of the failure of our present 
society to provide ideals capable of inspiring the youth of our nation” (45).  In the same 
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year, Paul Goodman wrote in Growing Up Absurd that “Culture is, first of all, city and 
patriotic culture” (57).  He claims,  
I shall try to show that patriotism is the culture of childhood and adolescence.  
Without this first culture, we come with fatal emptiness to the humane culture of 
science, art, humanity and God . . . Young people aspire mightily to appearances 
on television and other kinds of notoriety, but I doubt that many now think of 
being honored by a statue in the park and winning ‘immortal’ fame, the fame of 
big culture. (57)  
 
The generation gap was being written into public dialogue.  The youth were central, but 
the current youth were disaffected.  C. Wright Mills used the term post-modern in 1963 
to characterize an age where “the ideals of freedom and reason have become moot; 
[where] increased rationality may not be assumed to make for increased freedom” (74-5).   
Again there are reverberations of what Riesman articulated in The Lonely Crowd and 
Marcuse would articulate shortly in One-Dimensional Man.  The irony of the late 1950s, 
according to cultural historian Lary May’s argument in Recasting America, was that 
although the United States had actually achieved its utopian dreams expressed earlier in 
the century, the effect was to bring about a state of extreme anxiety.  While the 
perception of living in crisis was not new, “their concern, particularly in its intensity, was 
new: it is rare for people to be so self-aware, so self-conscious, so self-concerned” (23).  
According to May, one of the main reversals in the feeling of relief at America’s 
newfound power was in “mass participation in government.”  Mediated culture had 
created the “youth” as an identity category to be marketed to, but this “produced” culture. 
We can even see this in jaded reactions to the 1960s.  While Schlesinger, in the article 
mentioned above, presciently claimed that “national purpose . . . acquires meaning as part 
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of an ongoing process; its certification lies, not in rhetoric, but in performance” (46), in 
1971, John Lennon expressed his jadedness surrounding the period by reflecting that 
“nothing happened.  We all dressed up, the same bastards are in control, the same people 
are runnin’ everything.  It is exactly the same” (in Wenner).  For Lennon in his freshly 
post-Beatles bitterness, the performance of the 1960s was not effective.  It was all show.  
Such bitter perspectives are just as present as nostalgia for a time when “everyone” had a 
cause, for a time when the “personal” became “political,” when the fabrication between 
public and private made a public game of lifestyle.  The fact that the personal could 
become political, however, is merely an articulation of expanded citizenship.     
Mediated culture challenged longstanding notions about subjectivity, perhaps 
especially the idea that subjectivity is a trap.  In 1958, Hannah Arendt described with 
dismay the reactions people exhibited at the success of Russia’s Sputnik satellite.  In her 
prologue to The Human Condition, she says, “when [humans] looked up from the earth 
toward the skies, [they] could behold there a thing of their own making.  The immediate 
reaction, expressed on the spur of the moment, was relief about the first ‘step toward 
escape from men’s imprisonment to earth’” (1).  We see in Arendt’s words that just 
before the psychedelic movement took off there was a culturally expressed desire for 
something “outside,” something more expansive in terms of situating subjectivity.  It is 
also true that the youth of the affluent societies were growing up having their lives 
documented and directed in ways previously unknown to humans.  This may be because 
youth of affluent societies grew up less as subjects than previous generations – in the 
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sense that the standard of living afforded a great deal of expendable income to the youth.  
At the same time, mediated culture located youth itself as a subject.  These themes 
dominate the literature of the late fifties and early sixties.  Two especially poignant 
themes are a return to childhood and a critique of masculinity. 
The first of these themes can be seen in a few important books before the 
introduction of psychedelics to the public.  In The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Tests, Tom 
Wolfe mentions the importance of Hermann Hesse and Arthur C. Clarke.  Wolfe 
compares Ken Kesey to Leo from Hesse’s Journey to the East: “He was never openly 
known as the leader: like Kesey, he was the non-navigator of the brotherhood” (266).  
Earlier in his narrative, Wolfe explains, “For a long time, I couldn’t understand the one 
Oriental practice the Pranksters liked, the throwing of the I-Ching coins” (142).  What the 
divinatory practice leads him to understand is Jung’s concept of synchronicity in which 
“the way the coins fall is inevitably tied up with the quality of the entire moment in 
which they fall.”  The synchronous moment of “Now” here invokes the ancient past and 
ushers in the space of the perennial.  It is then that Wolfe has another “ah-ha” moment: 
There is another book in the shelf in Kesey’s living room that everybody seems to 
look at, a little book called Journey to the East, by Hermann Hesse.  Hesse wrote 
it in 1932 and yet…the synch!…it is a book about…exactly…the Pranksters! and 
the great bus trip of 1964. (142) 
 
But another book of Hesse’s that perhaps more ideologically prefigures psychedelic 
aesthetics work: The Glass Bead Game.  
Hesse, who was a pacifist like Aldous Huxley, produces politics that may seem 
overly naïve and even complacently dangerous on the surface, but the The Glass Bead 
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Game centralizes themes of childhood and the transcendence of time that are important to 
psychedelic aesthetics.  In the book, Joseph Knecht, an aging scholar, decides to leave the 
distinguished position as Magister Ludi of the Glass Bead Game set in the future, an 
“academically religious” land called Castalia – the name Timothy Leary and Richard 
Alpert used for one of their foundations after leaving Harvard in the early 1960s.  The 
Glass Bead Game is, among other things, academic precision par excellence, and Knecht 
has completely mastered it.  Open to the criticism of a few long-time friends, however, he 
comes to see that Castalia is intellectually over-privileged and thus out of touch with 
humanity in the rest of the world.  According to Knecht’s friend, an aged Catholic priest 
named Father Jacobus, what Castalia is particularly out of touch with is a deeply critical 
account of history.  In Knecht’s resignation letter as Magister Ludi, he cites the words of 
his friend in the following post-script:  
Times of terror and deepest misery may be in the offing.  But if any happiness at 
all is to be extracted from that misery, it can only be a spiritual happiness, looking 
backward toward the conservation of the culture of earlier times, looking forward 
toward serene and stalwart defense of the things of the spirit in an age which 
otherwise might succumb wholly to material things. (363)   
 
Spirit and history are intertwined for Father Jacobus and Knecht. 
Though an old man, Knecht leaves Castalia for a more “secular” territory in order 
to become a tutor to his friend Plinio’s son, Tito, at a remote house in the mountains.  
Here, his mission into the secular world seeks to re-enchant the world with a religious 
conception of the temporal.  It is a deepening of Knecht’s own spiritualism.  On the first 
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morning of his arrival at the families’ vacation home in the mountains, Knecht finds Tito 
dancing in the dawn’s sunlight:   
the young man seemed to him stronger and more impressive than he had hitherto 
thought, but also harder, more inaccessible, more remote from culture, more 
pagan.  This ceremonial and sacrificial dance under the sign of Pan meant more 
than young Plinio’s speeches and versemaking ever had; it raised the boy several 
stages higher, but also made him seem more alien, more elusive, less obedient to 
any summons.  
 
In this dance, Tito,  
without knowing what he was doing, asking no questions, . . .  obeyed the 
command of this ecstatic moment, danced his worship, prayed to the sun, 
professed his devout movements and gestures his joy, his faith in life, his piety 
and reverence, both proudly and submissively offered up in the dance his devout 
soul as a sacrifice to the sun and the gods, and no less to the man he admired and 
feared, the sage and musician, the Master of the magic Game who had come to 
him from mysterious realms, his future teacher and friend. (422)   
 
Knecht, compelled by admiration for the young Pan, follows him swimming into a cold 
mountain lake.  The cold water is too much for the old man though, and Knecht drowns.  
Tito, sobered by the experience, goes on to reform his recklessness, and so it would seem 
that Knecht, in the act of dying, fulfills his final task – a teacher till the end.  But what of 
Tito’s sacrificial dance?   
The reference to Pan, a demigod, the one who lulls with music and forgetfulness, 
is an appropriate image that was frequently invoked in early twentieth century children’s 
literature as a rise in interest in classical and pagan deities accompanied the perception of 
an end to metaphysics in general.  In drowning, Knecht merges into a timeless pre-
history.  The novel then follows with a legendary account of Knecht’s life and three 
fictional autobiographies that Knecht had written during his student days, two of which 
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are pre-historical as well, the other an account of a saintly life.  Transcendence through a 
sacrifice that ecstatically disseminates a life outside of lived-time, or what Martin 
Heidegger might call “care” or “being-toward-death.  Hesse’s book itself, as in Knecht’s 
three fictional past-life accounts, each account for Knecht’s various incarnations over 
time.  The reason for being, in Hesse’s novel, points toward this enlightened 
transcendence, but it does so through overcoming histories.  Knecht’s drowning 
represents a well-intentioned will that is overcome by the force of fate, and the narrative 
of the book presents itself as a biography of Knecht, celebrating his acts.  The will acts to 
overcome its intention.  In Heidegger’s philosophy again, it is the taking up of one’s 
angst through one’s thrown-ness in the world in order to live the authentic life.  The 
authentic life is to be praised, glory in the destruction of will, transcendent merge with 
impersonal spirit.  But the metempsychosis and the return to the perennial is crucial in 
relaying the fact that it is not just one time, modernity, which is to be overcome through 
some technologizing account of progress. 
  In Hesse’s novel, Knecht’s transcendence makes way for Tito’s enlightenment 
and moral development while he himself achieves a sort of bliss in death.  Hesse presents 
the enlightened subject who is reconstituted through an experience that occupies so much 
of literature, and psychedelic literature in many ways merely continues this.  It performs 
the literary subject as the site of identification.  Later works, such as Italo Calvino’s If 
upon a Winter’s Night a Traveler is psychedelic in the way the text performs 
identification with the reader’s gaze, even if like Hesse it remains Romantic in its 
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presentation of experience.  There is an amplification of the text’s constructed-ness when 
compared to The Glass Bead Game or Nabakov’s Pale Fire (1962).  In many ways, the 
form of the artwork as transferable, containing the experience.   
An easy way to conceptualize this is the theme of childhood innocence. In 
contrast to Hesse, during the psychedelic era Arthur C. Clarke’s science fiction novel, 
Childhood’s End, projects a vision of the human race overcoming all subjectivity and 
ending itself through a kind of mass-scale transmigration of souls.  The narrative of the 
book arrives at the space beyond humans:  
There was nothing left of Earth: They [the last generation of children] had leeched 
away the last atoms of substance. It had nourished them, through their 
inconceivable metamorphosis, as food stored in a grain of wheat feeds a plant as it 
climbs toward the sun. (211)   
 
In order for the book’s narrative to proceed from this point in the novel, the reader must 
adopt the longing gaze of the alien, Karellen, as he contemplates why his race is not 
allowed to evolve the way humans do.  In following Karellen, the reader is invited to 
transcend humanity itself.   
Tom Wolfe, in The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Tests, compares Ken Kesey and the 
Merry Pranksters to the children in Clarke’s novel.  Here, the “return” to nature is not a 
mere return but a fulfillment of some sort of evolutionary progress.  Wolfe explicitly 
writes that the entire idea of the psychedelic experience involved in the acid and in the 
Prankster’s performance antics could be found in a long passage from Clarke’s book 
describing “total identification,” which was itself the product of constructed media space:  
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The history of cinema gave the clue to their actions.  First sound, then color, then 
stereoscopy, then Cinerama, had made the old ‘moving pictures’ more and more 
like reality itself.  Where was the end of the story? Surely, the final stage would 
be reached when the audience forgot it was an audience, and became a part of the 
action.  To achieve this would involve the stimulation of all the senses, and 
perhaps hypnosis as well…When the goal was attained, there would be an 
enrichment of human experience.  A man could become – for a while, at least, – 
any other person, and could take part in any conceivable adventure, real or 
imaginary.  (in Wolfe 233-34; in Clarke 142) 
 
The Pranksters, through their performances, through LSD, through being aware of their 
own construction in their movie, “re-enchant” a participatory space.  Total identification 
became the goal of their psychedelic aesthetics, but it was not ideologically a one-
dimensional goal. 
In Childhood’s End, it is significant that the last human, Jan is a black man.  With 
his characterization, Clarke expands citizenship and inverts the racist primitivism present 
in the early 1950s.  Jan remains curious about space travel, and had wanted to be an 
astronaut before the Overlords had come and made the innovation useless to humans.  
His romantic dreams were not, however, destroyed.  Jan attends a party where an alien 
interested in paranormal activity in humans has come.  The partygoers decide to play a 
Ouija Board, and Jan asks it the location of the Overlord’s home planet.  The board, 
powered by Jean Greggson’s latent psychic ability, produces the exact coordinates to the 
astounded crowd.  Jan decides to stowaway on the alien’s ship while Jean and her 
husband eventually move to the artist colony “New Athens,” where people are suspicious 
of the Overlords’ true intentions.  Clarke describes New Athens as having been founded 
by a Jewish man, a nod to the recently created Israeli state merged with irenic Greece: 
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He had been born in Israel, the last independent nation ever to come into 
existence – and, therefore, the shortest lived.  The end of national sovereignty had 
been felt here perhaps more bitterly than anywhere else, for it is hard to lose a 
dream which one has just achieved after centuries of striving. (139)   
       
If Wolfe’s connection to the goals of the acid tests being the total identification achieved 
by the children in Clarke’s novel with the Overmind, the tests also push toward 
deterritorialization and transcendence of nation-states.  In doing so, they appear to have 
given up transcendent religion altogether; but secularization is also overcome through the 
enchantment of the psychic mind.  Childhood as a theme in the works the Merry 
Pranksters found important was not just a return to the romantic construction of 
childhood innocence.  Childhood works as a theme in psychedelic aesthetics to invoke 
the perennial through the nostalgia produced by modernity’s claim to temporal progress 
and alienation from nature.  History is overcome by moving to a pre-political state of 
nature both before and beyond the nation state.  Another important theme in 
accomplishing this goal was a critique of masculinity and the family. 
Although not necessarily a psychedelic work, both the themes of childhood and 
masculinity are beautifully allegorized in Vladimir Nabakov’s Lolita (1955).  In the 
novel, Humbert Humbert, the double-named academic tries to reconcile European fantasy 
structures with American consumerism by fetishizing and attempting to possess his 
nymphet, Lolita.  Humbert embodies the decadent authority of specialists.  His attempt to 
control consumption itself carries to the end of the book.  As Humbert awaits his own 
death, he writes his memoir and elegy, but then refuses to publish it:  
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When I started, fifty-six days ago, to write Lolita, first in the psychopathic ward 
for observation, and then in this well-heated, albeit tombal, seclusion, I thought I 
would use these notes in toto at my trial, to save not my head of course, but my 
soul.  In mid-composition, however, I realized that I could never parade living 
Lolita.  I still may use parts of her memoir in hermetic sessions, but publication is 
to be deferred. (308)  
 
Humbert’s narcissism presents as a chivalry, or a parody of chivalry – as if it were not 
always parody of a sort: “I could never parade living Lolita.”  Humbert desires for the 
book to be published only after Lolita is dead.  His final act of control is his own 
metempsychosis into the transcendental realm of Art: “I am thinking of aurochs and 
angels, the secret of durable pigments, prophetic sonnets, the refuge of art,” he writes, 
addressing the living / dead Lolita (309).  From his refuge, Humbert is still able to make 
threats to Lolita’s husband from beyond the grave: “That husband of yours, I hope, will 
always treat you well, because otherwise my specter shall come at him, like black smoke, 
like a demented giant, and pull him apart nerve by nerve.” Art effects and enables 
control, and as Nabokov’s professor John Ray, writes in his “Introduction” to Lolita, 
claiming the book’s moral lessons “should make all of us – parents, social workers, 
educators – apply ourselves with greater vigilance and vision to the task of bringing up a 
better generation in a safer world” (6).  The book parodies the desire to control, whether 
it is Humbert, the professor, or the reader.  The narratives of the “generation” of youth in 
the 1960s enact a similar desire.  The youth generation’s consumer freedom positions 
them as hyper-mediated subjects-objects.  This realization accompanies a collapse of 
idealism in the narratives of late sixties and early seventies, as “coming down” from the 
trip brought baby boomers into adulthood.  A liberal generation was normed.   
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Ian Hacking has eloquently argued in The Taming of Chance that the construction 
of “normal people” is developed in the late nineteenth century as an outgrowth of 
Enlightenment thought replaces chance as “superstition of the vulgar” (1).  He says, “the 
cardinal concept of the Enlightenment had been, simply, human nature.  By the end of the 
19th century it was being replaced by something different: normal people.”  Yet chance 
and indeterminacy came to “subvert” such rational normality in the early twentieth 
century, according to Hacking, by way of massive amounts of collected data and the rise 
of probability and statistics to account for such data (3).  What arose with indeterminacy 
in physics and these ways to account for data was a theme of games and the theorization 
of play:  
Games of chance furnished initial illustrations of chance processes, as did birth 
and mortality data.  Those became the object of mathematical scrutiny in the  
seventeenth century.  Without them we would have nothing like our modern idea 
of probability.  But it is easy for the determinist to assume that the fall of the die 
or the spin of a roulette work out to the simple and immutable laws of mechanics.  
   
One can see both the ludic and the fascination with chance in psychedelic aesthetics with 
the Merry Pranksters use of the I-Ching for divination and the importance of performance 
as self-aware.  This is perhaps fully realized in late psychedelic works like Thomas 
Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow (1973).  Pynchon’s main character Slothrop comes to find 
that German V2 rockets land wherever he has recently had sex.  Philip M. Weinstein 
writes:  
Slothrop (thanks to his re-scriptable member) can become ‘organically’ aligned 
within political organizations utterly alien to his sense of who he is.  Engineered 
to be somatically foreign to himself, but unaware of this, he is, for much of the 
novel, both Slothrop and not-Slothrop” (202).   
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What appears in the “both Slothrop and not-Slothrop” is a questioning of liberal 
subjectivity that marks the trauma of the psychedelic era, and the narrative seeks to 
overcome this mystery.  Pynchon’s work, like Hacking’s, shows normalcy to be a 
construction, hence marking a well-known postmodern shift.  While the narrative 
construction of Lolita, with its false introduction, also parodies the construction of 
normalcy and the construction of the book as consumed object through professor Ray’s 
moralizing message, Pynchon’s work attributes the construction to an almost enchanted 
interstitial and even international governing forces and conspiracies.   
There are two extremes at work here, visible in the doubling of characters.  
Humbert is a culpable agent who, though consumed with desire, maintains a certain 
degree of self-identity.  Slothrop, on the other hand, in his search for the V2 rocket with 
the impossible serial number 00000, is completely dissimulated.  His character disappears 
as the novel focuses on the rocket itself.  Slothrop’s doubling, in contrast to Humbert 
Humbert, is much more directly tied to the idea of a nation-State that is being destroyed 
by the rockets.  Slothrop is a bio-political entity whose masculinity has been transfigured 
by the State itself.  He is experimented on both as a child and an adult.  Whereas Humbert 
Humbert’s fetishes become transcendent art, Slothrop’s sexual conduct marks and 
portends destruction.  Whereas the forces that Humbert transgresses are cultural norms, 
Slothrop’s are political institutions where control and chaos are difficult to distinguish 
from one another.  While a typical modern-versus postmodern theme about agency can be 
set up here, psychedelic aesthetics exists somewhere in-between the subjective perverted 
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sexual agent, Humbert, and the objectified, dismembered soldier whose story becomes a 
cypher numbered rocket.  The difference is biopolitcal, and psychedelic aesthetics are 
particularly concerned, not just with overcoming conventional morality, but with the 
state’s construction of it through subjugation of its citizens.   
Psychedelic aesthetics, according to Aldous Huxley’s thinking presented earlier, 
must transcend into “the spiritual” which situates subjectivity and objectivity, and these 
aesthetics are largely evidenced in works between the late fifties and the early seventies.  
At the heart of psychedelic therapy is a continued reliance on the return to subjectivity.  
While a critique of European fantasies of modern subjectivity is at work, a liberal subject 
remains.  Institutional critique, even if it is cartoonish, exists as an earnest part of 
psychedelic aesthetics.  These aesthetics suggest that what institutions need is not to be 
destroyed, but to be updated through a return to a state of nature accomplished by a 
psychedelic experience.  Figuratively, psychedelic aesthetics accomplish this by a 
critique of masculinity and through the transfer of narrative perspective. 
 Between Lolita and Gravity’s Rainbow we can situate another major literary 
work dealing with masculinity: Ken Kesey’s One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest.  Here, the 
state institution performs a virtual castration of McMurphy’s masculinity through the 
normative and generic frigidity of Nurse Ratched.  Normalcy conquers by lobotomizing 
McMurphy’s wildness, his attempts at leadership and his attempts for fraternal 
organizing.  But the narrative perspective belongs to Chief, the sanest of the bunch, 
whose voice is the text itself, though he remains mute through most of the narrative.  And 
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it is only through Chief’s smothering of McMurphy that his lobotomized virility is 
transferred to the half-Native American, allowing him to escape the hospital.  Chief 
performs euthanasia on the “white man,” taking his symbolic power with him.  Chief is 
also a different kind of subject.  He learns and leaves.  Power is redistributed through him 
and re-territorialized. 
Tom Wolfe explains that Kesey’s interest in normalcy is driven by his interest in 
controlling people.  In The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Tests, he writes of Kesey’s antics 
when asked to come talk to a conference of the Unitarian Church in California: 
Kesey was, in fact, now tremendously interested in the phenomenon of…Control.  
He had discovered that the Paranksters had been able to control the flow of the 
conference, not by any Machiavellian planning, but simply by drawing the 
conference into their movie.  The conference was on a schedule, but the 
Pranksters always arrived…Now, and in no time at all everyone had become a 
part of their movie. (190)  
 
Kesey’s control was electric, affective and aesthetic.  At the conference, Kesey lectured 
the crowd about “symbols we use and the games we’re in and how you can’t really know 
what an emotion is until you’ve experienced both sides of it” (187).  His answer was an 
affective study.  Kesey took an American flag off of the stage and began trampling it.  
Unitarians, one would think, would be all too aware of iconoclasm, but instead there were 
gasps and sobs.  Wolfe frames Kesey’s intent: “don’t just describe an emotion, but arouse 
it, make them experience it, by manipulating the symbol of the emotion, and sometimes 
we have to come to an awareness through the back door.”  As Kesey tries to explain his 
action, he refers to singing the song “America the Beautiful” as a child, but one of his 
Pranksters interrupts him telling him to “do it” or “sing it” and Kesey leads the whole 
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crowd singing the song.  Here again is another instance of what Agamben calls 
glorification over glory.  Glorification exists in the affective moves of psychedelic 
aesthetics as an aesthetic that re-enchants superseding the power of nation-state authority. 
Kesey makes essentially the same gesture in the transference of narrative 
perspective in Sometimes a Great Notion.  While the narrative is largely about two 
brothers, one a weaker, suicidal hipster named Leland Stamper, who seeks revenge on his 
more manly, older half-brother, Hank, for carrying on a love affair with his mother, their 
father’s second wife.  Part of the revenge plot involves winning the love of his older 
brother’s wife, Viv.  But, as with One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest, the narrative frame 
allows for a different ending.  Despite the fact that character’s shift perspective 
throughout Sometimes a Great Notion in a fashion reminiscent of William Faulkner, the 
dramatic situation that holds the novel together is that of Viv Stamper relaying the 
mythological story of the Stampers to Union Boss, Floyd Evenwrite.  While the revenge 
narrative emphasizes the family struggle, and the failed search for a new masculinity – 
Leland sets ultimate revenge on “stealing” his brother’s woman – Viv’s narrative ends 
the novel when she leaves town and both men.  Again, the old myths are transferred to 
the voice of a seemingly marginalized character.  Citizenship is expanded.  Viv has been 
on a marriage trip, and on the return she has said, “no thank you.”26    
                                                
26 Both film versions of these novels ignore the dramatic situation implied by the storyteller, hence they 
miss the point of the transfer of power present in Kesey’s work and a larger thrust in his critique of modern 
subjectivity.  
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Kesey’s novels, like many psychedelic works, valorize a “return” to the un-
modern, the pre-modern, and the perennial.  In the casting off of modernity the new 
citizen is ushered in with the consciousness of the failure of modernity.  Kesey figures 
this return in Sometimes a Great Notion with nods to the tradition of American literature 
and the home.  With echoes going back to Poe’s “Fall of the House of Usher” and 
Hawthorne’s House of Seven Gables, the home flawed at its foundation is a long-standing 
device for establishing familial and generational conflict.   
Nine years before Kesey’s book was published, Sloan Wilson’s The Man in the 
Gray Flannel Suit (1955) was a best-seller.  The book opens with the story of a crack in 
the wall of Tom and Betsy Rath’s house.  After a marriage fight over money, Tom had 
“heaved” a forty dollar vase Betsy had bought that day against the wall, causing a crack 
in the plaster to form all the way up the wall in the shape of a question mark (1).  
Wilson’s heavy-handed figure is completely earnest.  Tom and Betsy repair their 
marriage by eventually moving into Tom’s mother’s home after she dies.  The house is 
on a large plot of land and the couple wins a zoning battle with the local city council to 
have part of the land turned into a subdivision.  They also win a battle with his mother’s 
corrupt gardener who claims to have rightful inheritance to the land.  Throughout the 
book, Tom’s manhood is in question as he struggles to be ambitious enough to please his 
wife.  He constantly thinks about how many men he killed as a soldier in the war and a 
lover he left in Europe whom has contacted him for monetary support for a child he did 
not know he had.  The settling of the situation with Tom’s intergenerational home and his 
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commitment to build modest homes for others while stepping out of the corporate world 
saves his marriage and family and lets him become a stand-up father to his child 
overseas.  Family wins over corporate ambition.  Family produces a balanced 
masculinity, at least when the wife is understanding enough.  This is not the case with 
Kesey’s approach to the home. 
Sometimes a Great Notion opens by returning to a mythical time, gesturing 
toward Beowulf.  Outside the Stamper household, a man’s arm hangs for the public to 
see.  The house is on a riverbank in Oregon, was built by Jonas Stamper, who left Kansas 
in 1898 with his two sons.  Jonas, convinced by his “seven-teen-year-old son” that “we 
can do better than this yere sticker path we got now” (17), acquires Oregon land by 
homesteading, but he quickly realizes that the land he has built the foundation of his 
home on is slowly being eaten away by the river: “Watching, it occurs to Jonas that it 
isn’t the bank that is giving way, as one might naturally assume. No. It is the river that is 
getting wider” (25).  Jonas’s dilemma is characterized as an American generational 
problem.  He is a religious man who has left his wife behind in Kansas. 
A stringy-muscled brood of restless and stubborn west-walkers, their scattered 
history shows.  With too much bone and not enough meat, and on the move ever 
since that first day the first skinny immigrant Stamper took his first step off the 
boat onto the eastern shore of the continent.  On the move with a kind of 
trancelike dedication.  Generation after generation leapfrogging west across wild 
young America; not as pioneers doing the Lord’s work in a heathen land, not as 
visionaries blazing a trail for a growing nation . . .  but simply as a clan of skinny 
men inclined always toward itchy feet and idiocy, toward foolish roaming, toward 
believing in greener grass over the hill and straighter hemlocks down the trail. 
(16) 
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Jonas eventually loses hope and leaves his sons and wife to go back to Kansas without 
telling them.  He is a failed father.  To get money to live and finish the house, Henry 
Stokes must join a local co-op against his will and pride.  Fighting against the expanding 
river, Henry builds a bank that requires constant maintenance.  This is the result of the 
flawed foundation of the flawed father at the end of the continent.  Nature itself de-
territorializes the home, and the flawed father returns in the next generation. 
Henry Stamper makes up for what his father lacked by becoming ultra masculine 
and a shrewd ruler of his house.  By the time he has a family, “the domain is an absolute 
monarchy in which no one dares make a move, not even the crown prince himself, 
without first consulting the Great Ruler” (78).  The “crown prince” is Hank, Henry’s 
first-born.  His mother dies and Henry takes a trip back to New York to get another wife.  
He returns with a woman less than half his age with whom he has a second son, Leland, 
but he is too old to please her.  Lonely and desperate, she develops a romantic 
relationship with Hank.  Leland sees them together as a boy and develops a hatred for his 
older brother.  Leland is brainy instead of brawny and goes off to college; meanwhile his 
mother leaves the Stamper house and eventually kills herself.  Blaming his brother for his 
mother’s suicide, Leland returns home after his own failed suicide-attempt to take 
revenge on his brother. 
The typological references to sibling rivalry in the book are themselves a 
reference to Steinbeck’s East of Eden (1952), which offers a perspective of individual 
will overcoming the shadows of history and fate.  But the generational struggle is 
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different with Kesey.  Before leaving to go back home, the young hipster Leland has a 
session with his psychiatrist, telling him he thinks he is going mad.  His doctor tells him, 
he is not mad. 
“You, and in fact quite a lot of your generation, have in some way been exiled 
from that particular sanctuary.  It’s become almost impossible for you to ‘go mad’ 
in the classical sense.  At one time people conveniently ‘went mad’ and were 
never heard from again.  Like a character in a romantic novel.  But now” – And 
think he even went so far as to yawn – “you are too hip to yourself on a 
psychological level.  You are all too intimate with too many of the symptoms of 
insanity to be completely off your guard.  Another thing: all of you have a talent 
for releasing frustration through clever fantasy.” (71)  
      
Leland’s entire generation has been so “normed” they do not know where else to go.  The 
psychologist proves to be right in a way, for Leland’s fantasy becomes set on outdoing 
his overly masculine older brother by stealing his wife, Viv.  And through the novel we 
see him plot with hipster leanings toward paranoid schizophrenia and “sensitive” 
masculinity.  Hank’s masculinity is as much as trap for him as anything.  Everyone wants 
to fight him, including his younger brother.  In his ultimate confrontation with Hank, 
Leland performs his failure at physically overpowering Hank while demonstrating that 
his plot to disrupt Hank’s marriage worked.  But in a characteristically Keseyan twist, the 
brothers unite together to save their family business in a desperate attempt to fight labor 
unions, and Viv leaves both of them.  Like Chief at the end of One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest, the shift in narrative frame accomplishes an expanded sense of 
citizenship, even if they are only Kesey’s fantasies of Native-American-ness and 
femininity. 
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In disrupting not so much the mythological narratives that Kesey draws on to 
invoke a literary lineage but the perspective by which myths are told, Kesey challenges 
both state citizenship and transcendent religion.  His use of enchantment occurs partly 
through his choice of character shifts – in these two examples, a half Native American 
and a woman from Colorado.  Both are associated with a land that becomes re-
territorialized through their emerging perspectives.  But Kesey enchants at a more subtle 
level as well.   
Sometimes a Great Notion constantly calls attention to its own construction 
through song and frequent shifts in character’s perspectives.  For example, Kesey 
attempts to one-up William Faulkner by generally using perspective shifts between 
chapters while occasionally shifting from paragraph to paragraph.  In addition, characters 
interrupt their own narratives to point this out.  Leland speaking in first-person, at one 
point says, “Looking back (I mean now, here, from this particular juncture in time, able 
to be objective and courageous thanks to the miracle of modern narrative technique), I 
see the terror clearly” (71).  And, in a technical sense, the narrative of the book moves 
from Viv’s frame on the last page to “Jenny,” a Native American woman, lifting her skirt 
for a man.  These moves mimic camera-like shifts in perspective throughout the novel 
and point to an “electric” quality of enchantment. In doing so, they gesture outside of the 
medium of the written word.   
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Perhaps more overtly, this is accomplished throughout the novel as country song 
lyrics interrupt scenes from the jukebox in the bar, and even then, more significantly in 
the title’s allusion to “Goodnight Irene”: 
Sometimes I live in the country 
Sometimes I live in town, 
Sometimes I have a great notion 
To jump in the river and drown 
 
Besides being an allusion to suicide by drowning and drugs (the lyrics reference dying of 
morphine) because a woman left, which seems to unify both Hank and Leland’s 
situations at the end of the novel, as well as to land and the river in the book, “Goodnight 
Irene” has a larger cultural significance for Kesey.  “Goodnight Irene” was a popular 
song in the late nineteenth century, but its melody had been forgotten until a Lead Belly 
performance of it was recorded by John and Alan Lomax.  It was then recorded by Pete 
Seeger and the Weavers in 1950 and became a mega hit.  Kesey is directly tapping into 
not just a hit but also into America’s past.  According to John Szwed, between the 
Weavers’ release of their version in July and October of 1950, the song was heard all 
over the country in jukeboxes and on the radio “an estimated two million times a day” 
(249).  Although the move is subtle, Kesey uses the texture of recorded music as a way to 
move into the perennial. 
Again, psychedelic aesthetics invoke the perennial as a way to collapse textures 
into a space beyond time.  It is a virtual space in the fact that it is constructed and 
“produced.”  In recorded music, the explosion of folk music during the 1950s was a way 
to re-territorialize the American landscape in the postwar years.  It was also a way to 
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critique state power, and so much of folk music of the time was left-leaning.  It hardly 
needs mentioning that Bob Dylan made this more psychedelic when he “went electric” at 
the Newport Folk Festival in 1963.  What made the move so shocking both to the 
audience and to Dylan was a perceived inauthenticity in Dylan’s use of instrumentation 
associated with more commercial music.  Commodification removed the intellectual 
“status” of the austere folk aesthetic.  But Dylan seemed to already be aware that there 
was nothing “authentic” about any of it.  It was all performance, and there was nothing 
wrong with that.   
In another way, there was nothing particularly revolutionary about Dylan’s move; 
in his song structure he remained committed to folk and blues forms, but his lyrics 
became more narrative-driven, associative and textural – and that, combined with 
electricity (a familiar psychedelic trope) was what made him psychedelic.  What folk 
listeners had yet to understand was that all of it was already mediated, and their aesthetic 
was based in a commitment to a virtual presentation of landscape from which they could 
deterritorialize and the re-territorialize the political landscape.  They were simply 
committed to a kind of naturalism they romanticized.  In a nostalgia for the land and the 
“people” of the land, folk music collectors work to preserve territory, whether it be local, 
national or “world.”  In psychedelic aesthetics, “folk texture” becomes one of many ways 
to invoke the perennial through the gesture of a return to “nature” or the land.  The 
technological innovations in musical production destroyed any sort of claim to naturalism 
in recorded music.  In his brilliant study, Echo and Reverb: Fabricating Space in Popular 
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Music Recording 1900-1960, Peter Doyle traces how early uses of reverb were used to 
convey a kind of naturalism through a sense of vastness of space.  However, by the late 
1950s, musical production had shifted beyond appealing to naturalism and created 
entirely virtual space: 
Reverberation and echo simply are sonic attributes of physical space. When 
discussing the nature of the space(s) inferred by the use of echo and reverb on 
recordings, however, especially when lyrics do not cue us to imagine specific 
space(s), we move further into connotation; in teasing these meanings out, we run 
the risk of interpreting idiosyncratically, of over interpreting, or of misreading. 
(14)            
 
Again, this can be connected to the virtual space alluded to by Arthur C. Clarke in 
Childhood’s End with regard to the cinema and Lary May’s writings about “produced 
culture.”  The virtual space in psychedelic aesthetics provides another access point to the 
perennial. 
But the perennialism of psychedelic aesthetics also builds out of the modernist 
avant-garde aesthetics of failure, and that is why my initial chapters linking psychedelic 
aesthetics to European thought are important.  The failure of traditional masculinity was 
one way to present a critique of the state.  While Burroughs accomplished this with 
surreptitious homosexual encounters with the president in Naked Lunch, Kesey showed it 
to be a trap.  His apathy for the inability to “graduate” from acid tests is already apparent 
in the fractured ending of Sometimes a Great Notion.  Viv does not know where she is 
going, she is simply going.  The only recourse seems to be some “becoming” of other that 
knows its failure.  Of course, this failure is evident in earlier literary figures, and the most 
famously inspiring figure for both Kesey and Dylan is the figure of the beatnik hipster. 
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Power is generally redistributed in the literature of the 1950s and 1960s.  When 
Jack Kerouac imposes his white privilege in On the Road calling the “Negro” the 
essential American, he expresses more than the invisibility of white power and its ability 
to drain who or what it others by its narrative enthusiasm.  The ignorance of the power is 
indicative of the power itself – a power unrecognized because it is taken for granted.  
Because power powers, it does not recognize.  As such, much of the Beat and post-Beat 
poetry, like the emerging avant-garde jazz of the period, is fundamentally about the 
intensity of energy outside of source.  Taking away existing harmonic song structures 
essentially produces the perennial, it moves to a state preceding functional harmony.  The 
convention in avant-garde jazz at the time was to begin a piece with a pre-written melody 
or “head,” and then to use that as a point of departure into free improvisation.  This 
process dramatically performs the psychedelic experience.  But in a narrative medium 
like fictional literature, getting to the perennial requires associative and allegorical 
moves.  It is these moves that accomplish the transference of power by creating a state of 
“becoming,” as Deleuze and Guattari would say.   
The perennial brings one into contact with one’s desire.  Desire here ceases to be 
a lack.  If racial essentialism is present unconsciously, in the perennial it will be overt and 
part of what Kleps called the “shitstorm” of enlightenment.  Kerouac’s essentialism has 
been noted by many in passages like the following from On the Road: “I wished I were a 
Denver Mexican, or even a poor overworked Jap, anything but what I was so drearily, a 
‘white man’ disillusioned” (180).  If one takes his desire seriously, however, then one has 
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to acknowledge that “true” American citizenship is coded as “non-white.”  White power 
and masculinity, like the European imaginary, fail in the perennial, especially as 
citizenship expands and new narratives are formed – at least this is how the aesthetics 
figure it. 
The figure of the Beat attempts to shrug off the weight of biology as it exists 
socially while maintaining a certain naivety concerning the fact that the choice to 
sacrifice himself is a self-employed consecration.  At least part of this had to do with a 
generation feeling they were inheriting a “utopia” they had never asked for.   It is 
important to note that Sal Paradise, Kerouac’s narrator, fails to become an essential 
American.  The book itself performs a kind of failure.  Sal meets Dean Moriarty just after 
his marriage has fallen apart.  His New York intellectual friends bore him with their 
“negative, nightmare position of putting down society and giving their tired bookish or 
political or psychoanalytical reasons, but Dean just raced society eager for bread and 
love; he didn’t care one way or the other” (8).  Moriarty’s appeal initially comes to Sal as 
a kind of feigned or even anti-intellectualism from just as keen a mind as his New York 
friends.  This is what makes Sal take his initial trip out west beginning his life “on the 
road,” because “somewhere along the line I knew there’d be girls, visions, everything; 
somewhere along the line I knew the pearl would be handed to me.”  But the novel ends 
with Sal reluctantly off to a bourgeois concert with New York friends and Dean 
romantically off west again.   
   218 
Kerouac’s personal goals for his work also perform a kind of spiritual failure.  
Ann Charters has noted that  
Kerouac was never able to convince his critics that the Beat Generation was 
‘basically a religious generation,’ but his friend [John Clellon] Holmes 
understood that the characters of On the Road were actually ‘on a quest, and that 
the specific object of their quest was spiritual. (xxix) 
 
It was for Holmes an inward turn despite the outward-ness of the traveling.  Even so, Sal 
and Dean never succeed in finding Dean’s absent father, and by the end Kerouac rests in 
the cold comfort that “nobody knows what’s going to happen to anybody besides the 
forlorn rags of growing old” (307).  It is deeply Romantic, but more than being 
optimistic, it is a performance of failure.   
Kerouac’s aspirations to mysticism accompany an abdication of the responsibility 
of privilege.  The romantic “holiness” of the artist privileges the self while sacrificing the 
self’s power.  Who it “others” may never have asked for the blood of the self-sacrificing 
artist.  Nevertheless, the sacrifice is there – the blood of privilege that destroys itself in its 
last attempt to maintain control.  But like any such violent act, the demonstration is itself 
the demonstration of powerlessness.  Viv, like the Dean Moriarty at the end of On the 
Road, simply disappears into the distance.   
The difference between On the Road and Sometimes a Great Notion, however, is 
poignantly revealed in narrative comparison.  In the latter, the reader has more freedom to 
travel with Viv or to recede from the book.  A certain “naivety” accompanies the Beat, 
embedded in the knowing-non-acknowledgment of modernism’s failure, because the 
enthusiasm of the spiritual quest remains genuine. The Beat believes in his holiness, but 
   219 
the move to self-sacrifice for the sake of holiness is larger than any individual decision to 
self-sacrifice.  The decision to perform sacrifice itself arises from the cultural 
reconfiguration of power and privilege.  Although Kerouac’s narrator is not emasculated 
in the same way Nabakov’s Humbert Humbert, Kesey’s McMurphy, and Pynchon’s 
Slothrop are, Sal Paradise can do nothing but go to a boring concert and think of the 
layered poetic figure of desire that Dean Moriarty has become – a tragic return to one-
dimensionality.  What keeps Kerouac’s On the Road from really displaying psychedelic 
aesthetics then, is its fetishization of failure – (he even later came to perform this very 
failure in his own life).  Psychedelic aesthetics, on the other hand, track a certain 
masculinity that must die and be mythologically disseminated and reborn, but On the 
Road glorifies its own failure. 
However, certainly if anyone bought into the glorification of this failure it was 
Kerouac’s readers and the emerging displaced affluent youth who had nowhere to turn in 
a utopic society overcome by its own anxiety, to put it in Lary May’s terms.  And Kesey 
was an avid consumer of Kerouac.  Becoming involved at one level requires an act of 
will and at another level an overcoming of that will.  Groups like the Merry Pranksters 
sought to overcome the will through affective means, but they certainly weren’t the only 
group to do so.  John Gruen, in The New Bohemia (1966) referred to this produced 
culture as “combine culture”: “The true emblem of this New Bohemia,” he says, “is 
action – physical, mental, emotional.”  He contrasts these youth with Jack Kerouac and 
the beats in terms of mobility:  
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[The combine generation’s] highway leads not so much through the Whitmanian 
wonderment of these United States, as through the currently more relevant 
Whitmanian social awareness of the development of comradeship, the beautiful 
and sane affection of man for man. (9) 
   
Mobility, process, means over ends, but also means overcoming themselves: these 
characteristics are present in psychedelic aesthetics, as well as a transcending of 
geographical place, accomplishing a more hazy distinction between ‘subject’ and ‘world.’  
Artifice here ceases to be alienated from nature and instead presents as ‘organic’.  As Bob 
Dylan sings, “You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows,” but the 
weathermen’s terrorism is merely the performance of a return to a pre-political state of 
nature.  There is nothing necessarily in the return to the state of nature that means it must 
be non-violent.  Thomas Hobbes would perhaps laugh and shrug, but he would also be 
deeply concerned with the complete lack of controlled meaning through associative 
aesthetics. 
If the narrative of the trip itself becomes allegorical, a kind of pilgrimage, the 
story of the psychedelic experience in many ways can be superimposed onto Sal Paradise.  
What began as guided trips in the “overly intellectual” east coast psychology became a 
free for all on the west coast.  As Tom Wolfe tells it, the entire trip the Merry Pranksters 
began with the assumption that they were all already crazy: “The trip, in fact the whole 
deal, was a risk-all balls-out plunge into the unknown, and it was assumed merely that 
more and more of what was already inside a person would come out and expand, 
gloriously or otherwise” (87).  Kesey’s prankster was an updated form of Leland the 
hipster from Sometimes a Great Notion, so familiar with the symptoms of madness, he 
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could not do anything to escape it.  In such a situation one might as well recognize the 
entire metaphysical situation as a game.  Once this is recognized, it all becomes 
performance.  The existing social structures in America became the stage for this 
performance:  
Pranksters were out among them, and the citizens of the land were gawking and 
struggling to summon up the proper emotion for this – what in the name of God 
are the ninnies doing.  But the opposite was happening, too.  On those long 
stretches of American superhighway between performances the bus was like a 
pressure cooker, a crucible, like one of those chambers in which the early atomic 
scientists used to compress heavy water, drive the molecules closer and closer 
together until the very atoms exploded. On the bus all traces of freakiness or 
competition or bitterness were intensified. (Wolfe 88) 
 
Fiction becomes reality in psychedelic aesthetics. 
 
Psychedelic Citizenship  
In accepting the metaphysics of life as a ludic performance, Ken Kesey and his 
friends decided to make a movie.  But the production of the movie, like Federico Fellini’s 
8½ is a context collapse of self and other, inside and outside.  The body becomes the 
focus of such a collapse, and psychedelic aesthetics come to be expressed through 
lifestyle in the late 1960s and 1970s.  In entering this “headspace,” there is an abdication 
of control for both self and environment, and things are left up to aesthetic forces and 
affective waves.  But it is not simply an experiment in anarchy.  Control moves through 
the force of energy and power itself.  Unsurprisingly, the acid tests alarmed even other 
folks in the psychedelic community.  Wolfe notes that Owsley Stanley, the famous 
manufacturer of LSD was skeptical at times of Kesey’s tests, but also the ex-Harvard 
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crew who had originally promoted guided trips.  The Merry Pranksters had fully 
embraced the perennial “Now,” and it is this move that underlies the experience of 
“happenings” and guerilla politics of the late 1960s.  Like Kleps in his Boo Hoo Bible, 
setting and preparation became way less relevant: “Let the setting be as unserene and 
lurid as the Prankster arts can make it and let your set be only on your…brain, man” 
(233).  The plan for the Acid Tests was: “Everybody would take acid, any time they 
wanted, six hours before the Test began or the moment they got there, at whatever point 
in the trip the wanted to enter the new planet.  In any event, they would be on a new 
planet.”  What would citizenship look like there? 
The result of the Acid Tests was that there needed to be a “graduation” from acid.  
Wolfe presents Kesey’s theory to go beyond acid: “You find what you came to find when 
you’re on acid and we’ve got to start doing it without acid; there’s no use opening the 
door and going through it and then always going back out again” (263).  Here Kesey 
begins to sound much more like Aldous Huxley had sounded in theorizing that drugs 
could potentially help society by giving people access to mystical experiences who 
otherwise would not have it within their means to achieve a feeling of spirituality on their 
own.  Huxley then remains the theorist of the psychedelic experience par excellence, 
even if his aesthetic implementation of his ideas was more austere and less performative.  
Still, Kesey and others building psychedelic aesthetics off of allegories of trips certainly 
left a cultural stamp with the emergence of festival culture. 
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An obvious connection here, and one that was often invoked during the 1960s, is 
that of the Dionysian festival.  In its political sense, the festival was articulated in liberal 
philosophy by Rousseau in the form of civic religion.  Festival culture, so present in our 
society today, exploded in the 1960s, and the acid tests invoked a similar rhetoric of 
citizenship: “you’re either on the bus off the bus.”  With the acid tests and psychedelic 
aesthetics, citizenship is presented as a performance that is self-aware, the outcome of 
“produced culture” that arises after World War II.  It is a mass-produced self-awareness 
that is participatory and may or may not be ironic – for dramatic irony depends on an 
audience perceiving a difference, and total identification leaves no audience behind.  
Festivals function to rejuvenate the spiritual life of the community, but they also involve 
sacrifice. 
Simon Critchley’s Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology 
explicates Rousseau on festivals and civic religion.  Critchley writes:  
in order for the internalist laws generated by the general will to have authority, 
they have to be decreed or ‘statuted’ by a quasi-external lawgiver, who belongs 
neither to the realm of politics nor nature, but who exists in a ‘no place’ . . . It is 
by occupying this quasi-external, quasi-divine ‘no place’ that the lawgiver gives a 
fictional majesty to the law. (61)   
 
But Critchley later turns to explications of Wallace Stevens, saying that “in the realms of 
politics, law, and religion there are only fictions.  Yet I do not see this as a sign of 
weakness, but as a sign of possible strength.”  Although it is merely a dim possibility, 
Critchley believes “the critical task of poetry is to show that the world is what you make 
of it.  But that does not exhaust the category of fiction.  Paradoxically, a supreme fiction 
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is a fiction we know to be a fiction – there is nothing else – but in which we nevertheless 
believe” (91).  As the affective turns of psychedelic aesthetics in the mid-twentieth 
century redraw subjectivity outside the legal norms of nation-states through 
consciousness expansion, they re-enchant citizenship in terms of a spirituality that must 
overcome its own irony.  Experimentation in religion during the 1960s and 1970s 
becomes here a civic gesture – though perhaps more global cosmopolitan than nationalist 
– whether it be through yoga, New Ageism or Satanism.  The advantage in religious 
experimentation is in its ability to deterritorialize. 
Critchley’s turn toward a poetics that would enchant “faithless” citizens during 
crises in liberalism, resonates strongly here both with early twentieth century aesthete 
Walter Benjamin’s use of aesthetics against politics and also with a similar passage from 
structuralist criticism of the 1960s and 1970s.  Rene Girard’s Violence and the Sacred (a 
work I would characterize as psychedelic), for example, argues regarding ritual sacrifices 
that 
sacrificial substitution implies a degree of misunderstanding.  Its vitality as an 
institution depends on its ability to conceal the displacement upon which the rite 
is based.  It must never lose sight entirely, however, of the original object, or 
cease to be aware of the act of transference from that object to the surrogate 
victim. (5)   
 
Fiction becomes especially important to political accounts of secularization in this regard. 
A fictional displacement occurs in structural and post-structural and criticism with 
regard to writing.  Poststructuralism exhibits many qualities of psychedelic aesthetics, 
especially if one considers them in terms of the body and narratives of secularization.  
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Poststructuralism re-enchants in its deterritorializing of cause-and-effect historicization 
and gestures toward the perennial.  If Critchley’s call for a poetic approach to citizenship, 
we can consider the enactment of citizenship in terms of writing.  In psychedelic 
aesthetics, however, this remains figurative.  A poem may be a dance or an enchanted 
gesture.  It is possible to situate re-enchantment by looking at some writing from the late 
sixties and seventies with respect to subject-object demarcations and critiques of 
subjectivity.  I begin with approaches to writing. 
Two of the most well-known post-structural essays, Michel Foucault’s “What is 
an Author?” and Roland Barthes’ “Death of the Author,” both frame their arguments as 
secular critiques of religion while simultaneously pushing toward a poetics of 
metempsychosis.  For Barthes writing is “the neutral space” where identity slips away 
“starting with the body writing” (142).  Barthes in particular compares this “death” to 
“ethnographic” societies” in which authority is not assumed or placed on a located 
subject but rather channeled by a mediator or shaman.  “We know now,” he says, “that a 
text is not a line of words releasing a single 'theological' meaning (the 'message' of the 
Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them 
original, blend and clash” (146).  Foucault, in contrast, presents his author function as the 
disciplining of subjects with regard to punishments and liabilities enacted on them during 
the Reformation.  Insofar as both writers critique modern subjectivity as its own fiction 
they also align themselves with a secularization narrative that desires liberation from 
   226 
religion in its binding sense.  Both Barthes and Foucault in these essays buy into a 
narrative of disenchantment. 
In The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, Cornel West echoes more recent 
thought concerning Max Weber’s thesis, saying, “disenchantment of the world – resulting 
in fewer commitments to God-talk – is not true” (105).  Rather, there is a shift towards 
immanence over transcendence that in turn intensifies an “enchanted” immanence.  In a 
2009 essay collection entitled, The Re-Enchantment of the World, editors Joshua Landy 
and Michael Saler challenge the standard narrative of secularization, along Max Weber’s 
term, “disenchantment.”  They claim that  
the world must be enchanted anew – human flourishing requires it – for those who 
wish to be consistent in their adoption of secular rationality. It must be enchanted 
with dignity, which is to say in concord with secular rationality, in full awareness 
of pluralism and contingency.  And it must be multiply enchanted, so as to satisfy 
again all pressing demands satisfied by religion. (14) 
 
Yet Landy and Saler’s collection positions itself carefully against what they call 
“atavism” with regard to re-enchantment, claiming that their version of re-enchantment is 
not “the periodic resurgence of traditional ideas and practices,” of which they claim 
exorcism as one (2).  As such, they take a rather snobbish academic approach to New 
Ageism and the occult, because they are unable to see such moves in a long tradition of 
critiques of the European imaginary.   
The most recent authority on secularization narratives is Charles Taylor, who in A 
Secular Age asserts a gradual “taming of nobility” over the past few centuries:    
the eighteenth century generated new, stadial theories of history, which saw 
human society developing through a series of stages defined by the form of their 
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economy . . .  Commerce, “le doux commerce,” was endowed with this power to 
relegate material values and the military way of life to a subordinate role, ending 
their age-old dominance of human culture.  Political societies could no longer be 
understood simply in perennial terms; one had to take account of the epoch in 
which things happened. (218) 
   
History situated against the perennial here accompanies what Taylor calls the Immanent 
Frame in which belief in God becomes merely one choice among others rather than a 
persistent authority or cosmology.  In this light the call to re-enchantment, to fiction, to 
culture, remains historicized and in tension with the mythological and perennial.  In 
comparison to this, poststructuralist attempts to transcend the body of the subject 
suspiciously dematerialize into the space of myth by de-stabilizing subjectivity and 
objectivity.  One can see this in poststructural experiments in figuration with regard to 
“chora.” 
The aesthetic tension that critically accompanies an overcoming of subject-object 
distinction, or the dissolution between ontological and epistemological methods, can be 
characterized with the term “chora,” as it is used in Lacan and Kristeva as a hazy 
boundary between the conscious and the unconscious.  As James DiCenso summarizes 
with regard to Jacques Lacan, “The chora represents a psychical condition referred to 
retrospectively but never known as a subjective position as such ‘in which the linguistic 
sign is not yet articulated as the absence of an object and as the distinction between the 
real and the symbolic’” (71).  In an overlapping metaphor with Deleuze and Guatarri’s 
de-territorialization and with emerging studies of gender and the body, Kristeva explicitly 
attaches the term to its Greek origins in Revolution in Poetic Language:  
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We borrow the term chora from Plato’s Timaeus to denote an essentially mobile 
and extremely provisional articulation constituted by movements and their 
ephemeral stases.  We differentiate from this uncertain and indeterminate 
articulation from a disposition that already depends on representation, lends itself 
to phenomenological, spatial intuition, and gives rise to a geometry. (25-6)  
 
For Kristeva, chora precedes symbolic representation.  It is not yet ‘worlded,’ not yet 
born.  Kristeva’s use of the term refers to pre-oedipal life in the womb.  Patricia 
Huntington notes that the term in Plato’s Timaeus refers “to the notion of the maternal 
receptacle” and “constitutes the space where subjectivity is generated” (478).  The 
overtones of a redistribution of metaphors based on female anatomy are of course part of 
Kristeva’s politics, which expand citizenship for women.  The poetic ambiguity, her 
stress on the not-yet ‘worlded,’ expresses the convoluted politics of “returning” to nature 
or to the primordial while effectively contributing to the political situation in the early 
1970s. Subjectivity is then generated pre-reflexively and pre-politically by the rhythm of 
the maternal body, but not only that.  Kristeva also emphasizes  
the regulated aspects of  chora: its vocal and gestural organization is subject to 
what we shall call an objective ordering [ordonnancement] which is dictated by 
natural or socio-historical constraints such as the biological differences between 
the sexes or family structure.  We may therefore posit that social organization, 
always already symbolic, imprints its constraint in a mediated form which 
organizes the chora not according to law (a term we reserve for the symbolic) but 
through an ordering. (26-7) 
 
During and after the late sixties, theorists like Kristeva come to see the subject as ordered 
beyond and prior to the domesticated symbolic space of law.  This is psychedelically 
similar to what Kesey was after through his attention to affective waves in the Acid Tests.  
He was looking for the force of ordering beyond control. 
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This is also the discursive backdrop to what in Political Theology becomes “the 
state of exception,” which arises out of critiques of the narrative of secularization.  There 
is couched in the state of exception a desire for a return to the pre-political, to the 
mythological time of Persephone’s daughter.  It is a kind of chora, in the sense that 
Lacan, Kristeva, and Derrida use the term, as a hazy boundary between the conscious and 
the unconscious but also between body and world – poiesis in its earliest form, yet 
historicized.  There is an attempt to transcend and re-instantiate history through mergence 
with the pre-representational.  This is a kind of sacrifice. 
We can see this more particularly with regard to literary criticism from the late 
1960s turning to a sacrifice of its own subject matter.  In Tzvetan Todorov’s 1968 
Introduction to Poetics, he writes: 
there is not one science of literature, since, apprehended from different points of 
view, literature becomes the object of every other human science . . .  on the other 
hand, there is not a science of literature exclusively, for the features characterizing 
literature are to be found outside it, even if they form different combinations.  The 
first impossibility relates to the laws of the discourse of knowledge; the second, to 
the particularities of the object studied. (71) 
 
Todorov then goes on to say, “today [1968] there is no longer any reason to confine to 
literature alone the type of studies crystallized in poetics: we must know ‘as such’ not 
only literary texts but all texts, not only verbal production but all symbolism.”  Poetics 
unattached to the study of “literary works” alone thus takes on a “transitional role” which 
then requires “the investigation of the reasons that caused us to consider certain texts, at 
certain periods, as ‘literature’” (72).  Poetics is called upon “to sacrifice itself on the altar 
of general knowledge.”  This sacrifice is a civic act. 
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Todorov’s book gives an account of a widening, “secularization” of professional 
conceptions of literature since the 1960s characteristic of the “mind-manifesting” of 
psychedelic aesthetics.  But the move does not disenchant the literary.  It does not destroy 
poetics.  Rather, it makes the field of the literary more immanent and less transcendent.  
But what is especially important is that he characterizes the move in terms of a sacrifice.  
“Meaning” itself is pushed into ambiguous ether in order to create the circumstances for 
the possibility of new fictions.  As a background discourse to the state of exception, 
psychedelic works perform public sacrifices on both state authority and modern 
subjectivity, enacting a kind of mystical re-enchantment.  A kind of practical mysticism 
becomes the civic action of psychedelic citizenship. 
Mystical experiences create stories, overlapping with structural literary models of 
journey and return, yet with the benefit of not going anywhere physically. The narration 
of the experience is at the heart of the literary.  In Mysticism after Modernity, Don Cupitt 
has argued that mysticism is itself a certain kind of writing poststructuralist thinkers 
employ, “steeped in paradoxes” of life experience traditionally made “secondary” by the 
attempt among the Greek political philosophy to locate a “primary” basis for living. 
Celebrating “postmodern” writers who challenge a fixed center, Cupitt also calls for 
anarchic mysticism to disrupt fixed religious and governmental institutions.  That is, he 
calls for worldly action arising from passive, other-worldly experience. Mysticism can 
therefore be a model for exploring how intentional passivity relates to social action in our 
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society. Cupitt’s reliance on text as writing perhaps displays a limited and essentially 
modernist hermeneutics:  
Mysticism is protest, female eroticism, and piety, all at once, in writing. Writing, I 
say, and not ‘immediate experience,’ that Modern fiction.  Many or most mystics 
have been persecuted by the orthodox, but whoever heard of someone being 
persecuted for having heretical experiences? To get yourself persecuted, you have 
to publish heretical views; and at your trial for them your judges will need 
evidence of them in writing. Indeed, unless mysticism were a literary tradition of 
veiled protest, we’d never have heard of it. (62-3) 
  
Yet as Barthes says, the death of the author births the reader, and mystical and divinatory 
methods are sought when there are no worldly answers to the woes of living. This 
reading-writing is ritual, ancient ritual.  Can we really claim a secularized re-
enchantment?  Or was enchantment present all along and simply left out of discussions? 
In Marcel Gauchet’s The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of 
Religion, he employs structuralist techniques to argue that the development of 
transcendent religion accompanies the formation of early nation states in what is now 
referred to as the axial age, thus moving away from “primitive” immanent religion.  
Gauchet claims:  
Immanence is the result of distance from the instituting period, since which time 
nothing has happened; thanks to its remoteness, it is actually present in a world 
that replicates and revitalizes it.  Supernatural beings and gods themselves inhabit 
a completely formed world, within which they regularly exert an influence, 
without dictating its course. (51-2)   
 
Immanent religion relies on myth and magic.  The development of state religion alters 
this significantly by inaugurating transcendent religion which reunites “the original and 
the actual, the inaugural institution and the actually present forces of the invisible” (52).  
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With the formation of the State then, “the religious Other actually returns to the human 
sphere” (35).  Gauchet characterizes this as the birth of a long history of humans moving 
away from religion itself and even calls Christianity the religion to end all religion (15).  
Thus,  
transcendence not only separates reason and faith, it also divides subject and 
object.  The world’s objectivity is the result of a radical separation from God, 
which moreover frees and institutes the cognitive subject in humans by making it 
autonomous in relation and withdrawing it from the hierarchy of beings. (53)   
 
At this point, Gauchet’s argument fits into European narratives of secularization.  But if 
we add psychedelic aesthetics’ sacrificial attempt to remove the State’s transcendent 
authority, the immanent gods return. 
In America, mysticism has a long tradition of worldly, do-it-yourself, pragmatic 
qualities, which have informed mystical political activism, and perhaps this is part of the 
cultural cache poststructuralism acquired among academics in the late twentieth 
century.  With the inheritance of longstanding critiques of subjectivity as it existed in the 
European imaginary we call modernism, psychedelic aesthetics signify a collection of 
common tendencies among artistic works which each exhibit an attempt to represent 
either something metaphysical in a unique form, or an expansion in consciousness – in 
other words, artistic attempts to represent the outside, exterior, and the infinite in 
necessarily finite circumstances.  In the gesture toward the un-definable they code their 
desire to be beyond subjection, to being locate and seen as something.  The psychedelic, 
in this sense, relates to a cultural condition where consciousness, which has been rapidly 
expanded and destabilized, begins to re-orient itself in light of what it has seen.  It is a 
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therapeutic recovery from a trauma which may not be so much final as necessary for 
discursive continuity in a community that is looking for what its sacrifice is; that is, what 
holds to hold communities together. One sees this clearly when regarding 
poststructuralism and its debates, the claims of the death of theory, etc., in terms of 
psychedelic aesthetics as sacrificial citizenship re-instantiating liberalism’s values outside 
of political territories and outside of bodies.  With this, a freshly enchanted citizenship is 
imagined as part of globalizing efforts in the west to include the east. 
In Prisoners of Shangri-la: Tibetan Buddhism and the West, Donald Lopez tracks 
the concept of Tibet as a nation over the past two hundred years.  Escaping formal 
colonialism until China took it over in the late fifties, deterritorializing the Dalai Lama, 
Tibet becomes the conceptual storage space for all that could be sacred – a true mystical 
State without states – the leaderless imaginary space Critchley requires for the making of 
law.  Lopez tracks the influence of Theosophists, Helena Blavatsky and Henry Olcott 
(whose anti-colonial activism in Ceylon produced enough development for the country to 
him a postage stamp), through varying translations of the Tibetan Book of the Dead, 
including Timothy Leary, Richard Alpert and Ralph Metzner’s The Psychedelic 
Experience and Sogyal Rinpoche’s focus on end of life care in The Tibetan Book of 
Living and Dying.27  Spiritualism here merges with and informs fictional western 
figurations of Buddhism. Lopez claims, “Tibetan Buddhists are building an empire of 
individuals” regardless of nation or ethnicity (207).  Lopez notes the Dalai Lama’s 
                                                
27 Lopez’s book precedes the most recent and thorough translation of The Tibetan Book of the Dead. 
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theosophical universalism, discussing in particular large Kalachakra ceremonies, 
initiating people into the religion. According to Lopez’s account of the religion, “world 
peace” is to be restored by enlightened Buddhists in the year 2425 in the mythical land of 
Shambhala (206). Such a vision is a psychedelic amplification to Puritans seeking to 
establish a New Jerusalem.  
Simon Critchley’s “dim possibility” for poetry is indeed potentially overly 
optimistic, and certainly many concerns quickly arise when considering art’s involvement 
with politics.  Giorgio Agamben’s tracing of oikonomos as an aesthetic “Archaeology of 
Glory” as an amplification of Foucault’s “Governmentality” is informed by a 
disembodied and sacrificial apparatus.  Coupling this with the psychedelic, we see the 
coding of a “secular” version of the afterlife as a new form of culture.  In one’s answer to 
the question, “Can culture be cultivated?” is an important convergence of selfhood, state, 
and history.  The question is not “when does life begin?” or “when does life end?” but 
“how do the dead continue to haunt the living?” and “how do we communicate with 
them?”  Having traced these questions through psychedelic literature to various post-
structural writers, we can argue psychedelic citizenship enacts a poetics whereby to read 
culturally and aesthetically today is to read ‘humanity’s guts,’ rather than simply the 
ancient practice regarding the entrails of birds, but it remains divination all the same.  
Mystical writing of the sort Cupitt describes above is a performance of re-enchanted 
divination. 
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By applying discussions of Political Theology to the interpretation of literature, 
and in particular reading works that inform the “psychedelic movement,” we can narrate 
the ways an emerging aesthetic style helped to expand and critique notions of citizenship 
while preparing people for globalization amid the decline of the modern State.  Such 
works present a “sensibility” or “frame” – and in some cases “no places” or utopias – by 
which citizens can contain and then transcend their conceptual arrangement of self.  This 
is a way of conceiving self as a temporary stasis from which to transcend: I know who I 
am so that I may transcend who I am.  In this transcendence there is a social-integration 
that is willed, but will or intention overcomes itself through the obliteration of ego, a kind 
of pragmatism for sure.  Again here, Huxley is especially relevant in his being the 
inspiration behind Timothy Leary’s translation of The Tibetan Book of the Dead as The 
Psychedelic Experience.  At its most practical level, the self (or the soul’s) “progress” is 
merely a committed engagement with the world.  Whether or not one believes in such 
progress or not does not matter, the emphasis on effective fictions remains relevant. 
 
In light of Aldous Huxley’s importance to both the theory of the psychedelic 
experience, we can now begin to approach his work, both fiction and non-fiction, in 
terms of Political Theology.  My approach in the remaining chapters will be to explore 
the theme of sovereignty and its dissemination into various forms of subjectivity in 
Huxley’s works.  Such a method favors an initially aesthetic treatment of texts over an 
historical account of their production, which may initially seem a-historical.  My ultimate 
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goal, however, is to situate these works into a larger philosophical-historical context, one 
relating to discussions of “self” and “subjectivity,” because I believe the ways these 





CHAPTER SIX: ALDOUS HUXLEY THE POLITICAL THEOLOGIAN 
 
More than simply being a theorist of the psychedelic experience, Aldous Huxley 
was a state theorist and political theologian, but he has not traditionally been read this 
way.  Recent scholarly work in Political Theology has opened a discursive frame for 
receiving Huxley – and literature in general – in new ways.  Huxley has not had the 
influence he deserves in the field, partly because he is thought of as merely a fiction 
writer or public intellectual and partly because his attachment to re-enchantment, 
pacifism and mysticism was not taken seriously in the earlier half of the twentieth 
century.  The development of New Ageism has not helped either with respect to Huxley.  
Although portions of Huxley’s Perennial Philosophy appear in the recently published 
anthology Spirituality in the Western World (2011), Political Theology as a discourse has 
yet to take Huxley seriously as an historian of the 30 years war (Grey Eminence) and 17th 
century mysticism (The Devils of Loudon), as well as a large body of political writing, 
including the book-length study, Ends and Means, let alone his novels.  This is because 
Political Theology as a discourse has yet to engage seriously with the question of 
aesthetics.  
Scholarship that does connect the political-theological overtones in Huxley’s 
work instead tends to focus on his more well-known fiction books like Brave New World.  
For example, Peter Manly Scott in Future Perfect? God, Medicine and Humanity 
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connects Agamben’s Homo Sacer to Brave New World (77) but neglects to account for 
the ways Huxley updated the ideas in Brave New World in his last novel, Island.  
Similarly, according to David William Martinez, "The Placeless in No Place: The 
Deconstructive Identity of Homo Sacer in Brave New World."  Both works point to the 
importance Huxley had on discussions of biopolitics, but there is less direct discussion 
about his emerging spirituality that informed his later work.  Having explored the 
implications of psychedelic aesthetics for citizenship in my previous chapter, we can now 
work backwards into Huxley’s large body of works to explore political-theological 
questions. 
In Neuropsychedelia, Nicolas Langlitz notes that important members of George 
W. Bush’s President’s Council on Bioethics, the physician Leon Kass and the political 
economist Francis Fukuyama, “emphasized the analogies between this historical 
diagnosis and the dystopian future envisaged in Huxley’s Brave New World” (Kindle 
Locations 147-150). Langlitz writes of the “peculiarities” of their reading of Huxley 
within a frame critiquing technological and scientific advances over the religious view 
that, especially with the developments in anti-depressants over the last half-century, 
further alienated “modern man” from the conditions of “being.”  This leads them to 
follow philosopher Michael Sandel’s advocating for 
the development of a “religious sensibility” resonating “beyond religion” and 
acknowledging the giftedness of life. “Respect for a being created in God’s image 
means respecting everything about him, not just his freedom or his reason but also 
his blood,” Kass . . . wrote. Any attempt to overcome the limits and burdens 
imposed on the individual by God or nature was supposed to entail a loss of 
humanity and human dignity. Human nature was to be protected against its 
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biotechnological transgression and deformation. (in Langlitz Kindle Locations 
165-169) 
  
Langlitz correctly points out that both Kass and Fukuyama have neglected to account for 
Huxley’s final novel, Island.  Kass and Fukuyama are plain evidence that literary 
interpretation, wrong or right, has direct political consequences.  Kass, Fukuyama, and 
Sandel believe that a critique of modernity’s extreme alienation of humans from nature 
should entail a return to the pre-modern of religious enchantment.  In this view, neo-
conservatives erringly locate their return to a version of transcendent, state-based 
religion, rather than going back to the anthropological foundations of religion.  A return 
to the perennial, in other words, is not a chance to time travel where you can pick and 
choose the moment of human history you nostalgically long for to determine the value of 
human life.  What they are correct about, however, is the undeniability of religious 
enchantment in the post-secular world.  This chapter aims to provide a fuller accounting 
of Huxley than both scholars of Political Theology and public intellectuals have given.  
In doing so, my implicit claim is that Huxley’s influence on psychedelic theories and 
aesthetics reveal the deeply political-theological nature of the aesthetics. 
     
Huxley’s scope was wide indeed, and his knowledge of continental and English 
political history was deep.  He constantly presents tongue-in-cheek observations.  As 
early as 1930, in a slight nod to Swift’s “Modest Proposal,” Huxley writes in The 
Evening Standard:  
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Human standardisation will become a political necessity . . .  ‘Advanced’ people 
propose that the family system should be abolished altogether and that the 
professional educator, paid by the State, should take control from earliest infancy.  
Indeed, this view threatens to become the orthodoxy of the modern democratic 
State. (“Babies – State Property” 49)  
  
During the mid 1930s, he also predicts serious environmental concerns and wryly 
mentions a coming “generation war” due to the necessity to embrace new kinds of 
socialism (“The Next 25 Years” 174).  Despite political ramifications, however, Huxley 
has been received as “anti-political.”  In his introduction to a 2012 edition of Ends and 
Means, sociologist Howard Schneiderman’s descriptions of Huxley’s work on pacifism 
are particularly backhanded: 
Huxley seems to define pacifism either in terms of what it is not, or in terms of 
what it stands against.  Thus, pacifism is not politics, indeed it is anti-politics; it is 
not nationalism; it is obviously not militarism; it is not imperialism; and it is not 
about competing for international prestige, wealth and power.  On the contrary, 
Huxley’s pacifism is about brotherly love, reform, peace, cooperation, social 
justice, and more than less it is about socialism and a leavening of wealth and 
power.  In a word, it is anti-political.  It is also, at least in large part, anti-
sociological. (Ends and Means xvii) 
 
Schneiderman even goes on to compare Huxley to Max Weber with respect to Huxley 
calling twentieth-century politics “primitive”: “We might well take this as the utopian 
atavism of an otherwise brilliant and progressive mind at work.  Weber was undoubtedly 
the more clear-minded and realistic thinker about politics” (xviii).  This is because, “the 
state determines the nature of politics, and for Weber, the state is defined by its aims, 
which differ from state to state, but always by the means specific to it, namely physical 
force” (xviii).  This account of Weber is close to Carl Schmitt’s description in The 
Concept of the Political of friend-enemy distinctions characterizing international 
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relations.  Schneiderman points George Orwell’s claim against Huxley during the Second 
World War that “Pacifism is objectively fascist” (xxi).  Despite Huxley’s ability to 
“arouse interest” among current “social scientist intellectuals,” Schneiderman’s 
indictment of Huxley is clear: “the fact that [Huxley] extolled the virtues of pacifism, in 
spite of its consequences for the Jews, shows his utopian thinking as an ethic of 
conviction that is morally and politically distasteful” (xxii).  Huxley’s pacifism thus 
continues to be characterized as anti-political and irresponsible today.  Schneiderman has 
nothing to say about Huxley and religion with reference to his apparent moral vacancy, 
nor does he have anything to say about the much more politically exigent place that 
international and even supra-national politics and economic forces have in 2012.  If we 
look at Huxley as a perhaps unwitting political-theologian, citing his influence on 
psychedelic aesthetics as evidence of real political action, Huxley appears as anything but 
atavistic.  However, this requires a much broader reading of Huxley’s vast amount of 
work. 
Besides Huxley’s overtly political non-fiction, it is important to focus on how 
Huxley’s fiction, and literature in general, might contribute to discussions concerning 
Political Theology.  In a recent paper by William M. Curtis on Aldous Huxley’s last 
novel, Island, Curtis argues that it should be read alongside Brave New World, the book 
Richard Rorty has referred to as “the best introduction to political philosophy” (in Curtis 
91).  Rorty, as Curtis discusses, is interested in an idea of liberal utopia as “an 
imaginative extension of our best liberal democratic ideals” where malleability of human 
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nature maintains a kind of optimism.  Huxley’s work presents and critiques such utopias, 
and the fact that he was so consciously writing both in his fiction and non-fiction makes 
him an appropriate place to start if we are to take the “dim possibilities” for the poetically 
informed re-enchantment of citizenship to which Simon Critchley refers.  By focusing on 
Aldous Huxley’s literary work alongside major contributors to Political Theology, we get 
a better view of how aesthetic works have been playing out the very political issues we 
consider critical today.  To situate Huxley within the discourse of political theology, 
however, requires some tricky historical moves.   
When we look at Huxley’s politics and their influence on the psychedelic 
movement, a different conception emerges.  The work of Aldous Huxley presents one 
example of the politically useful nature of literature – an underlying social value of art 
that psychedelic aesthetics inherit – but this requires that we read Huxley as literature 
and not merely as philosophy coded in the literary, which is how he is often read, 
especially in reductive readings of Brave New World.  It is necessary to conceive of “the 
literary” as a discursive space where simultaneous meaning provides an economic way to 
communicate.  Literary trends in the United States over the past fifty years emphasized 
an intense relationship to the performance of language to convey the dynamic nature of 
philosophical ideas.  This linguistic focus is an extreme pushing of a kind of high-
modernism, present in a writer like James Joyce, who Huxley says, “seemed to think 
words were omnipotent” and had “a magic view of words” (“Huxley Interviewed: Part 
   243 
1”28).  Such a linguistic approach is itself indicative of a trend toward material 
immanence, but Huxley has an altogether different conception of literature.  As a writer, 
Huxley theorizes through the hypothetical space of the literary.  He employs many 
qualities of psychedelic aesthetics, but unlike later psychedelic literature he does not 
overtly point out the performance of them.  Because of this his language is more austere 
and less radical, which, in the post psychedelic, poststructural world has made him seem 
less interesting and even snobbish as a writer.  
Rather than relying on extraordinary uses of language, Huxley tells one 
interviewer with his characteristic anaphora:  
What interests me in writing, in expression, in thought, is the attempt to 
coordinate different fields; the attempt to say many things at the same time; the 
attempt to bring together in a single and coherent meaningful whole a great many 
disparate events and data. (“Huxley Interviewed”)  
  
Huxley’s works cannot be summed-up as merely thinly disguised philosophical dialogues 
because of his layering techniques, and if one removes his literary qualities, one misses 
many of his points.  Huxley should rather be read allegorically because his sense of the 
literary is bound with the idea of figural blending of characters, plot and theme with 
genre, themes and historical context.  While he claims to be uninterested in “bare, bald 
classical style” which he regards as too simple, for him art should impose “order on a 
complex number of formal, literary, and emotional elements in the widest sense.”  
Unsurprisingly then, Huxley regarded New Criticism as “boring,” “trivial,” and “barren,” 
                                                
28 The documentation of this source is flawed on YouTube.  It is not Watts interviewing Huxley.  I cite is 
because it is electronically available, easily accessible and clearly Huxley himself speaking. 
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claiming “elaborate linguistic work is probably useful but to regard it as the be all and 
end all of criticism seems to me absolutely absurd.”  As opposed to scientific, legal, and 
political language – the kind of fixed meaning Thomas Hobbes longs for in the early 
chapters of Leviathan – Huxley uses straightforward language to communicate through 
complex arrays of characters and ideas, performing a kind of “practical mysticism.”  He 
associates elaborate philological attempts with nineteenth-century aesthetics.  Yet 
Huxley’s approach seems both pragmatically useful and allegorically rich.  He, like 
Spinoza, writes simultaneously for philosophers and the vulgar (Strauss).      
For example, in 1935 Huxley wrote a short piece published in The Daily Express 
entitled “The Next 25 Years.”  Huxley here introduces a trend that would be widespread 
among political writers in the 1950s: that of predicting what the 1960s would have in 
store.   He poses himself as writing from the year 1960, and with his typical edge, says,  
Ministries of Propaganda found that it was possible to supply dictators, monarchs 
and even democratic Prime Ministers with a brand of synthetic eloquence 
incomparably more moving than that of the greatest orators of previous epochs. It 
was in America that the invention was first applied to religion.  Revivalists made 
use of synthetic voices so pathetic and persuasive, so terrifyingly minatory, so 
suavely unctuous, that they were able to secure mass conversions on a hitherto 
unprecedented scale. (172)   
 
Huxley’s sardonic writing here presents an irony that even he would overcome by the end 
of the 1930s after he had relocated to the United States.  In the States during the 1930s, 
“the Voice” of Arthur Bell was just beginning his prosperity cult, Mankind United, and 
Frank Robinson had begun one of the fastest growing religions of the day, Psychiana, by 
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publishing an ad in Psychology Magazine stating, “I TALKED WITH GOD – SO CAN 
YOU – IT’S EASY.”  As Mitch Horowitz writes in Occult America,  
Within the first decade, [Robinson] secured six hundred thousand paying 
subscribers spanning sixty-seven nations.  His direct-mail ads, consisting of 
detailed pamphlet-length espousals of Psychiana theology, began entering two to 
three million households a year.” (107)   
 
Huxley’s imagined future was not far off, and his warnings though characterized as “anti-
political” are certainly politically motivated; this is apparent in his fiction. 
Huxley’s intensifying commitment to pacifism in the 1930s made him the subject 
of public ridicule in England, as his unwavering views and the Peace Pledge Union gave 
way to England’s political involvement on the continent.  Eyeless in Gaza, the story of a 
sociologist coming to terms with his own commitment to pacifism and mysticism, 
documents this with its slightly masked allusion to John Milton’s Samson Agonistes, a 
dramatic retelling of Samson’s fight against religious oppressors.  The novel was difficult 
for Huxley to write as a follow-up to Brave New World.  It took about six years due to 
depression and writer’s block, which Huxley overcame through a rigid dedication to 
meditation and exercise.  Despite his previous success, Huxley was troubled by monetary 
concerns and needed to finish another novel (Dunaway 2).  And as one of his 
biographers, David Dunaway accounts, Eyeless in Gaza captures Huxley’s move from his 
grandfather’s agnosticism to “that hard-sought substitute for religion – pacifism” (14).  
During the period of writing Eyeless, Huxley’s pacifism became very public and political, 
as many of his peers, still critical of Victorian British colonialism and its over-attention to 
an empire on which the sun never sets, became critical of attempts to muster English 
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support for the brewing violence on the continent.  Other leftists and socialist cohorts 
came to see his pacifism as overly idealistic.  This struggle prompted Huxley and his 
friend Gerald Heard to take their views in lecture form to the United States, where 
Huxley would eventually settle for the rest of his life.   
As with most Huxley novels, the intersections between the people in his life and 
characters in his books – and particularly with his own life – are thinly drawn.  Anthony 
Beavis, the central character of Eyeless in Gaza, displays many of the conflicting 
emotions that Huxley’s biographers convincingly attribute to his life, not the least the 
reference to blindness itself.  But also on a literary level, Eyeless in Gaza’s biographical 
aspects reflect a continuing commitment to the Bildungsroman as filtered through 
Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu and Joyce’s Ulysses.  Later in Huxley’s life, he 
claimed that Ulysses, although a great book, displays more the limitations of the novel as 
a form than the characteristics of a successful one (“Aldous Huxley Interviewed”).  He 
recounts Joyce’s flawed personal etymology of Odysseus’s name as a blend of the 
nobody (ουδείς) and God (Zeus) as an inspirational idea for Leopold Bloom. 29  Still, 
Eyeless is one of Huxley’s most experimental in terms of form.  Dunaway calls Eyeless in 
Gaza “a modernist novel with a postmodern structure; its antihero, Anthony Beavis, is 
caught between these two eras,” and it “is probably his most autobiographical novel” 
(vii).  It is reasonable to conjecture that Eyeless philosophically takes the collision of time 
                                                
29 For a more precise discussion of the etymology of the name “Odysseus” see “The Homeric Etymology of 
the Name Odysseus” by W. B. Stanford in Classical Philology, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Oct., 1952), pp. 209-213. 
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and myth in the subject of the protagonist as not only Huxley’s autobiography of his 
struggles but also as a philosophical statement on how time works.   
He particularly does this with his allusions to the tyrant, Polycrates as an 
intersection between mythical and historical time – a clear case of embedded political 
theology in Huxley’s work.  The collision of the two temporalities relates by allusion to 
the lucky king point to in the midst of Huxley’s emerging Vedantic cosmology.  As a 
writer, Huxley builds characters in polysemus literary ways, blending historical fact and 
mythical truth.  Eyeless in Gaza marked a transition point in Huxley’s own literary 
career.  Huxley’s use of Polycrates shows a particular instance of how Huxley’s approach 
to myth informs his writing.  Ultimately, this conception moves toward Huxley’s pre-
Greek interpretations of the figure of soma, the famous drug of Brave New World, which 
returns in various places in his writing about the psychedelic experience.  But his method 
is clear: organized, polysemus layering of figures of his characters maps a systemic 
approach to political action.  This is ultimately realized in psychedelic aesthetics.  
Moreover, as an outgrowth of his commitment to pacifism and mysticism which 
deepened during his years in America, Huxley’s use of myth informs mythological 
scholarship’s searches for soma as a political symbol for what transcends nation-states in 
the later twentieth century.  In other words, Huxley’s work on mythology discursively 
shapes the tenor of later ethnobotanical and mythological scholarship with respect to 
psychedelics, and that scholarship is embedded with the political-theological 
underpinnings of Huxley’s cosmology.    
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In Eyeless in Gaza, Anthony Beavis and his lover, Helen, have a discussion in 
1933 about pain in reference to a scar on his leg.  Anthony had received the scar eighteen 
years before, training to be a soldier in the Great War.  An “imbecile recruit” had thrown 
a grenade short during training; it wounded Anthony and prevented him from going into 
battle.  He tells Helen, ending the chapter: 
“In hospital, I had all the leisure to think of that other royal progress through the 
earth.  Stupidity has come back, as a king – no; as an emperor, as a divine Fuhrer 
of all the Aryans.  It was a sobering reflection.  Sobering and profoundly 
liberating.  And I owed it to a bumpkin.  He was one of the Fuhrer’s most faithful 
subjects.”  There was a silence. “Sometimes I feel a bit nervous – like Polycrates 
– because I’ve had so much luck in my life.  All occasions always seem to have 
conspired for me.  Even this occasion.”  He touched the scar.  “Perhaps I ought to 
do something to allay the envy of the gods – throw a ring into the sea next time I 
go bathing.”  He uttered a little laugh.  “The trouble is I don’t possess a ring.” (68) 
 
In this passage historical and political time collapse into the present as an almost 
Proustian accumulation of Anthony Beavis’s personal experiences.  The time of kings 
becomes the emperor, then the dictator or tyrant.  The First World War and Nazi 
Germany collapse as well.  But during the silence this is transferred over into Anthony’s 
imagination of himself.  In this sense, Polycrates operates as a kind of mythical persona, 
acting as a figure for Anthony himself – and possibly Huxley too. 
The historical account of Polycrates is given in The Histories of Herodotus.  
Polycrates became the despot of Samos by overtaking the government and then dividing 
the land between himself and his two brothers, only to put one to death and drive the 
other out.  He made a guest friendship with Amasis, the King of Egypt, who curiously 
dedicated offerings in Hellas, first to Athena and then, in Samos with two wooden figures 
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of himself, to Hera as a gesture of his friendship with Polycrates (2.182).  Polycrates was 
so successful that Amasis wrote him a letter saying, 
It is a pleasant thing to hear that one who is a friend and a guest is faring well; yet 
to me your great good fortune is not pleasing, since I know the Divinity is jealous; 
and I think that I desire, both for myself and for those about whom I have care, 
that in some of our affairs we should be prosperous and in others we should fail, 
and thus go through life alternately fairing well and ill, rather than that we should 
be prosperous in all things: for never yet did I hear of anyone who was prosperous 
in all things and did not come to an utterly evil end in the last. (3.40) 
 
So, Amasis advises Polycrates to take something he treasures dearly and cast it away 
where no man can find it and to keep doing so until his fortune changes.  Polycrates, 
heeding his friend’s advice casts an emerald ring into the sea, only to find it inside a large 
fish gifted to him by one of his subjects days later.  Upon hearing this news, Amasis 
breaks off his friendship with Polycrates fearing evil to come.  Meanwhile, things 
continue to go well for Polycrates, and Herodotus makes a striking claim about him:  
Polycrates was the first of the Hellenes of whom we have any knowledge, who set 
his mind upon having command of the sea, excepting Minos the Cnossian and any 
other who may have command of the sea before his time. Of the allegedly mortal 
race Polycrates was the first. (3.122)   
 
Donald Lateiner, commenting on this passage notes that Herodotus is making a 
distinction between the age of heroes and the historical age (183).  Polycrates thus 
represents the entrance of mortals into history and an accompanying hubris, or at least 
ignorance of how to appease the gods through sacrifice.   
This agonistic relationship with the divine can be seen in Polycrates’ death as 
well.  Against the warnings of his diviners and an ominous dream of his daughter’s, 
Polycrates makes an alliance with Oroites, a Persian, who “killed him in a manner not fit 
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to be told” and impaled his body (3.125).  His daughter’s vision saw him “bathed by Zeus 
and anointed by the sun,” which foretold his exposure.  Polycrates’ body and life become 
the sacrifice he was unable to make through his own deeds.  Rather than being a man of 
action, he is subject to the force of fortune and history.  
This is a strange allusion for Huxley to use for character named Anthony, whose 
name derives from the Greek words for “man” or “flower” and Beavis, meaning “dear 
son” or “beautiful man,” especially as he speaks to a lover named ‘Helen.’  Also at work 
here is St Anthony, patron saint of swineherds, who was invoked to cure the mania of “St 
Anthony’s Fire,” caused by ergot poisoning – a subject Huxley returns to often in later 
work.  Huxley’s protagonist seems then to assert something different than, but in reaction 
to, James Joyce’s “nobody-god.” 
Anthony Beavis is a sociologist by occupation who, as the novel progresses, 
engages in-depth with the definitions of persona, religion, mysticism and pacifism.  The 
novel begins with Beavis in 1933 looking at photographs and then cuts to one of many 
chapters presenting passages from his diary.  Chapter two begins, “Five words sum up 
every biography. Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor. Like all other human 
beings, I know what I ought to do, but continue to do what I oughtn’t do” (9).  By chapter 
four the reader accompanies Anthony as a young boy who has just lost his mother on a 
train ride where the wheels make the sound, “dead-a-dead-a-dead” (10).  He is comforted 
by his friend Brian’s mother, Mrs. Foxe, who reads to him from the New Testament.  Yet 
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she tells him regarding the Ascension the authors merely wanted Jesus to seem 
wonderful:  
“to us, nowadays, these things make it seem less wonderful; and we don’t feel that 
they do him honor.  The wonderful thing for us” she went on, and her voice 
thrilled with a deep note of fervor, “is that Jesus was a man, no more able to do 
miracles and no more likely to have them done for him than the rest of us.  Just a 
man – and yet he could do what he did, he could be what he was.  That’s the 
wonder.” (79)  
  
As a young man, Anthony tells his friend, “I do believe . . . not in orthodox explanations, 
of course.  Those are obviously idiotic.  But in the facts.  And in the fundamental 
metaphysical theory of mysticism” (89).  Experience of the thing itself, the young man 
pedantically asserts to his friend, tells more than any bookish knowledge.  Despite his 
youthful aspiration to be a saint, Anthony is capable of ditching his poor and pious 
friends for rich idiots, feeling “by the mere force of social and economic circumstances, 
these ignorant barbarians found themselves quite naturally behaving as he did not dare to 
behave even after reading all Nietzsche had said about the Superman, or Casanova about 
women” (96).  Still, the longing for an experience of being more than he can be consumes 
Anthony intellectually. A bit older, Anthony writes of Hamlet being the character who 
could rise above the knowledge of his time (106).  He goes on: 
Man, according to Blake (and, after him, according to Proust, according to 
Lawrence), is simply a succession of states.  Good and evil can be predicted only 
of states, not of individuals, who in fact don’t exist, except as the places where the 
states occur.  It is the end of personality in the old sense of the word. 
(Parenthetically – for this is quite outside the domain of sociology – is it the 
beginning of a new type of personality?  That of the total man, unbowdlerized, 
unselected, uncanalized, to change the metaphor, down any one particular drain 
pipe of Weltenschauung – of the man, in a word, who actually is what he may be.  
Such a man is the antithesis of any of the variants on the fundamental Christian 
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man of our history.  And yet in a certain sense he is also the realization of that 
ideal personality conceived by the Jesus of the Gospel. (107)  
     
Anthony comes back to his interpretation of Hamlet after this, claiming that “Hamlet 
didn’t have a personality – he knew altogether too much to have one” (109).  Anthony 
Beavis thus longs to overcome personality itself, but his move toward impersonality 
betrays a kind of heartlessness.   
In perhaps one of the most memorable moments of the book, a dog falls from the 
sky, splattering blood all over Helen and Anthony as they sunbathe.  Anthony’s inability 
to feel sympathy for the dog or Helen causes her to leave him.  He tries to get her to come 
back, but it’s too late.  His luck appears to have run out.  His lack of a “ring” appears to 
accompany a lack of values or commitment.  He is unable to deal with utter absurdity. 
In referencing Polycrates as one of the layers to Anthony Beavis’s personality, 
especially because the character imagines himself as Polycrates, Huxley portrays a 
character trying to transcend his “succession of states” and enter something that perhaps 
transcends history while simultaneously being the realization of history.  Similar to 
Anthony’s imagining himself as Polycrates, he implies that the character of Hamlet is 
some sort of model for transcending of personality.  Both Hamlet and Polycrates are 
political figures who meet their respective ends through violence to their bodies.  Their 
deaths appease fate, drama or action.  Yet Anthony describes Hamlet as unrecognized by 
his peers because of his body.  According to Anthony, Hamlet also was  
just a succession of more or less incongruous states.  Hence, that perplexity at 
Elsinore and among Shakespearean critics ever since.  Honour, Religion, 
Prejudice, Love – all the conventional props that shore up the ordinary personality 
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– have been, in this case, gnawed through.  Hamlet was his own termite and from 
a tower has eaten himself down to a heap of sawdust.  Only one thing prevents 
Polonius and the rest from immediately perceiving the fact: whatever the state of 
mind, Hamlet’s body is still intact, unatomized, microscopically present to the 
senses. (109)   
 
The soul that eats itself realizes the divine inside and nourishes it.  Sounding a bit like 
Artaud, Anthony later says, “Only the rather stupid and insentient, nowadays, have strong 
and sharply defined personalities.  Only the barbarians among us ‘know what they are’” 
(110).  For Anthony at this point, the ‘sentient’ seem to be void of personality but held in 
place by their bodies.   
What would seem appropriate, then, would be something that transcended both.  
Huxley presents such a solution in Eyeless in Gaza with Anthony’s ultimate turn toward a 
pacifism that allows him to sacrifice his body willingly by going to speak in front of a 
crowd despite a violent threat warning him against it: “There is no remedy except to 
become aware of one’s interests as a human being, and, having become aware, learning 
to act on that awareness, which means learning to use the self and learning to direct the 
mind” (343).  He seems to have found his values and commitment through an act of 
sacrifice on behalf of “human interests.”  Anthony’s commitment to self-sacrifice through 
a communicative action of non-violence shows a kind of optimism that was not present in 
Huxley’s earlier work. 
Even Brave New World, written just a few years before Eyeless, lacks this 
emergent intentional behavior modification.  Brave New World describes a future where 
the happiness of civilization is controlled by ingesting soma, the fictional drug that 
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Huxley invents by invoking the substance described in the Rig Veda.  Unhappy with his 
place in the “World State,” Bernard Marx searches for self-determination by limiting his 
soma intake and exploring “primitive” life on a southwestern Indian reservation.  Marx 
and his friend Helmholtz’s dissatisfaction with a “doped-up” existence eventually results 
in their choosing to be banished from society.  They choose the authenticity of an 
existence that includes unhappiness and pain.  In Brave New World, the banishment of 
intellectuals like Marx and Helmholtz helps maintain a society of status quo individuals 
anaesthetized by soma.  The World State determines and maintains moral authority, yet 
banishment is certainly not death.   
Soma ingestion in Brave New World performs Karl Marx’s oft quoted remark 
about religion being the “opiate of the masses,” thus solving the problem of modern 
humanity’s alienation from meaningful labor.  Yet Soma also marks Huxley’s use of 
mythological figuring in his texts, because soma comes from his studying of Sanskrit and 
The Rig Veda.  Operating like the figure of Polycrates, the reference to soma signifies a 
return to ancients’ religious ritual in society’s future.  This perennial state unites east and 
west while overcoming history.  The darkness of Brave New World comes more from the 
unification of religion and technology in “Fordism” as a blend of totalitarianism and state 
religion.  The social ingestion of the drug makes soma the sacrament of the World State.  
While this imagined future is scary for liberalism, it is as much a critique of 
liberalism as it is totalitarianism.  Huxley’s use of soma somewhat ironically creates the 
space later mythological scholars explore unity beyond nation-states altogether – a unity 
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that does not work with a notion like a ‘world state.’  The later scholarship develops 
through an awareness of the structure of ritual sacrifice that informs the study of Greek 
culture.  In order to understand how this works, in the following section I will trace 
(insofar as possible) the concept of soma as it enters Greek and ultimately “western” 
culture.  My intention here is to paint a scholarly imaginary that extends from the 
European imaginary with regard to subjectivity described in earlier chapters.  This 
scholarly imaginary space is the landscape for an ideological battle about citizenship, 
nation-states, human consciousness – indeed, the very definition of human.  The still 
unsettled debate over the substance of soma, the original psychedelic drug from the 
sacrifice ceremony, is something Huxley’s literature significantly helped to set in motion.  
After exploring discussions of soma, I will then return to my broadened reading of 
Huxley as political-theologian. 
 
Soma 
Soma, in The Rig Veda, has multiple meanings.  In “On the Significance of 
Soma,” Sanskrit scholar Biswanath Mukhopadhyay historicizes the development of the 
term as follows: “soma first meant the inebriating juice of plants, secondly, the plants 
bearing soma, thirdly, the elixir of life and delight and lastly the god” (6).  It is unclear 
what Mukhopadhyay’s rationale is for this specific order of placement.  He generally 
moves toward the more abstract concept.  He mentions that it is derived from the Proto 
Indo European root, su, meaning “to press” (7).  Soma in The Vedas is also related to 
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music, along with the deities Agni and Savitr, but it is particularly associated with the 
Anustubh meter in the creation of the sacrifice (Rig Veda 10.130).  In a related article on 
the Bhagavad Gita, “The Song Celestial,” Mukhopadhyay discusses the distinction 
between divine and mortal soma, saying, “it is through the power and inspiration of this 
drink alone that the victorious god Indra accepted the task of killing the fearful demon, 
Vritra” (28).  Soma is also associated with Srikrsna’s celestial singing and the Samaveda, 
which along with the Rig Veda date as far back as 1700 B.C.E.  Soma persists through 
later Indian literature; in The Bhagavad Gita, Srikrsna tells Arjuna “that Krsna is Arjuna 
himself” (Mukhopadhyay 29).   
In order to attempt understanding the ancient meaning of soma, it must be linked 
to the part it plays as oblation in the sacrifice, and that part is to be a unifying aspect of 
the mortal and the divine.  Thomas Oberlies argues “that access to the divine draft soma 
signifies political power and legitimizes rule” (in Whitaker 417).  Those who took the 
soma became a political elite.  Jarrod Whitaker, however, disagrees with Oberlies’ 
assertion that “the terms ‘presser’ (susvi) and ‘non-presser’ (asusvi) represent a 
separation of Vedic society into two halves; one that participates in the soma cult and one 
excluded from it.”   In either case, it appears that access to soma was still meant for those 
who were privileged and those who were “non-pressers” were looked down upon for not 
participating in the cult (425).  While it is unclear to what extent soma pressing 
determined Aryan citizenship, it is certainly a term that distinguished an identity group, 
even if that was only a group of priests.  Partaking in the sacrifice determines citizenship.   
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If Mukhopadhyay is right in relating soma to the relationship between Krishna 
and Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gita, then it appears that the conception of divine inspiration 
and merge transcend the sacrificial ritual and eventually relate to dharma, or upholding 
the natural order of things.  If ingested, soma would inspire one to act rightly.  In acting 
rightly, one performs a kind of citizenship in the soma cult.  To press and drink soma was 
part of ritual sacrifice, which seems to have traveled from India to ancient Greece, where 
the word’s meaning changed to represent “body.”  Many scholars find similarities in the 
Eleusinian mysteries, but hasty references to the mysteries, such as Wasson’s famous 
claims in the 1950s cited by Leary in his perennial returns to the pre-political, mask the 
anthropological complexities and unsubstantial evidence present in the field. 
In linguistic terms, it is tough to track the word from Sanskrit into Greek, the 
meaning of soma, as it seems to have moved from Aryan culture into Greek culture.  
While anthropological evidence is emergent and encouraging, it can only be roughly 
traced both through mythology, etymology, and philosophy.  The scholarly literature 
then, inadvertently codes the desires of the scholars working in the field.  For example, in 
The Apples of Apollo: Pagan Mysteries of the Eucharist, Carl A. P. Ruck, Blaise Daniel 
Staples and Clark Heinrich discuss soma by focusing on entheogens, particularly the 
hallucinogenic mushroom, Amanita muscaria, which they trace from its usage in the Rig 
Veda through the Indo Aryan and Indo European nomadic cultures which transported 
both entheogens and ideas about sacrifice to ancient Greece.  Ruck et al. discuss the myth 
of Perseus, the “mushroom picker.”  They read what other scholars have read as a tiny 
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detail – Perseus’ picking of a mushroom on the site of the city of Mycenae – as “the 
culmination of his career,” for plucking the mushroom and decapitating Medusa appear 
to be “one and the same.”  They base their findings on analyses of artistic depictions on a 
Greek vase from the fourth century BC.  Moreover, they note that in the Garden of the 
Hesperid sisters, Medusa’s head “is equated to the Golden Apples of the tree – and with a 
pair of mushrooms” (43).  This group of scholars has a long history of trying to identify 
Amanita muscaria as soma. 
Ruck et al. base much of their research on the ethnobotanical work of R. Gordon 
Wasson, a banker turned ethnomycologist whose article, “Seeking the Magic 
Mushroom,” in a 1957 issue of Life Magazine, brought the subject to a wide public.  
Wasson and his Russian wife, Valentina Pavlovna Guercken, were obsessed with 
different cultural attitudes to mushrooms between Russians and Anglos, developing 
theses concerning how cultural attitudes toward vegetation parallel other developments in 
civilization, especially religious practice.  In “Seeking the Magic Mushroom,” Wasson 
recounts a trip to the Catskills with his wife in 1929: 
In ecstasy she called each kind of by an endearing Russian name. She caressed the 
toadstools, savored their earthy perfume. Like all good Anglo-Saxons, I knew 
nothing about the fungal world and felt that the less I knew about those putrid, 
treacherous excrescences the better. For her they were things of grace, infinitely 
inviting to the perceptive mind. She insisted on gathering them, laughing at my 
protests, mocking my horror. 
  
Wasson’s article influenced many scholars and hipsters to hallucinogenic mushrooms and 
brought traditional healers like Maria Sabina into the public eye.  Sabina’s aesthetic 
influence on psychedelic poets like Anne Waldman has been noted in Jerome 
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Rothenberg’s collection, Maria Sabina: Selections.  But Wasson’s ongoing research 
eventually led him from Mexico to India and Southeast Asia during the 1960s, after he 
heard about soma myths.  He believed he could prove the soma plant was a mushroom.  
In 1969 he published, Soma: Divine Mushroom of Immortality.  Wasson’s work did not 
go unchallenged, however, due to a lack of the mushroom in present-day India.  Even so, 
in “Historical Evidence: India’s Sacred Soma,” a 1972 article by Huston Smith, Smith 
defends the validity of Gordon Wasson’s claim to have identified the soma plant as an 
hallucinogenic mushroom against those who deemed Wasson an amateur, citing the 
approval of a variety of famous scholars, including Claude Levi-Strauss and Roman 
Jakobson, a close friend of Wasson and Pavlovna.  Wasson’s 1986 collaboration with 
Stella Kramrisch, Jonathan Ott and A. P. Ruck, Persephone’s Quest: Entheogens and the 
Origins of Religion, mentions that entheogens “are extraordinarily rare in the Eurasian 
botanical world, and Amanita muscaria was the entheogen of the ancient world.  The 
citations of Soma in the Rig Veda are all consistent with this reading” (33).  Wasson sees 
challenges to his theory as evidence of a Eurocentric aversion to mushrooms.  He is so 
sure of his work by 1986 that he claims, “We are well beyond the stage of hypotheses” 
(16).  It is unclear at this point if Wasson is referring to Amanita muscaria or if he is 
referring to the thesis he and his wife first developed about cultural attitudes toward plant 
life.  In any case, a large body of literature now surrounds Wasson and his intellectual 
peers like Carl A. P. Ruck, Huston Smith, Jonathan Ott, and Albert Hoffman – the 
discoverer of LSD 25.  This group of intellectuals, beginning in the late fifties and 
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continuing today have made a large impact both on Religious Studies and broader culture 
as well.    
That Huston Smith chose to reprint the article defending Wasson in his self-
selected anthology of his own work, Cleansing the Doors of Perception, in 2000, attests 
the author’s continuing acceptance of Wasson’s claim, despite numerous other 
hypotheses about the nature of the original soma plant.  It is now, for example, generally 
understood that soma was not a single plant, and as far back as 1978, Mukhopadhyay has 
asserted this (“On the Significance” 7).  Soma, then, in ethnobotanic and religious 
discourse since the late fifties has broadened in meaning as it has joined a larger 
discussion about entheogens in general and their relationship to human civilization, and 
this broadened meaning has itself affected ancient scholarship.   
This is evidenced by Huston Smith, who in the same article discussed above, 
credits Aldous Huxley’s The Doors of Perception (1954) and Heaven and Hell (1956) 
with “introducing entheogens to the contemporary west” (63).  It is strange that Smith, a 
famous professor of Religious History, would so quickly gloss over William James’s 
Varieties of Religious Experience – a text that is recurring even in Huxley’s own 
writings, in which the subject is addressed.  Therefore, Smith’s statement should be read 
as referring to the popular nature of Huxley’s audience and to the perception that the 
discourse changed in the 1950s.  That change is, of course, the nascent psychedelic 
movement.  And it is not surprising, therefore, that Huxley’s work also finds resonance in 
Ruck’s The Apples of Apollo.          
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Huxley’s Heaven and Hell (1956) characterizes the experience of entheogenic 
drugs and visionary experience as both producing mystic ecstasy and horror.  This too 
can be found in the account Ruck et al. give to soma in The Apples of Apollo, and it is this 
version of soma that is the more conceptual one, developed by scholars since the late 
fifties.  So, along with Perseus, Ruck et al. claim that Prometheus stole soma in the form 
of spiritual fire (23).  They also cite Euripides’ Ion, which tells the story of Creusa, the 
Queen of Athens, who receives two drops of Medusa’s blood, one which “was intended 
as the consecrating anointment for the city’s dynastic sovereign.  The other sprang from 
the Gorgon’s serpents and was a lethal poison” (43).  In doing so, these scholars both 
amplify and transcend the romantic tradition of William Blake within which Huxley has 
placed his lineage.    
Ruck et al. build their definition of soma from the following epithets they attribute 
to it: “golden apples, an eye, a multiplicity of eyes, golden water, honey, lightning bolts, 
golden urine, golden semen, golden rain, golden snow, estrual cows, bellowing bulls, 
golden hides, pelts, phallus, vulva, wings, etc.” (41).  They also suggest that tracing soma 
occurs etymologically, and not just as a collection of epithets: “‘It rains’ in Greek is the 
impersonal verb huei, and if there is a subject, it is Zeus; but the verb is cognate with 
Sanskrit sunoti, which means “to press out the juice.”  In Herodotus’ account of 
Polycrates’ daughter’s premonition of his death, Zeus also brings rain on Polycrates’ 
impaled body.  The Vedic entheogen Soma is named as ‘the pressed one’” (69).  
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According to Ruck, this concept carries all the way into Christianity with the story of 
Gethsemane.  Gethsemane, in Aramaic, means oil press: 
The agony of Gethsemane took place at the Oil-Press, perhaps an element of the 
mythologizing: for Jesus was the prophesied Messiah, anointed, as it would now 
appear, with the same amber feverish pharmakon that Apollonius discovered 
amongst the Brachmanes.  This act of pressing is significant, since not only does 
it yield the oil of chrismation, but also the juice of the grape, the wine that will be 
transubstantiated into the blood of Jesus.  The Soma of the Brahmans was named 
with the epithet the “Pressed One,” pressed in sacrifice from dried mushrooms 
soaked in water, to produce the drink of blood.  In the Hellenistic age of religious 
syncretism, it would have been inevitable that Soma be confused with the Greek 
word for “body,” soma (although its cognates are probably to be found in Greek 
sus, and English “swine,” the boar being a common metaphor of fly-agaric).  The 
communion experience of the Eucharist was real and profound. (211)  
 
We can also see the sus / swine root in the suovetaurilia sacrifice, which is described by 
Circe to Odysseus in books ten and eleven of Homer’s Odyssey as a sacrifice to Demeter 
in the underworld.   
Ruck et al. suggest a confusion of meaning between the Greek soma as body and 
the juice / deity in Sanskrit.  Rather than confusion, it seems to me that the term went 
through linguistic narrowing between Homer and Christ, and that this narrowing parallels 
the burgeoning philosophical discussion of the western state and the citizen’s relationship 
to governing bodies. While the narrowed term of soma as “body” may have had a more 
fixed meaning linguistically, it also had philosophical counterparts in Greek culture that 
maintained some of it the contextual aspects of its original meaning, those relating to 
sacrifice.   
Sacrificial ceremonies differ according to culture, and contemporary scholarship 
surrounding soma has often glossed over those differences in ways that concern scholars 
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committed to multiculturalism.  One brief way to conceive of this is to consider ancient 
Mesopotamian sacrifice in relation to Semitic and Greek notions.  Walter Burkert has 
written extensively concerning a bias in mythological criticism against “oriental” or 
“eastern” influence on early Greek culture in The Orientalizing Revolution and Ancient 
Mystery Cults.  Tzvi Abusch has argued that sacrifice “may serve to maintain a group that 
is drawn together by, or whose identity is based on, some common characteristic” (46), 
but also that a comparison between Semitic sacrifice and Mesopotamian sacrifice reveals 
an important difference.  For Mesopotamians, according to Abusch, sacrifices had to do 
with the temple, which was a storehouse of food.  Food was offered to gods as a part of a 
relationship where the gods created humans to serve and feed them.  After the prepared 
food was offered to the gods, it was distributed to the members of the cult.  The Semites, 
on the other hand, organized their sacrifices around kinship and blood ties:   
For the Semites, then, it was the family, the tribe, and the wider tribal territory 
that defined identity and power.  This remained true even of the Semites of 
northern Babylonia and northeastern Syria.  For while they absorbed the culture 
of the urban Mesopotamians of the south, they did not give up their own 
identities; rather, they transformed the culture that they had assimilated, 
introducing new images into it that were consonant with their own background 
and social situation – images such as the blood that they introduced into the 
Mesopotamian mythological tradition of the creation of man. (45)     
 
As part of the cultural assimilation then, the Semites introduced blood and liquid aspects 
of sacrifice, which related to kinship relations and the transference of governance by 
family lineage.  Political theology in its western sense is burgeoning here.  It is well 
known that this appears to have replaced the Mesopotamian, female-centered fertility 
social structure, but Marvin W. Meyer’s The Ancient Mysteries discusses fertility cults 
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surviving in Eleusinian mysteries.  Meyer writes that “the mystai participated in rites that 
performed three types of sacred observances: legomena, “things recited,” deiknymena, 
“things shown,” and dromena, “things performed” (10).  There are similar distinctions 
between the different Vedas.  In contrast to this, however, Tzvi discusses the 
Mesopotamian creation myths where human bodies were formed out of clay and covered 
in flesh and blood of a sacrificed god.  The god’s flesh gives life to the clay.  As Tzvi 
argues, 
The addition of flesh and blood reflects a new point of view.  While the flesh is 
the source of the human ghost, the blood, . . . is the origin of the ability to plan, 
that is, of human intelligence, and is, ultimately, the source and etiology of the 
personal god or, rather, the family god who is passed down from generation to 
generation by a male progenitor.  The personal god is not simply the god of an 
isolated individual; rather, he is the god of the individual as a social being. (45)    
 
Still, the liquid aspects of the blood sacrifice are reminiscent of Vedic soma, and it would 
be worthwhile to more precisely track down the historical diaspora of Aryan and Semitic 
cultures to see cross-cultural contact.  But, as I have said, debates over soma are not 
settled. 
What we can glean from what I have presented here is the possibility that the 
blood and liquid aspects, which Tzvi claims are the roots of intelligence, merge with the 
liquid aspects of the Aryan soma, and that the liquid and material aspects begin to 
divurge in Western culture, eventually becoming the distinction between soma and 
psyche.  Hebraic political theology of course shapes western political theology.  One can 
see this with respect to the Yom Kippur festival and the idea of the scapegoat and the 
sacrificial goat.  One goat was offered to the god while the other bore the sins of the 
   265 
people and was taken out of town by a “prepared man” and thrown off a cliff (Stokl 209).  
Daniel Johannes Stokl argues, “with the destruction of the temple in 70 CE, the Temple 
ritual lost its natural geography.  The centre of Jewish worship shifted from the destroyed 
temple to the synagogues, and its ritual was transformed into a bloodless service of 
liturgical memory” (210).  So, while Tzvi sees a connection between the personal god 
and blood sacrifice, Stokl sees a decentralization of the sacrifice in Jewish and eventually 
early Christian cultures.  While I certainly cannot trace a direct lineage of the western 
meaning for soma back to Aryan ritual, knowledge of how Middle Eastern and 
Mediterranean cultural mixtures does help to understand how in the West a separation 
was developing between body and soul.  However, that separation, as Tzvi suggests, is in 
relation to a personalized deity that maintains a unified identity structure for particular 
groups of people through the development of transcendent religion, which Marcel 
Gauchet aligns with the idea of the State.  But in order to continue the discussion about 
soma, it is necessary to touch on one of soma’s Greek counterparts: psyche. 
According to John P. Wright and Paul Potter, the editors of Psyche and Soma: 
Physicians and Metaphysicians on the mind-body problem from Antiquity to 
Enlightenment, in the western tradition the concept of soma can be traced historically in 
the following way: 
The soma, which is contrasted is with psyche, is seen variously as the shell of a 
real person, a kind of counter-self with desires and goals of its own, the sensible 
and affective part of ourselves, the unactualized potentiality of a living being, the 
‘nature’ of the organism which carries out the operations of life the community of 
Christian believers, a mechanical automaton, a mechanism which is in a state of 
constant corruption. (7)  
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While Ruck et al. have connected soma to Gethsemane and the Eucharist, Wright and 
Potter trace it to Christian conceptions of corrupted flesh.  This is an inversion of the 
Mesopotamian idea that it was the fleshy parts of the sacrificed god that gave clay men 
life.  So as the word “soma” changed meaning from Sanskrit to Greek, entering a western 
discourse based on tensions between mind and body, its meaning narrowed to signify 
something seemingly more materialistic.  In Greek discourse, tension arises between 
soma (body) and psyche (breath, life, soul).  As a result, psyche takes on some abstract, 
liquid, and vaporous qualities of soma.  One cannot understand the concept of soma in 
the west without understanding the meaning of psyche. Wright and Potter claim that 
psyche, like soma, means a variety of things: 
the life principle of the body, the principle of sensation and purposeful movement, 
the morally significant part of the human being, the principle of a being which has 
self-movement, the intellectual part of the self, the ‘form’ of a natural body 
possessing the potentiality of life, the inner person who can reflect on himself, an 
intellectual being constantly required for the maintenance of the body, a force that 
represents the teleological and integrative processes of the living organism. (7) 
      
Beate Gundert discusses how the usage of the word psyche changes throughout the 
Hippocratic corpus, saying among other meanings “it refers to the male and female seed 
as the vehicle of life” (33).  So, it does retain material qualities.  Gundert asserts that  
for the Hippocratic physician mind and body are two distinct, yet related aspects 
of human nature.  According to Regimen, both soma and psyche consist of the 
same substances.  The characteristics of both are shaped in a similar fashion by 
external influences and inheritance . . . the division is not absolute: symptoms 
change from mental to somatic, and vice versa, as a disease moves from one part 
of the body to another. (31-32) 
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This concept had, according to Gundert, changed since Homer, and here again the 
division between body and soul gets thematized:  
For Homer, psyche is the life principle that leaves the body [soma] after death and 
persists as image in Hades . . . Between Homer and Plato . . . psyche, while 
originally meaning ‘life’ – albeit now the living person – comes through a fusion 
with the many specific expressions for perception, thought, and the emotions to 
denote in addition the mental correlate to soma: the pair psyche and soma stands 
for the living person in his totality. (13-14)   
 
Even as far back as Homer, then, soma designates body or corpse for the Greeks, losing 
its liquid qualities and becoming static and taking on the physical aspects of sacrifice.  It 
is a body that is sacrificed, and we can see this easily with the pharmakon and human 
sacrifice.  Soma in western culture thereafter takes on more nominative (subjective) or 
accusative (objective) fixed linguistic meaning, and the linguistic interchange between 
subjectivity and objectivity as it relates to mysticism and psychedelic writing should be 
sought here.  In contrast, the development of the concept of psyche, while never 
completely separate from soma, often relates to the capacity for feeling, for sense, and 
perception.   
This capacity for what one “may be” is expressed by Anthony Beavis in Eyeless 
in Gaza.  Before he encounters Miller, the character loosely based on Gerald Heard and 
F.M. Alexander, the body for Anthony is merely what holds one’s place in time.  In 
Anthony’s ultimate acceptance of pacifism, however, the possible death of the body loses 
its significance as merely a placeholder for being-toward-death. 
Soma as characterized by Wright and Potter as “unactualized potential” needs 
psyche to activate itself.  In this capacity, then, are the notions of mind, intellect, and 
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thought (nous, dianoia, gnome) (33).  While the totality of the human body is an 
aggregate of soma and psyche, aisthesis (sense, perception) “provides a paradigmatic 
case-study in relations between soul [psyche] and body: sentience becomes possible only 
through the interaction of the mutually dependent body and soul, yet it is necessary to 
both” (von Staden 86).  This is especially important for ancient Greek thinkers’ notions 
of aesthetics, and it has important implications in the twentieth century philosophy and 
psychedelic aesthetics, as we saw previously with poststructuralist meanings of chora, as 
discussed earlier.   
The beautiful was for ancient Greeks, in a very real sense, attunement of body to 
soul. It is not until after Christ, when Galen discovered nerves, that sense begins to be 
more associated with body than psyche, and major Greek philosophers’ – Plato and 
Aristotle’s – conceptions of the soul driving the body, while still influential, began to 
change (von Staden 116), eventually becoming much more codified in the modern era 
after Descartes, when the body became viewed much more mechanistically (Wright and 
Potter 9).  The European Enlightenment can, especially when we consider the concept of 
soma, indeed be characterized as codifying rather strict relationships between subjects 
and objects, a result of emerging liberal societies as well.  The secularization that 
occurred in the Renaissance could be characterized in some ways as a recapitulation of 
the separation in the ancient world between polytheism and monotheism.  As Tzvi 
argues, the blood sacrifice was derivative of Semitic kinship relations and transference of 
power through patriarchal lineage.  This form of governance continued through Europe’s 
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conceptions of royalty, corporation, and the body politic.  Yet even in medical discourse, 
Francois Aznouvi has argued that the enlightenment distinction between body and soul 
became a distinction between the moral and the physical. This was then refined in the 
nineteenth century,  
when, as a result of the Cartesian revolution, soul became synonymous with 
thought and body with movement, the need arose to develop a new term to 
designate the opposite of material reality, to designate the realm to which we refer 
to today with the word psychique – in English, ‘psychological’ – a new term as 
indispensable as it is vague.  Moral, then, would be the ancestor of psychique, 
referring to something non-material, which is nevertheless not pure thought.  
(270)         
 
The excess aspects of soma, particularly those related to ritual and sacrifice, public and 
State, thus became an abstract “morality” with the rise of the modern, liberal subject.  
Morality became synonymous with a version of society with which the liberal subject 
was always in tension. God’s laws were replaced with civic apparatuses and social 
contract philosophy.  The development of the social sciences, particularly the disciplines 
of psychology and anthropology, evidence this shift, as does Nietzsche’s genealogical 
approach to enquiry, which valorized ancient views of the good over and against modern 
views and influenced both Huxley the writer and his characters.  All of this deep political 
theology is behind the concept that Huxley uses with respect to entheogenic ingestion and 
citizenship; and while messy, it is a clear rivalry with respect to thinkers like Carl 
Schmitt.  But both early political theologians did not have the benefit of religious studies 
or more recent archaeology as disciplines to draw from. 
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Carl Raschke argues in Fire and Roses: Postmodernity and the Thought of the 
Body that “it is not historically coincidental that the advent of the discipline known as 
religious studies in the 1960s coincided both with the Nietzschean “murder of God” and 
the liberation of body throughout Western culture” (120).  Characterizing modernism 
itself as a kind of faith, Raschke argues that its founding myth is a myth of “the 
transformative.”  Raschke is part of a generation of scholars who criticize – while not 
discarding – structuralist approaches to mythology and religion.  Raschke sees 
Nietzsche’s “death of God” as a sacrifice itself.  Discussing regicide and the Greek idea 
of the Pharmakon (scapegoat and sacrificial victim) Raschke returns to Vedic ideas of 
sacrifice.  Building from the work of James Frazier, Rene Girard, and Bruce Lincoln, 
Raschke notes:  
The priest slays the king to let lose the transformative energies that he possesses.  
To put the matter in nonmythological language, we can say that “humanity” as 
priest sacrifices a vital aspect of itself (i.e. the “king”) to attain a higher state of 
existence, to be reunited with the three quarters that are “immortal in heaven.” 
(130) 
 
Raschke sees modernism’s myth of transfiguration as culminating in personal 
transcendence through an attack on structuralism’s centrality.  Poststructuralism and the 
work of Jacques Derrida thus become especially important for religious studies as they 
focus on the deconstruction of the state and the body politic.  Raschke and 
poststructuralist thinkers like Derrida and Michel Foucault then evidence an examination 
of the entrails of the sacrificed body of the state in the wake of psychedelic aesthetics.  
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But the state is not just a somatic body; it is a psychic one as well, because psyche is what 
is inside the body politic.   
Rene Girard’s classic Violence and the Sacred argues for a view of sacrifice via 
Freud’s Oedipal complex.  Raschke echoes this saying, “the sacrifice of the god was the 
recapitulation historically of, as well as the mythical token of the Oedipal wish for, the 
murder of god” (156).  Freudian psychology continues a long-standing parallel in western 
medicine between psyche and soma.  The Western concept of soma is deeply attached to 
the concept of the State and bodies of power; thus, a sacrifice on the State itself cannot 
only occur in terms of institutional bodies – and politics cannot either.  In order for the 
sacrifice to be complete in the west, psyche must be sacrificed along with soma, and that 
is what the psychedelic aesthetics have attempted and continue to attempt.   
“Psychedelic,” a word coined in 1957 in a letter to Aldous Huxley, literally means 
“mind-manifesting.”  The search for soma and entheogenic religion thus arises out of this 
historical situation in which individuals radically assert themselves over and above the 
out-moded authority of the State.  This happened in the 1960s as a performance of 
aesthetics as the psychic manifestation of exactly what transcended state power 
determined in the Weberian sense Schneiderman asserted above by means of physical 
force.  Huxley’s pacifistic transcendence of such a worldview seems anything but 
politically complacent in this view.  Consciousness changes and paradigm shifts can be 
understood as the psychic counterpart to the somatic sacrifice of institutional bodies.  In 
searching for the mythical soma and entheogens then, scholars ideologically attempt to 
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usher in the new age of religion.  In experimenting with psychedelic drugs in the 1960s, 
populaces partook in the sacrifice of the state by reorganizing the notion of citizenship.  
They did not have to believe they were doing this as individuals. 
Yet, as I stated earlier, the affordances that soma allows for certain writers 
(myself included) creates problems. Take, for example, a more recent book entitled 
Soma: the Divine Hallucinogen, by the ethnobotanist David L. Spess, which argues that 
soma is based on Indo-Aryan magic, where cosmology overlaps with human soul (breath, 
prana) and the “inner man.”  This leads him to claim soma’s influence on the Greek 
conception of logos and the mystical beginning to The Book of John.  Spess claims: “The 
entheogenic soma drink’s inner formation of this body coupled with the soma ritual, not 
only influenced all Indian religions, but it appears to be the original source of influence 
upon later Western conceptions of the subtle body” (92).  This leads Spess to the grand 
claim that the soma ritual informs not only all western alchemy and hermeticism, but also 
Chinese, Greco-Egpytian and Islamic alchemy (161).  It is important to see Spess’s claim 
as continuing a tradition of scholarship into entheogens that is politically fueled by the 
psychedelic movement in the 1960s.  
Soma, in the scholarly discourse I have discussed, is often metonymic for a return 
to the perennial.  As such, it ideologically performs the same criticism of European 
subjectivity that I claimed psychedelic aesthetics employed in earlier chapters.  It is also, 
however, highly suspect to scholars interested in maintaining distinct cultural identities.  
What is at stake is the possibility of conceiving a broader definition of humanity that is 
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global.  What is at stake is the possibility of human rights and international legal 
legitimacy.   
Insofar as soma, or more recent studies of molecules like DMT relate to post-
1960s consciousness studies of Stanislav Groff, which try to produce psychedelic 
experiences without the use of drugs, a fundamental structure for human consciousness 
may indeed be biologically determined.  This discourse, if proven, could perhaps take 
away from the stigma of essentialism inherent in cross-cultural ethnobotanic work as well 
as help in legal discussions about human rights.  The issue quickly becomes biopolitical 
and theological in nature.  But what we learn from psychedelic aesthetics is a growing 
tradition that criticizes liberal subjectivity from within western cultural frames and 
habitus.  If western notions of subjectivity in terms of law and human rights could be 
more historically informed, that is, in ways that precede the development of nation-state 
discourse, we might be better able to create working definitions of human rights and 
citizenship than current ethnocentric ones.  Implicitly, Aldous Huxley explores these 
issues in his final novel, Island, where soma becomes moksha, and so now I return to 
discussing Huxley as a political theologian. 
  
Island 
Aldous Huxley’s growing interest in psychedelics worried some of his intellectual 
peers early on.  When considering Huxley as not just a theorist of the psychedelic 
experience but also as a political theologian, it is worth comparing him briefly to the most 
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well known aesthete and political theologian of the twentieth century, Walter Benjamin. 
Huxley was one of many intellectuals from abroad, who arrived in the United States as 
the result of political strife during and between the wars and had tremendous cultural 
impact on the 1960s.  Walter Benjamin, who died trying to get to the U.S. in the late 
1930s, has a somewhat surprising affinity with Huxley when we consider Huxley as a 
political theologian.  It is easy to forget that Aldous Huxley and Walter Benjamin were 
born only two years apart in countries that became political rivals during the first decades 
of the twentieth century.  They were not only contemporaries, but shared similar interests 
– aesthetic and politico-theological –as well as mutual acquaintances (Murray 402).  
While one can only speculate, as Scott J. Thompson does in “From ‘Rausch’ to 
Rebellion,” as to whether Benjamin and Huxley would have likely met had Benjamin 
been able to cross the Atlantic, Benjamin was certainly interested in hashish and aesthetic 
experience.  The interest in psychedelics perhaps makes Benjamin’s work less rigidly 
dialectical than his Eastern European Marxist contemporaries like Gyorgy Lukacs and 
Thomas Mann.  Mann, who succeeded in emigrating the United States in the late 1930s, 
had received a copy of The Doors of Perception in the 1950s from Ida Herz, was critical 
of Huxley.  Thomas Mann writes Herz in response,  
Thank you very much for The Doors of Perception, though the book does not 
excite me with the enthusiasm which it has you. It presents the latest, and, I might 
add, most audacious form of Huxley's escapism, which I could never appreciate in 
this author. Mysticism as a means to that escapism was, nonetheless, reasonably 
honorable. But that he now has arrived at drugs I find rather scandalous.” (qtd in 
Thompson) 
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Clearly, Mann is familiar with Huxley’s recent work on mysticism, The Devils of Loudun 
(1952) and perhaps his Perennial Philosophy (1945).  Mann’s concerns about drugs were 
informed by the Nazi regime’s human subject testing, which he was able to escape.  What 
he calls Huxley’s escapism is a human rights issue.  However, as Thompson argues: 
“Both Huxley and Benjamin were attempting to recover a concept of experience which 
had become entirely alien to the neoclassicist thinkers of the Enlightenment.”  While I am 
unsure that “recovery” is the right term here, Thompson is onto something.  It is clear, 
however, that throughout the Enlightenment there are plenty of examples of 
Enlightenment critiques, and as I have argued in previous chapters, enchantment never 
disappears completely.  What thinkers like Thomas Mann were unable to see was a 
significant shift in Huxley’s approach to drugs, the State, and religion between Brave 
New World and his works on psychedelics in the 1950s. 
The often-made claim against Huxley is his utopianism.  William M. Curtis’s 
notes the affinity between Aldous Huxley and Richard Rorty, perhaps the most important 
theorist of liberal utopia in the latter twentieth century (in Curtis 91).  Rorty, as Curtis 
discusses, is interested in an idea of liberal utopia as “an imaginative extension of our 
best liberal democratic ideals,” where malleability of human nature maintains a kind of 
optimism. Building off Curtis, I suggest that not only is Huxley’s work prescient of the 
world crises occurring fifty years after his death, but that, through allegory and dialogue, 
Huxley’s literary works provide important venues for deliberations in states of exception.  
Huxley has not been given enough credit as a thinker in these matters, even though he 
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was a contemporary of major writers in the discourse, partly because literary works are 
often perceived as inefficacious in political matters in the United States and partly 
because the psychedelic aesthetics suggested in Huxley’s work (and those he has 
influenced) takes an approach to character and citizenship that blends private and public 
spaces with mystic traditions in ways that may initially make proponents of secularism 
squeamish in traditional public deliberations.  The excessive psychic attributes made 
present in psychedelic aesthetics afford artistic works a more overt presence in terms of 
politics. 
Island is a particularly useful choice of study because it presents Huxley’s most 
mature presentation of a working society.  Huxley scholars often read his work as a 
progression between the earlier, satirical English works and the more overtly “spiritual” 
American novels.  Brave New World, Huxley’s most well known book, sits at the center 
between the phases of Huxley’s writing.  Less well known than Brave New World, Island 
is sometimes wrongly considered the lesser artistic achievement.  In an initial review in 
The Nation (1962), Arthur Herzog wrote, “It is a curious book, more successful as a 
vehicle of ideas than as a novel.  It is written heavily and without the incisiveness of 
Brave New World.  The characters are weak and poorly drawn” (74).  In contrast, 
Gorman Beauchamp has argued,  
if by novelistic criteria Island appears thin and didactic, by utopian criteria it has 
more than usual complexity of character and plot […] the extensive attention paid 
to the process of spiritual enlightenment among the Palanese and the 
demonstration of its effects on the soul of the cynical Farnaby tip the balance of 
Island more toward the personal than the systemic, the eupsychic than the eutopic. 
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Island is an example of Huxley’s “third option,” from the essay “Brave New World 
Revisited.”  This option moves toward an emphasis on self-transcendence by way of an 
immanent view of the spiritual that accompanies the collapse of Pala’s (the island in the 
novel) government.  This immanent view is also embodied in Huxley’s theories of the 
perennial and mysticism.  In presenting this option, Huxley helped to shape psychedelic 
aesthetics as a politically theological motivating force, where a mystical or psychedelic 
experience obliterates and then re-norms an individual’s sense of civic morality and 
allegiance beyond traditional ideas of the nation state.   
This, I believe, is Huxley’s vision of social progress.  It is performed in his 
writing, which unifies his characters as different aspects of one Self existing in their own 
times.  Huxley’s psychedelic aesthetics perform metempsychosis within the characters in 
Island, but in order to do this it requires more sophisticated reading of Huxley than those 
normally performed (something closer to Leo Strauss’s readings of Machiavelli).  While 
Huxley began formally experimenting with this in Eyeless in Gaza, it is his critique of 
high modernist aesthetics like Proust, Eliot and Joyce that informs his less overtly 
experimental and certainly less elite style.  This comes as a product of his belief in 
mysticism, which blossomed in him during the 1930s and 1940s.  In Ends and Means 
(1937), which can be considered Huxley’s non-fiction follow-up to Eyeless in Gaza, 
Huxley says the only way to peace is through the time-proven mystical ideals of non-
attachment and charity.  He identifies thinkers in various traditions, East and West, as 
having espoused this.  He says, 
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charity cannot progress toward universality unless the prevailing cosmology is 
either monotheistic or pantheistic – unless there is a general belief that all men are 
“the sons of God” or, in Indian phrase, that “thou art that,” tat tvam asi.  The last 
fifty years have witnessed a great retreat from monotheism toward idolatry.  The 
worship of one God has been abandoned in favor of the worship of such local 
divinities as the nation, the class and even the deified individual. (8-9)  
 
Either way it goes, monotheistic or pantheistic, Huxley’s answer is enchanted.  In his 
literary work of the period, Huxley tries to perform this charity by writing very simply 
with multiple simultaneous meanings.  He consciously rejects high modernist literary 
aesthetics as elitist, and while his work seems simpler, what he is really up to is critiquing 
the self of the European imaginary, just as his contemporaries like Artaud, Benjamin, and 
Marcuse were doing.   
Understanding Huxley’s psychedelic aesthetics requires a literary approach to 
allegorical reading that I believe constitutes a necessary skill-set for understanding the 
dynamics of figuration in political discourse in the twenty-first century – hence my 
attempt to build a bridge between Huxley’s work and Political Theology.  I want to give 
context to current discussions of Political Theology that have difficulty relating spiritual 
discussions to public discourse, offering a model of cosmopolitanism for discourse 
concerning spiritual and civic life.  This again requires a reading Huxley’s Island in light 
of Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatism and liberal utopia; that is, as “an imaginative 
extension of our best liberal democratic ideals” (Curtis 91).  This draws upon Rorty’s 
distinction between “ironist” intellectual elites who utilize the liberal value of free 
thinking and speech to promote revolutionary ideas to the general public discourse which 
“will be reformist and pragmatic.”  This distinction between the “elite” and the “normal” 
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recalls Huxley’s advisory conditions for the uses of psychedelic drugs.  Importantly, 
Huxley’s turn toward compassion does not mean the creation of a platitude between 
smart people and stupid people, or some kind of land where people are heavily normed.  
In Brave New World the intellectual elites choose a different life outside the World State; 
in Island both must learn to cohabitate.   
The social use of psychedelic drugs, for Huxley, was to allow people who could 
not see a bigger picture access to it.  But the spread of drugs – both controlled and 
uncontrolled – into society since the late fifties captures Rorty’s “ironist” who is 
“experienced” and the “naïve” or unreflective “normal” person (who may perhaps still be 
on some sort of prescribed antidepressant).  One can see this in visions of the hipster or 
the beat, whose drug-using edginess keeps him or her on the “edge” of society.  While 
Huxley was certainly a social critic of mass society in the United States, he chose to 
engage with the public and its problems rather than drop out.  Controlled use of 
psychedelics could help even the overly intellectual elite commit to a bigger view of what 
humanity is.    
In Island, Dr. Robert says that he and his dying wife, Lakshmi, with whom he has 
recently tripped, have taken moksha-medicine – a fictional variation on psilocybin – 
“once or twice each year for the past thirty-seven years” (169).  While this is a more 
frequent use of psychedelics than Huxley himself took part in, it both blends the 
experience of reading The Tibetan Book of the Dead to his dying wife, Maria (in 1955), 
and it precedes his own death in 1963 in which he famously took LSD and slipped away 
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as Laura Huxley describes “like a piece of music just finishing” (266).  Huxley, unlike 
the later Timothy Leary and Art Kleps, thought that psychedelics should be used in 
controlled situations with guides to encourage the embracing of the “pure light.”  Such is 
the way that Island’s protagonist, Will Farnaby, takes the moksha-medicine with Susila 
as guide during the climax of the book. It is here that Farnaby comes to actualize his 
belief in the political ideals of Pala, which he has learned about through characters who 
act as travel-guides and the Old Raja’s Notes on What’s What.  The book lays out Pala’s 
philosophical ideals blending the best of East and West.  At the climax of his trip, Will 
has an intense awareness of his subjectivity:    
This dark little inspissated clot that one called “I” was capable of suffering to 
infinity and, in spite of death, the suffering would go on forever.  The pains of 
living and the pains of dying, the routine of successive agonies in the bargain 
basement and the final crucifixion in a blaze of tin and plastic vulgarity – 
reverberating, continuously amplified, they would always be there.  And the pains 
were incommunicable, the isolation complete.  The awareness that one existed 
was an awareness that one was always alone. (341)     
 
Yet despite this eternal isolation, Will’s trip is a participatory ritual that convinces him 
that the ideals of Pala are right just as Pala is being invaded by an army that will bring 
western industrialization and commerce to the island.   
Will trips just as Murugan, the young Raja who has been raised and corrupted in 
the West, allied with the neighboring dictator, Colonel Dipa, invade Pala with plans to 
use island’s rich oil supply to build a military and “modernize.”  Will’s consciousness 
expansion during his trip both destroys his pre-existing metaphysics and reinstates him 
into a new moral perspective as he comes down and a new and much scarier reality sets 
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in – a reality that Will as a political intriguer has helped to bring about.  Huxley’s 
destruction of the utopia accompanies Farnaby’s enlightenment.  His new perspective 
allows him to navigate himself according to an authority that transcends both religion and 
State.  Nicolas Langlitz correctly notes, with reference to an essay by Reinhardt 
Koselleck on Carl Schmitt’s utopia, “Buribunks: A Historico-Philosophical Meditation” 
(1918), that in contrast to Schmitt’s temporalized utopia, Island is spatialized.  But if we 
connect Island to psychedelic aesthetics’ use of the perennial, it is not spatialized in a 
territorialized way. 
If Huxley is being ironic in Rorty’s sense, then it is only in showing that 
modernization, ruling royalty and colonization are all archaic and destructive and that 
enlightened individuals must find ways to proceed amid idiotic rulers.  But such a clear 
distinction between the “ironic” elite and the stupid masses is too easy a way of putting 
things because in Island Huxley presents intellectualism as its own sort of handicap.  This 
is the compassion from Ends and Means coming in here.  It is precisely the subjectivity 
of the ego that must be transcended, no matter how smart or stupid one is: as Mrs. Rao 
tells Farnaby, “Pala’s the place for stupid people.  The greatest happiness for the greatest 
number – and we stupid ones are the greatest number” (228).  Will’s moksha-experience 
is a transcendence of western transcendence, just as Walter Benjamin’s court of the 
Trauerspiel in Origins of German Tragic Drama transcends the very idea of sovereignty 
as transcendent.  The sovereign decision here is not in the sovereign as ruler, but in the 
personal commitment of the individual to come to terms with his or her own state of 
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consciousness by merging with the transcendent and recognizing a different kind of 
citizenship.  A term like “personalism” is not quite adequate to deal with the psychedelic 
experience. 
If one considers the process of ego death as described by Huxley along with 
thinkers like Timothy Leary, Richard Alpert and Ralph Metzner, it is clear that in the 
psychedelic and mystical experience there is a blurring of subject-object distinction, and 
irony cannot work without an audience for such a distinction.  The dialectic between 
irony and naïve earnestness – the faith of the innocent – Nietzche’s child after the camel 
and the lion in Thus Spoke Zarathustra – moves between the characters in Huxley’s 
work.  Island begins with the one liberation of Will Farnaby, the death of his fear of Evil.  
This process begins with a young Palanese girl using mesmeric first-aid to help Will get 
over his encounter with a snake at the beginning of the book.  As late as the summer of 
1963, Huxley writes to Leary who with Richard Alpert had “left” Harvard and started 
IFIF (International Foundation for Internal Freedom) in Millbrook, New York, that  
the idea of a school is excellent . . . one should make use of all the available 
resources – the best methods of formal teaching and LSD, hypnosis (used, among 
other things to help people re-enter the LSD state without having recourse to a 
chemical), time distortion (to speed up the learning process, auto-conditioning for 
the control of autonomic processes and heightening of physical and psychological 
resistance to disease and trauma, etc. etc….  (Moksha 246)  
   
Will’s time on Pala may culminate in his moksha experience, but he is set up by 
hypnosis, dialogue with the islanders, and the reading of the treatise, Notes on What’s 
What, which summarizes Spinoza:  
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The more a man knows about individual objects, the more he knows about God.  
Translating Spinoza’s language into ours, we can say: the more a man knows 
about himself in relation to every kind of experience, the greater his chance of 
suddenly, one fine morning, realizing who in fact he is. (43) 
   
This passage analogously situates the subject’s experience with God while nodding to the 
history of Political Theology.  While moksha-medicine democratizes mystical 
experience, it does not end there.  The expectation is that the liberation the medicine 
provides helps the society as a whole.  The individual subject, “Will,” is always part of a 
larger whole, and the moksha experience is a limit-experience, which, like the state of 
exception defines the norm – the distinction with Carl Schmitt being that for Schmitt, this 
is the sovereign decision whereas in Island, the beautiful young warlord sovereign 
Murugan is the very person who refuses and is disgusted by the moksha-experience.  
Huxley’s narrative thus ideologically deposes the sovereign by reoccupying the decision 
in the enlightened subject, characterized by his participation in a ritual that democratizes 
the mystical through a sacrifice of the nation-state.  Rather than Schmitt’s concept of the 
sovereign who makes a decision in the state of exception, the psychedelically informed 
citizen communicates with the divine for moral guidance. 
Huxley’s work is more than a utopia; it is an allegory for disparate character-
incarnations that are present throughout much of Huxley’s works.  It does not project a 
future imagined space but more of an alternate possible reality.  A “midrashic” and 
typological interpretation of Huxley, like that of Walter Benjamin employs in The 
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Origins of German Tragic Drama and Leo Strauss in How to Read Spinoza,30 helps 
evidence this.  Will is a character we see replicated in various ways through Huxley’s 
work.  He’s the satirist of the early Huxley novels like Antic Hay and Chrome Yellow, the 
outsider of Bernard Marx in Brave New World, the English script-writer narrator who 
presents William Tallis’s masterpiece in Ape and Essence, the internal thoughts of 
Sebastian Barnack in Time Must Have a Stop.  Similarly, Dr. Robert can be seen as 
Bruno Rotini from Time Must Have a Stop blended with the worldly wisdom of John 
Rivers in The Genius and the Goddess.  Huxley’s characters age throughout his novels, as 
the author himself ages, but he retains atavistic versions of himself in his characters.  One 
sees obvious parallels between Lakshmi and Dr. Robert’s marriage and that of Huxley 
and Maria.  But the cynical outsider remains in the form of the flawed character, even if it 
is also a younger version of Huxley himself.  So, for example, in Time Must Have a Stop 
we get the story of a brilliant but bratty youth who gains wisdom through the mentorship 
of quasi-mystic, Bruno Rotini, and who tells his overly-political father: “‘peace can’t 
exist where there’s a metaphysic, which all accept and a few actually succeed in realizing 
[unless it is through] direct intuition’ he went on; ‘the way you realize the beauty of a 
poem or a woman’” (276).  Romantic conceptions are held within “post-Romantic” 
conceptions.  Much of the narrative, we find out later in the story, has been the memory 
of Sebastian as he’s looked back on his foolish youth and romantic misadventures.  A 
certain perspective or way of being – call it wisdom or enlightenment – takes narrative 
                                                
30 See my attached appendix, “Notes on Political Theology” for an in-depth discussion of these works. 
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precedence over both romantic and political action of the linear unfolding of time.  This 
is metempsychosis or reincarnation expressed as psychedelic aesthetics. 
Instead of presenting ego expansion through a narrative return to the perennial, as 
the later 1960s fiction writers discussed earlier did, Huxley solves the problem of 
linearity in the medium of text and plot by casting a variety of similar characters in 
dialogical situations.  While some have found this stylistically overly transparent, it is the 
blending and tweaking of characters throughout Huxley’s works that displays a 
reincarnated dynamic between characters that might otherwise seem stock.  Keith May, 
for example, compares Will Farnaby’s experience of Bach while taking moksha – one 
that parallels Huxley’s own experience on mescaline – with Spandrell listening to 
Beethoven in Point Counter Point and argues that Island is Huxley solving a 
longstanding problem with Plato and idealism:  
If Huxley at the time of the earlier novel was tempted by Spandrell’s view that the 
purest music proves the existence of another world, a God who stands apart from 
His universe, by the time of Island he was sure that such music proves the 
occasional heavenliness of earth itself.  Likewise, the purity of the music is no 
longer regarded as the antithesis of evil (the “Essential Horror”) but as the quality 
that somehow flows into evil.  Good and evil are not finally separable. (423) 
 
Huxley’s characters are ideas existing on a spectrum, but never just one idea, and that is 
why he is not just writing thinly disguised philosophy.   
Even minor Huxleyan characters are revised in Island.  Will’s impression of Mrs. 
Rao parallels Sebastian Barnack’s relationship with the homely but nurturing librarian, 
Mrs. Ockham in Time Must Have a Stop.  The English matron who is a bit thick but so 
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nurturing as to make the sharper youth feel guilty for despising them transforms in 
Island.  To Will, Mrs. Rao at first  
seemed like a browner version of one of those gentle but inexhaustibly energetic 
English ladies who, when their children are grown, go in for good works or 
organized culture.  Not too intelligent, poor dears; but how selfless, how devoted, 
how genuinely good – and, alas, how boring! (216)   
 
His perception changes a bit when he finds that Mrs. Rao teaches young adults maithuna, 
“the yoga of love,” which is not just safe sex and preventative measures but a how-to 
guide for “doing it” (219).   
The older Huxley is softer in his approach to non-intellectuals.  They have 
important things to teach.  Both Will and Dr. Robert are aspects of Huxley, just as 
Murugan, the beautiful young despot-in-the-making is also an incarnation of Murugan the 
fierce and beautiful Vedic deity.  The drama that plays out with the island is Shiva 
dancing, creating and destroying; and Will’s experience is Huxley’s suggestion for us in 
the face of that, more than it is a warning of the problems of a society that lets technology 
get the best of it.  Though a deity, Shiva is pure immanence, and recognition of this is 
what provides the groundwork for tolerance among the Palanese. 
Dialogue between both characters and texts maintains underlying social value 
throughout Huxley’s works.  Huxley’s characters are always expressing opinions as if 
they are manifestos, even despicable characters like Colonel Dipa or the Rani desire to 
explain themselves to Will, to convince him that their way is best.  The underlying 
foundation for the text is perhaps a liberal-democratic one.  Language serves deliberative 
political ends.  But dialogue and tolerance are also temporal qualities that change, 
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progress and digress over time, like Shiva dancing.  A whole approach to society 
manifests in a whole citizen who instantiates citizenship in a variety of ways.  In the end, 
Will is convinced through the summing up experience of liberation catalyzed by the 
medicine he takes that temporarily destroys his ego, literally destroying “Will,” the 
character Huxley referred to as “the serpent in the garden” (in Watt 169).  The medicine 
is both scientific and spiritual – and his trip is sponsored and guided by citizens of a 
dying nation state.  Like Spinoza’s subject, Will recognizes, even if belatedly, evidenced 
by his choice in taking the “sacrament” moksha, the continuance of his own power in the 
interest of the community.  Insofar as the moksha experience is state-sponsored, the 
psychedelic experience disseminates sovereignty into the liberated citizens.   
This is also similar to Spinoza in his Theologico-Political Treatise, who has a 
vexed relationship between theology and politics, especially concerning scriptural 
interpretation, which he does not separate from politics.  Religion in Pala is neither 
separate from the State nor controlled by the State.  The society is regulated by a 
philosophy that has recognized the necessity for symbolic spiritual activity but has done 
away with what Huxley identifies as the perverse contradictions of European religion and 
embraced a kind of Mahayana Buddhism.  The society of Pala, again like Spinoza, 
recognizes the usefulness in religion for social commitment, especially with the “less 
rational” among the citizens, but also with the overly intellectual characters like Will 
Farnaby.  There is a spectrum of modes of worship for all.   
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But the thing about Pala is that most of the citizens tend to “naturally” choose a 
subordination of religion to philosophy, following an almost Epicurean notion that 
religion need not be based on fear.  Instead it can be a motivating force for hope, and that 
having passions is not the same as being evil or corrupt.  The citizens of Pala have 
thereby chosen a post-secular society.  This is partly why Will has to overcome the binary 
of the evil snake as his first initiation to the island.  This is again tempered and fulfilled 
through the state-sponsored moksha-medicine, through which Huxley is very deliberate 
about unifying the material and the spiritual.  He had been exploring the idea for at least 
thirty years.  
Will, who has injured himself while infiltrating the island for the business 
prospects of a rich oil man, is cared for by locals who, in pure Huxleyan curatorial 
fashion explain the intricacies of their post-industrial society.  As in Brave New World, 
the society helps maintain emotional balance by having liberated views of sexuality and 
drug usage.  The binding nature of religion here is tempered by the liberating moksha-
medicine.  Huxley’s views on drugs had indeed changed significantly since Brave New 
World.  
Huxley’s civic religion in Island is immanent, and he is quick to criticize 
transcendent religion.  He seems to have come to a more firm decision since Ends and 
Means.  Dr. Robert tells Will,  
I have a theory that, wherever little boys and girls are systematically flagellated, 
the victims grow up to think of God as ‘Wholly Other’ – isn’t that the fashionable 
argot in your part of the world?  Wherever, on the contrary, children are brought 
up without being subjected to physical violence, God is immanent. (139)  
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Will is quick to point out that child-beating has gone out of fashion in the 1950s to which 
Dr. Robert responds with a short lecture on Humanism’s positive effects on Christianity, 
resulting in the birth of New Thought and New Age religion “gathering momentum ever 
since” William James (140).  This is also apparent in The Perennial Philosophy, where 
Huxley claims that  
rites, sacraments and ceremonials are valuable only to the extent that they remind 
those who take part in them of the true Nature of Things, remind them of what 
ought to be and (if only they would be docile to the immanent and transcendent 
Spirit) of what actually might be their relation to the world and its divine Ground. 
(262) 
   
Huxley’s thought is radically materialist and follows a trajectory of immanent religion 
that develops in Enlightenment and especially in American thought.  While Huxley’s 
non-fiction, especially The Perennial Philosophy discusses this directly, Huxley thought 
that, rather than abstract philosophy, ideas should be grounded in “case studies” such as 
The Devils of Loudon.  In an interview from the early 1960s in which Huxley refers to 
Island as a “utopian fantasy” he has just written, Huxley is asked about his thoughts on 
the supernatural and says, “What people call the natural in our western tradition is in fact 
our projection of concepts on the world.  The genuinely natural world . . . is the world of 
immediate experience without all these concepts imposed upon it” (“Huxley 
Interviewed”).  Huxley thus moves from a disenchanted view of religion toward a 
religious view of culture and art as binding forces.  Culture’s fabrication itself produces 
enchantment.   
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This interpretive approach to culture can be seen in Island with the public 
performance of Oedipus in Pala.  In the Palanese version, Oedipus is talked out of 
blinding himself and Jocasta talked out of hanging herself by a boy and girl from the 
island.  The young Mary Sarojini explains to Will that both the play and Freud’s 
interpretations of it do not work well in Pala because their family relationships, strikingly 
similar to Margaret Mead’s interpretations of Samoan women’s sexuality in Coming of 
Age in Samoa, do not allow for strict biological relationships of authority between parents 
and children.  However awkward it may seem, the performance maintains a didactic 
quality for Palanese society and suggests a different aesthetic sensibility.  The category of 
‘literature’ itself is in question in Pala, but it is also clear that young children are familiar 
with both Freud and Sophocles.  But Mrs. Rao tells Will earlier on in the book, “what 
trouble we have with books in this climate!  The paper rots, the glue liquefies, the 
bindings disintegrate, the insects devour.  Literature and the tropics are really 
incompatible” (217).  Aesthetics in Pala lose a sense of the tragic but maintain a 
participatory role.  Performance-based drama replaces physical books.  (One wonders if 
they would have Kindles in an updated version.)  In any case, Huxley’s move emphasizes 
an immediate experience that overlaps with the island-culture’s immanent sense of 
religion. It is with this trend that Huxley offers something to discussions of Political 
Theology and the role of religion in current liberal democracies.   
If we speculate cursorily on religion in the United States, even since Huxley’s 
death, during the generations after the permissive society of the 1960s we see a trend 
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toward immanence, a moving away from transcendence.  This is characterized by a return 
to “natural” religion, which distorts a linear view of history of civilization as “evolving” 
away from religion and New Agism.  Of course, the ‘Wholly Other’ view is still with us, 
as Marcel Gauchet’s work attests, as well as Kass and Fukuyama’s views above.  But 
Huxley’s Pala is essentially an inversion of transcendent religion.  If modern states rely 
on document-centered laws and constitutions, Pala abides by the Old Raja’s more 
colloquial Notes on What’s What, which Will reads as he becomes acculturated to the 
island.  Island implicitly asks: is transcendent religion necessary for postmodern states? 
And it answers, No!  The implication is not that transcendent religions should go away 
but that the civic sphere of the post-secular must negotiate both transcendent and 
immanent religion. 
Even so, western culture, for Huxley, cannot escape Catholicism and Calvinism – 
the religion of the punished, according to him.  Again, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra seems just 
behind the scene asking, “Don’t [they] know God is dead?”  The Overman is the maker, 
the poet who has companions instead of followers.  Yet unlike Nietzsche’s Overman, 
Huxley’s man is not a “bridge” between beast and Overman.  It is not such a linear 
progression.  He knows his evolutionary theory well enough to know it is not as simple as 
having one Pithecanthropus Erectus.  Instead of a linear trajectory away from religion, 
Huxley’s State is comfortable with mysticism and faith over belief.  Ironically, it is 
presented as the evolution of mixing East and West, a kind of globalization.  This 
“evolution” occurs in the liberal subject who is able to transcend subjectivity and then 
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return to self informed by religious metaphysics.  There is nothing atavistic about religion 
for Huxley – though he might declare that unreflective attachment is dangerous.  This is 
performed by the Palanese children who go rock-climbing before being initiated by 
moksha: 
Danger deliberately and yet lightly accepted.  Shared consciously, shared to the 
limits of awareness so that the sharing and the danger become a yoga. Two 
friends roped together on a rock face.  Sometimes three or four.  Each totally 
aware of his own straining muscles, his own skill, his own fear, and his own 
transcending of the fear. (202)   
 
Huxley leaves us with the idea that consciousness change may be the only way for 
humanity to survive itself.  The change involves inter-subjectivity.  But how does this 
happen? 
Huxley’s transcendence does not move only in one direction.  It is dynamic and it 
strikes a balance between form and formless.  Huxley relates this again to the image of 
Shiva dancing.  Dr. Robert explains to Will:  
“Dancing in all the worlds at once,” he repeated.  “In all the worlds.  And first of 
all in the world of matter.  Look at the great round halo, fringed with symbols of 
fire, within which the god is dancing.  It stands for Nature, for the world of mass 
and energy.  Within it Shiva-Nataraja dances the endless dance of becoming and 
passing away.  It is his lila, his cosmic play.” (205) 
   
Because it moves in more than one direction, Huxley’s transcendence is timeless, the 
perennial.  Explaining the effects of moksha-medicine to Will, Dr. Robert says,  
you will know in fact what it’s like to be what you are, what you have always 
been.  What a timeless bliss! But, like everything else, this timelessness is 
transient.  Like everything else, it will pass.  And when it has passed, what will 
you do with the experience? (208)   
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Dr. Robert here sounds like Ken Kesey appealing to a graduation from acid tests.  Clearly 
informed by Vedic sciences where the human mind is a microcosm of the same design of 
the universe, Dr. Robert continues to discuss the State’s role:  
all that Pala can do for you with its social arrangements is to provide you with 
techniques and opportunities.  And all that the moksha-medicine can do is to give 
you a succession of beatific glimpses, an hour or two, every now and then, of 
enlightening and liberating grace. 
   
But it is within those couple of hours of grace that the subject seems to merge with the 
divine and then reemerge as self in the world, and it is from this fundamental psychedelic 
experience that one learns to navigate in the world.  In this transcendence, one must 
overcome all cynicism and sense of irony.  Rather than Rorty’s elite ironist then, it seems 
that Huxley’s vision calls for a different kind of political action.  In order to understand it, 
I will now move to integrating Huxley’s version of transcendence with the discussions of 
Political Theology and the challenges surrounding secularization. 
 
Huxley and More Recent Discussions of Political Theology 
Huxley’s Island attempts to make a relevant political contribution through an 
emphasis on the obliterated and re-normed self through the psychedelic moksha 
experience.  In such an experience, “redrawing” identity boundaries works as a form of 
authentication and insulation of identity, maintaining a certain necessarily violent 
representation.  What remain important about Huxley’s contributions are his approaches 
to Nature and temporality.  As stated above, Huxley’s view of the natural is that of 
immediate experience.  Such experiences conflict with architectonic notions of history as 
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“development” or as “cultured” in the Roman sense of cultivation.  Indeed, Charles 
Taylor has argued that, regarding development, “it has become difficult for us to 
conceive human society and history without this concept.  It almost seems that we 
wouldn’t know what to do, or how to define the social good, without it” (129).  This fits 
into Taylor’s larger narrative challenging traditional secularization narratives, which he 
characterizes with the term “buffered self,” which “is the agent who no longer fears 
demons, spirits, magic forces.  More radically, these no longer impinge; they don’t exist 
for him; whatever threat or other meaning they proffer doesn’t ‘get to’ him” (135).  The 
buffered self is normed and disciplined as opposed to the prior “porous self.”  Taylor’s 
porous self would be similar to “primitive” and immanent religion as described by 
Gauchet.  It is this “buffered” self that must reconcile with the continuance of and even 
recent increase in immanent religion in the United States, and that is why a thinker like 
Huxley is important.  This is not to argue against Taylor’s buffered self.  I think he is 
right, but there must be an account for both continued enchantment and re-enchantment.  
In The Re-Enchantment of the World, Landy and Saler claim that “the world must be 
enchanted anew – human flourishing requires it – for those who wish to be consistent in 
their adoption of secular rationality” (14).  While Weber for them “got it wrong,” they 
still see re-enchantment as a variety of strategies with “the common aim of filling a God-
shaped void.”  This is what Taylor has characterized as the Immanent Frame. 
I wonder, however, what Huxley would think of this, particularly with regard to 
works like The Devils of Loudun or his 1949 “Introduction” to Marion L. Starkey’s 
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history of the Salem witch trials, The Devil in Massachusetts.  In it, Huxley refers to the 
1486 version of Malleus Maleficarum, claiming that “toward the end of the Middle Ages 
the old vague notion – that what feels like magic and possession – was worked up into a 
coherent system,” that European folklore was “organized by scholarly ecclesiastics into a 
pseudo science” (xvii-xviii).  For Huxley, it seems that Early Modern rationality 
tactically installed something similar to what Landy and Saler want, but in the form of 
something they want to disavow as atavistic.  This is perhaps a strain of occultism in 
Huxley.  In The Birth of Modernism: Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, W.B. Yeats and the Occult, 
Leon Surrette claims 
Aldous Huxley catches the essence of the occult very well with his term 
“empirical theology,” by which he means a clear and immediate sense of 
“ultimate reality.”  The central occult claim, then, is that all of the world’s 
religions are partial, popularized, or even corrupt versions of a revelation, gnosis, 
or wisdom that is fully possessed only by a few extraordinary mortals – if indeed, 
mortals they be. (26)   
 
My reading of Huxley emphasizes a poetics based on multiple incarnations of self and 
character existing simultaneously but separated through dialogical interactions.  He does 
not seem to be interested in mortality or immortality but in what we are to do with 
experience, albeit couched in implicit reference to a higher, perhaps unperceivable 
reality.  And clearly, historical temporality remains important to him.  Huxley’s 
relationship to evolutionary thought is an intimate one, and thus we should pay particular 
attention to moments in his texts where the “supernumerary nipple,” a signifying mark of 
the devil in Malleus Maleficum, shows up on Loola, one of his characters in the novel (or 
screenplay in the novel) Ape and Essence, set in 2108.   
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In the novel, Loola is the love interest of Dr. Poole, who overcomes his Calvinist 
upbringing by falling in love with a wild, post-apocalyptic American woman with three 
nipples.  One could say, in other words, he falls in love with a Salem witch.  Huxley 
suggests that the  
the 18th Century never evolved a satisfactory explanation of the odd psycho-
physiological happenings which, in the past had been explained in terms of 
demonic possession and magic.  In the first decades of the 19th century, students 
of mesmerism discovered that most of these phenomena could be experimentally 
produced in the laboratory or consulting room by what is now called hypnotism. 
(in Starkey xx) 
 
For him, re-enchantment is a kind of rediscovery of phenomena that rationalism could not 
account for during the Enlightenment.  It is with this in mind that I think Huxley has 
much to offer current thinkers concerning Political Theology and the role of religion in 
the public sphere.               
Pala’s religion is both state-sponsored and openly liberal in its emphasis on the 
individual’s natural right to self-enlightenment.  Huxley’s vision of religion in the state, 
however, is based upon a deep engagement with the problems of European religious 
history.  As early as Ape and Essence, one of his Belial-worshipping characters 
speculates from the year 2108:  
“What if they’d made the best!” squeaks the Arch-Vicar. “Eastern mysticism 
making sure that Western science should be properly used; the Eastern art of 
living refining Western energy; Western individualism tempering Eastern 
totalitarianism.” (137-8)   
 
This of course is a prefiguring of Island’s content.  In Island, Huxley expands on the New 
Thought, saying that immanent religion has been “gathering momentum” since the 
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nineteenth century.  He distinguishes this, however, from the Rani’s spiritualism, which 
is reminiscent of Madame Blavatsky and Theosophy.  As early as 1917, Huxley had 
written his father with his take on Theosophy: 
Except for the bunkum about astral bodies, spiritual hierarchies, reincarnation and 
so forth, theosophy seems to be a good enough religion – its main principles being 
that all religions contain some truth and that we ought to be tolerant, which is the 
sort of thing to be encouraged in an Anglican stronghold like this.  A little 
judicious theosophy seems on the whole an excellent thing. (Letters 136-7, also 
cited in Washington 312)       
 
Huxley’s main disagreements tend to be addressed toward Madame Blavatsky, who was 
a frequent critic of his grandfather, T. H. Huxley,31 and this shows up in the character of 
the Rani in Island, who claims to receive messages from the divine and that the role of 
Pala under her son Murugan will be to help usher in a spiritual revolution.  Even though 
Huxley is not exactly dawning the age of Aquarius, he still shares more with New 
Thought than he disagrees with it; and he also anticipates environmental and neuro-
theological concerns that develop widely after his death.  What remains consistent with 
him is an all-at-once approach to social, political, and behavioral problems that combines 
training in the sciences and a kind of Vedantic spirituality.      
Today we are familiar with the popular and commercial dissemination of these 
ideas.  From yoga studios to television shows like Lost and Fringe, New Thought’s 
mixture with psychedelic aesthetics is part of our social fabric.  What is troubling is that 
such an obviously present part of our culture is such a sticky issue for both academics and 
                                                
31 Of course, Aldous Huxley famously befriended Jiddu Krishnamurti, who was raised by Theosophists, 
though his departure from the group (or at least Annie Besant) remained amicable.   
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politicians in the United States due to a lack of aesthetic awareness.  If religion is a 
touchy subject, just try linking it to the aesthetics of glorification as Giorgio Agamben 
has done (The Kingdom and the Glory).  Huxley’s literary work the psychedelic works in 
his lineage have been presenting ideas about how to fuse spirituality and common 
citizenship for over half a century, yet only in the past decade or so has it become a hot 
enough topic to try and renegotiate a relationship between spiritual and so-called secular 
politics.  This has accompanied the discussion of sovereignty and the role of political 
decision-making concerning who decides.   
Whether it is a figuration of an “Axis of Evil,” trumped-up claims of biological 
weapons, addressing natural disasters or redefining what constitutes a war or conflict in 
Libya, political decisions in the U.S. under a state of emergency require halting dialogue 
in for immediate action.  A non-cynical view of sovereignty in the United States rests on 
the ability for people in charge to act on behalf of the “people.”  Even for Huxley, this 
seems to work best at a local level in theory.  The reality, however, as it is presented in 
Island, is that power-hungry “Peter Pans” will continue to exercise their lust politically.  
The only potential for hope, if we are to keep Rorty’s liberal utopia in mind, is in the 
character of Will transcending himself through a psychedelic experience. 
Much has been written about the social and political failures of the psychedelic 
movement.  We know that Timothy Leary’s attempt to democratize mystical experience 
had dark side effects, but Huxley of course never went so far as Leary.  He always 
advocated for controlled environments and guides.  Nevertheless, we are culturally 
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saturated with post-psychedelic art, music and literature totally unaware of its place 
within a critique of western liberal subjectivity.  This lack of historical awareness can 
indeed lead to outlandish and even violent arguments couched in the guise of “freedom.” 
Psychedelic works demand highly interactive and affective relationships with their 
audiences and attentive hermeneutic criticism.  As with the turn to drama in Island, 
psychedelic aesthetics are participatory in a way that obscures audience and performer, 
thus obscuring the efficaciousness of irony.  Similarly, what Huxley’s characters learn in 
the “temporary timelessness” of moksha-medicine is the ability to distinguish the 
immediate temporality of the beyond subject-object and the “rational,” left-brained 
temporality of narrative and subjective experience.   
Liberalism inherently relies on and values this experience.  Liberalism requires a 
subject, but subject to what?  Increasingly, with the demise and crises of liberal nation 
states, such nominal imaginaries become less geographic and more virtual.  Literature 
physically manifests these virtual spaces, allowing for communication of ideas.  Its role 
in democratic societies should at least partly be filled by being a realm for potential ideas, 
especially those ideas that prevent the tendency for us to allow technology, in Huxley’s 
words, “to take us by surprise” (“Huxley Interviewed”).   
Obviously, accompanying such literature must be some sort of hermeneutic 
apparatus.  I have suggested that such a hermeneutic practice with regard to Huxley be 
modeled on Leo Strauss and Walter Benjamin’s “midrashic.”  This means an inter-textual 
analysis of the thinkers work in its historical context.  Carl Schmitt, like Murugan in 
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Island, is nostalgic for a sovereign, and the only way for citizens of a liberal democracy 
to keep such a sovereign in check is to disseminate power through a ritual of 
participation.  Such a sovereign would retain all decision in terms of legal interpretation.  
In Island, civic participation with moksha, based on ancient Vedic practices.  It is not the 
taking of the psychedelic but the appeal to spirituality made accessible by moksha that 
founds citizenship (not that people are required to take the sacrament as in Brave New 
World).  Both Huxley and Strauss want to include a wider scope of human history than 
Schmitt does, and Strauss in particular presents his work in a hermeneutic fashion that is 
a secularized derivative of midrash.  Huxley (Vedic) and Strauss (Judaic – though 
secularly so) are both able to add religious perspectives to liberal and secular discussions 
of society that do not rely on transcendent religions’ claims to statehood.  In this they 
exemplify Habermas’s citizens who “play their part in the endeavors to translate relevant 
contributions from the religious language into a language that is accessible to the public 
as a whole” (Dialectics 52). Huxley’s characters in Island, perhaps to an unrealistic 
extent that I would cede to certain of Huxley’s critics, display remarkable 
cosmopolitanism.  The coming violence of industrialization brought about by Murugan’s 
oil-dependency does not take place diagetically in the text, but is an impending fate if 
nothing can be done.   
Huxley’s use of dialogue deliberatively focuses on a cosmopolitan commitment to 
education and to discursive environments.  However, they are more than simply 
philosophic dialogues.  By using similar characters as figures – Will being both an 
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allegory for “will” while simultaneously holding a middle name of Asquith, the famous 
liberal Prime Minister of England and simultaneously a young cynic and writer like 
Huxley himself, for example – Huxley merges various forms together (17).  Will’s 
transcendence in Island is a combination of his own intellectual disillusionment with his 
life as a journalist in England, his discussions with his new friends and healers as a 
patient in Pala, his reading of the Old Raja’s Notes on What’s What, and his moksha-
medicine experience.  Huxley gives us a discursive platform for discussing immanent 
religious practice as a positive contribution to liberal democratic society, but he 
unquestioningly relies on a robust educational system capable of providing a holistic 
approach to mind-body health and a set of texts throughout the ages of human history as 
an important tool for tracking progress and avoiding catastrophe.  Perhaps this is what we 
have yet to achieve.   
 
 




CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION: RE-ENCHANTMENT AND PSYCHEDELIC 
AESTHETICS 
 
When secularized citizens act in their 
role as citizens of the state, they must not 
deny in principle that religious images of 
the world have the power to express 
truth.  Nor must they refuse their 
believing fellow citizens the right to 
make contributions in a religious 
language to public debates.  Indeed, a 
liberal political culture can expect that 
the secularized citizens play their part in 
the endeavors to translate relevant 
contributions from the religious 
language into a language that is 
accessible to the public as a whole.   
(51-2) 
 




And I dreamed I saw the bombers 
Riding shotgun in the sky, 
And they were turning into butterflies 
Above our nation. 
 
We are stardust (million year old 
carbon) 
We are golden (caught in the devil’s 
bargain) 
And we’ve got to get ourselves 
Back to the garden. 
 
Joni Mitchell, “Woodstock” (1969) 
 
 
How do we determine the superficial?  When people feel deterritorialized, when 
they lose a sense of place or home, they often re-orient by appealing to the invisible in the 
form of enchantment.  Strict secularist commitment has traditionally seen this as 
regressive, but that thinking is changing with the questioning of secularization as a grand 
narrative and what is increasingly being referred to as “post-secular” society.  Nation 
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States have a long history of entanglement with transcendent religions.  In “Rethinking 
the Secular and Religious Aspects of Violence,” Mark Juergensmeyer argues that a rise in 
religious extremism, “from Islamic jihadist militants to Jewish anti-Arab activists to 
Christian militia in the United States – the activists involved in these movements are parts 
of communities that perceive themselves to be fragile, vulnerable, and under siege from a 
hostile secular world” (185).  But at the same time, globalization threatens nation-states 
with unregulated international space and no existing legal apparatus.  Juergensmeyer 
draws on both Tocqueville and Ninian Smart to make the claim that secular nationalism 
is itself a religion based on “doctrine, myth, ethics, ritual, experience, and social 
organization” (198).  Secular nationalism’s competition with religions lies in creating the 
affective conditions to create citizens willing to die or kill for their country.  So long as 
there is no big threat to the State’s need for self-protection, multiplicity of faiths can 
flourish.  But globalization’s threat to nation-state creates the conditions for religious 
radicalism and nationalism to join forces if necessary. Juergensmeyer writes: 
The Frankenstein of religion created in the Enlightenment imagination has risen 
up to claim the Enlightenment’s proudest achievement, the nation-state.  The 
tragedy is that the challenge to the secular order that emerges from this kind of 
religious nationalism shakes the foundations of political power in ways that are 
often strident and violent. (199) 
 
People who are genuinely religious may be turned off by such a ‘worldly’ account of 
religion as this.  Yet from a different angle, R. Scott Appleby, in “Rethinking 
Fundamentalism in a Secular Age” and relying on Charles Taylor, writes: “Those 
religious actors who might properly be called fundamentalists cannot be said to be in the 
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grip of an enchanted world any more than others who are participating in the ongoing 
construction of modern societies” (236).  The idea that enchantment is something 
atavistic, that it is the pre-modern past coming back to haunt us, I believe, is misguided.   
We have been living with the dead alongside us for some time; we have just been 
refusing to listen.  Spectrum based views of the spiritual continue to exist in religions 
around the world, giving them local identities that are particular and maintaining an 
enchanted view of the world.  The problem is that enchantment itself has not been taken 
seriously in public discourse dominated by secular habitus at all gradations of religious 
experience – and this is as true with regard to aesthetic study as it is to religion.  But 
enchantment never ceased to exist despite the invention of so-called secular public space. 
That said, it is still remarkable that when both “faithless” and “religious” citizens 
feel their homeland or civil rights are questioned, they quickly find appeals within 
religious enchantment, as did radicals like Art Kleps, Timothy Leary, and Ram Dass did 
in the 1960s and 1970s – and certainly also with established religious groups and leaders 
like the Catholic Workers and the American Friends Service Committee, Thich Nhat 
Hanh, and the Dalai Lama.  Undoubtedly, an appeal to religion in a legal setting is an 
appeal to self-definition, and the United States has a long history of self-determined 
religious practice as a civil right, so it makes sense that even at a mundane (that is, for 
those who really do not want to believe there is such a thing as enchantment) level that 
United States citizens would turn to enchantment for self-definition.  I have argued here 
that psychedelic aesthetics arise as a way to renew a sense of citizenship beyond the 
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boundaries of the nation-state.  I hesitate to call this a “secular” enchantment.  It seems 
more appropriate to think of enchantment as a necessary balancing force in human affairs 
– almost a force of nature.  As such, psychedelic aesthetics do the affective and cognitive 
work to establish a sense of place in a deterritorialized reality.  Often they manifest as 
enchanted, but besides the few religions using entheogens regularly, these aesthetics are 
not institutionalized.  They are interstitial, and they come to redefine human life in terms 
of metempsychosis or reincarnation through a “return” to the perennial.  More than 
ideological, these aesthetics constitute a texture for a habitus that promotes a more porous 
rather than buffered self in their ongoing critique of modern subjectivity. 
Bland critiques of consumerism forget that materialism is both destructive and 
creative.  It is true that crass consumerism feels empty and alienating, and that one-
dimensional society has proved to be a threat to liberalism itself.  In Shall the Religious 
Inherit the Earth? Eric Kaufmann points to sociologist Daniel Bell’s warning in The 
Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism that 
the individualist ethos of modern consumerism would corrode the system [of 
liberal capitalism] from within, producing a ‘great instauration’ of religion to 
renew social cohesion and economic productivity.  However [Kaufmann notes] 
modern liberal societies have withstood the breakdown of the family, 
consumerism and rising crime rates without degenerating into anarchy. (252)  
 
Religion here is a threat to liberal society, but an approach to the issue from an aesthetic 
perspective where a return to poetics allows for “supreme fictions” to regenerate a sense 
of civic religion that is not watered down secularism, but rather seriously attuned to 
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enchantment gives another answer.  “False” gods are as real as “false” consciousnesses, 
but that is by no means the end of the story.   
As the anthropologist and aesthete Michael Taussig has argued with regard to 
extreme plastic surgery fads in South America and paramilitary groups, calling it “cosmic 
surgery” (instead of cosmetic surgery), the basic human ability to change “nature” 
structures consciousness and reality through enchantment.  The excessive fascination 
with the limits of the body that Taussig documents, with drug-lords who wipe their asses 
with toilet paper that has their initials imprinted in gold on each piece, what is produced 
is merely an extreme version of an aesthetics that performs itself as an attempt to use 
technology to merge with nature – a desperate attempt to be one with the divine through 
excessive signification.  In his brilliant earlier work, The Magic of the State, Taussig 
gives a striking account of this with regard to metaphor in relation to aesthetics and 
citizenship: 
Metaphor is, in other words, essential to the artwork by which the sense of the 
literal is created and power captured.  As to the nature of this artwork, the great 
wheel of meaning is here not only state-based but based on an artistic death in 
which metaphor auto-destructs giving birth to literality whose realness achieves 
its emphatic force through being thus haunted.  The real is the corpse of figuration 
for which body-ritual as in spirit-possession is the perfect statement, providing 
that curious sense of the concrete that figure and metaphor need – while 
simultaneously perturbing that sense with one of performance and make-believe 
in the “theatre of literalization.” (186) 
  
This process is determined more by habitus than it is by belief.  As Simon Critchley and 
others have sought a “faith of the faithless” or “supreme fiction” that knows itself to be a 
fiction, a serious approach to aesthetic enchantment remains constantly necessary in an 
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age where, as Taylor says, God is one choice among many (as if religion were only about 
believing in God).  Psychedelic aesthetics seek through transfers to performance and self-
sacrifice to perform such a ‘theatre of literalization,’ but also a continuation or 
transmigration of the soul.  The “dead corpse” of the “real” releases spirit through 
making or poiesis.  But secularists, in their attempt to disengage with spiritual lose their 
ability to see the power of art as enchanting and, as in the roots of the psychedelic 
experience, therapeutic.    
The quotation I opened this chapter with comes from a dialogue Jurgen Habermas 
had with the soon-to-be Pope Benedict XVI, then Joseph Ratzinger in 2004.  What 
Habermas calls for in the quotation above is an “ought” after the fact.  It is strange to use 
the language of potentiality for something that happens and has been happening regularly 
if one chooses to listen at a cultural level aesthetically.  Despite any difficulty within the 
realm of aesthetics to speak in terms of “movements,” the act of interpretation – 
especially the interpretation involved in translating – remains one of the most useful 
heuristic strategies for communicating labor (meaningful or not).  Interpretation is an 
ongoing act of political responsibility and deliberation.  As a translator of so-called 
religious language, the so-called “secular citizen” becomes a self-ordained priest and 
heretic – an officious augur who has lost the ability to read entrails.  What would a “post-
secular citizen” be? 
Habermas’s dialogue with Ratzinger is on the topic of “The Pre-political Moral 
Foundations of the Free State.”  That dialogue speaks to an exigency to come to better 
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terms with how to deal with the longstanding tension between the faithful and the secular 
regarding governance and citizenship.  Americans will read in this tension much of the 
motivating force for the foundations of the United States. Despite its “official” secularity, 
the United States maintains a high percentage of faithful citizens, and faith-based groups 
play significant roles in political life.  Though secular, civic institutions, especially 
universities, mediate between secular and religious values, it is largely done within an 
outmoded metonymy or dead metaphor.  The “academy” or “university” has until 
recently stood for a secular institution that embraced modern rationality and scientific 
reason since the European Renaissance.  Thus, when Habermas speaks of the duties of 
secular citizens, he is speaking simultaneously of the role of the university and the 
educated as a stronghold of secular knowledge.  The university has been the domicile of 
rationality, in other words.  Yet, since postmodern perspectives challenged more 
traditional notions of rationality, the foundations of the academy have been shaken.  
Habermas here shows both his ongoing commitment to reason as well as his implication 
that academic professionals are those “secularized citizens [who ought] play their part in 
the endeavors to translate relevant contributions from the religious language into a 
language that is accessible to the public as a whole” (52).   
But the fact that both Habermas and Ratzinger maintain a fairly rigid distinction 
between secular and non-secular or faith-based shows a rather conservative stance with 
regard to modernity and the role of reason in modernity.  For others, postmodernism’s 
critique of rationality aided the advent of what is being currently called the ‘post-secular.’  
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This term can have multiple meanings of which two are important here: 1) The 
perspective that the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have revealed the ways secular 
politics have continued to rely on theological claims and constructs at the most 
fundamental levels of laws and states despite claims to separations between politics and 
religion despite claims to separations between politics and religion.  This is Carl 
Schmitt’s claim in Political Theology. 2) That because of this, liberal societies should 
either: A) re-engage at the level of public discourse with religious language (Habermas 
above) or B) give up on the project of liberalism for not being able to deliver on its 
original promises.  This is by no means a claim that “secularism never happened,” nor is 
“secular” a useless or vacant term.  In any case, there has arisen among certain academics 
a renewed interest in the topic of secularization, particularly with attention to 
complicating traditional narratives given to it.  From an historical vantage point, 
secularism might be thought of as a mode of practical decision-making that at some point 
turned a blind eye to deep-seated metaphysical notions.  Thus, the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century claims concerning the death of metaphysics come to be seen as an 
indication of hubris, the kind that historically accompanies the demise of a civilization.  
From demographic studies, it seems that Daniel Bell is partially correct.  Eric 
Kaufmann’s extensive demographic research shows, at least from a social science 
perspective, that secularism is on its way out: 
Around the world, secular individuals are in the forefront of the shift to below-
replacement fertility rates which have swept the West and East Asia and, on UN 
projections, will encompass the entire planet by 2085.  As the sea of humanity 
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drains away, it will expose resistant fundamentalist well-springs – the future of 
our species. (252)  
 
If “the sea of humanity” is draining away, then humans (who apparently are “other” to 
fundamentalists for Kaufmann, although I think he is referring to humanism’s 
relationship to liberalism here) need an account of their death and perhaps an account of 
their rebirth or life after death.  Psychedelic aesthetics do not fulfill this, but they offer a 
starting-place for deliberation about humanity’s future, particularly as legal definitions 
strive to figure out just exactly what humans are, when life begins and ends, and 
humanity’s place in nature. 
The boldest claim I will make, then, as I end this preliminary study is that 
psychedelic aesthetics can help us to realize that, in terms of emerging international law, 
which is currently held back by the resistance of nation-states to face their own 
inhumanity, what defines the human is expanded beyond logos and the capacity to reason 
and language, and so we must attempt to legally define human life in terms of 
metempsychosis and reincarnation.  This requires that we take enchantment seriously in 
whatever form it exists in the post-secular era, but that we also give attention to the ways 
it works in aesthetic works of the past.  For what does a legal definition mean in a space 
with no “law”?  I believe the answer is an aesthetic one, although recent research in brain 
science with regard to psychedelics may offer more fact-based and less hermeneutic 
answers, more inartistic proofs. 
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To a post-secular perspective, a reconciliation between scientific knowledge and 
faith has no particularly reassuring appeal, however, because secularism never 
completely broke away from metaphysics in the first place.  Cognitive and disciplinary 
divides between the “humanities” and “sciences” are thus archaic and regressive.  At the 
same time, a post-secular perspective need not deny social progress occurring as a result 
of beliefs in secular politics.  Acknowledging enchantment gives a fuller picture rather 
than marking an attempt to simply return to the pre-modern.  To use the terms of 
psychedelic aesthetics: every trip ends, and the question is what to do with the 
information you learned.  In other words, embedded in the notion of post-secularity is a 
possibility to deliberate on how things could be better.  Like the “post” of 
postmodernism, post-secularism is not a complete rejection of secularism; it is both an 
extension and a deep critique of the dogmatic slumber that accompanies the unexamined 
acceptance of secularity.  It is this perspective, combined with Habermas’s charge for 
academics to adopt a communicative response regarding religious language and the 
public, which has in large part motivated this project.  However, this project also takes 
issue with exclusively institutional approaches to perspectives.  It does not work, for 
example, to speak in terms of a binary between religious and secular, or church and state, 
just as it does little good to speak broadly in terms of Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, or 
Judaism.  Liberalism continues to affect such notions.  In Shopping for Faith, Don Lattin 
claims that in the twenty-first century, 
for many Americans spirituality has become a private affair.  Rather than 
gathering in religious congregations, millions of seekers curl up at home with the 
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latest self-help book or inspirational tome.  Instead of coming together Saturday at 
the synagogue or Sunday at church, they pray and meditate in their own private 
temples.  Private religion and our dizzying array of spiritual choices can put us all 
in “little boxes,” isolated from one another. (5) 
 
But clearly, religion is not just a “private issue” either.  Public and private do not work as 
a binary any more than sacred and profane.  Religious enchantment must be thought 
anew, with attention to humans’ aesthetic ability to transport out of themselves and to 
return from that transport.  Even if this is only done figuratively, through artistic works, 
that sensibility will, if Taussig is correct, appear in the “theatre of literalization.”  We 
have a cultural archive of this with respect to the 1960s and psychedelic aesthetics.   
The second quotation above from Joni Mitchell’s “Woodstock” illustrates a 
popular and secular perspective that presents a value-laden call to action.  The speaker of 
the song comes upon “a child of God” while walking down a road.  She asks him where 
he’s going and he responds, “I’m going on down to Yasger’s farm / I’m gonna join in a 
rock and roll band / I’m gonna camp out on the land / I’m gonna try to get my soul free.”  
She joins the traveler and because, “I’ve come here to lose the smog / and I feel to be a 
cog in something turning.”  As the famous song goes, “by the time we got to Woodstock, 
we were half a million strong and everywhere there was song and celebration.”  Each 
narrative event is punctuated by the refrain (or chorus): “We are stardust, we are golden, 
and we’ve got to get ourselves back to the garden.”  Refrains work in songs to 
deterritorialize space.  As Peter Doyle writes, “for Deleuze and Guattari, the creation of 
territory is the very function of the refrain, and the disconnection of refrains from their 
territory – their deterritorialization – is what they call music” (17).   
   313 
Mitchell’s songwriting, and that of many of her peers, already evidences a post-
secular engagement with religion and citizenship, but their cultural status occupies a 
space of public vacancy even as their music continues to broadcast on airwaves, iTunes 
and the web.  It is not their status as low or popular art that prevents public meaning; it is 
a lack of belief in the enchanting power of aesthetics and art as a whole.  Artists like 
Mitchell and the writers I have discussed here have been doing the work that Habermas 
points to for quite sometime, and it is the inability of the academy to really account for 
the kind of worship-leading these artists did, especially in a non-nostalgic way.  In other 
words, I am not saying we should just turn on some tunes and relax (nor, let me be frank, 
am I suggesting we get high).     
Because many accounts of the 1960s have come from people who lived through 
them, existing studies tend to take on a self-referential quality at the expense of more 
“serious” scholarly approaches.  The writer’s nostalgia becomes easily conflated with the 
romantic nostalgia inherent in the aesthetic products.  When examining Joni Mitchell’s 
“Woodstock” we notice the perennial theme of returning to the garden.  In itself the 
biblical allusion is diluted by the secularity of the context.  But if we take the song 
seriously, we must look at the political message.  Mitchell’s song is messianic.  It is a 
knowledgeable return, a way of escaping being “caught in the devil’s bargain.”  In 
joining the traveler to Yasger’s farm, a Gnostic knowledge arises and then spreads.  A 
similar return occurs in the Beatles’ “Get Back”: “Jojo was a man who thought he was a 
loner, but he knew it couldn’t last. Jojo left his home in Tucson, Arizona, bought some 
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California grass.”  Like Mitchell’s “Woodstock,” we see a leaving home to overcome 
alienation, a deterritorialization to find a more primordial home; “Get back to where you 
once belonged.”  Both songs evoke a special kind of nostalgia.  In the literary analysis we 
can transcend the fact that Joni Mitchell wrote “Woodstock” because she herself could 
not attend the event or that Paul McCartney may have been writing about leaving his own 
Arizona home for his native England.  These are popular songs that enchant space.  That 
is what songs do and how art works across multiple mediums.   
And so I have implicitly pointed toward the next phase of this project, a musical 
accompaniment.  But in a way here I have attempted to interpret literature as a kind of 
listening.  At the level of the literary, there is a transcendence of the personal experience 
of the author into the space of culture.  In psychedelic aesthetics, as Joni Mitchell plainly 
states, this means a return to the perennial.  This means reading literature with a sense of 
hearing – and I am not talking about beat poetry or projective verse, though they may be 
informed by this – but rather the associative and allusive reading that I presented with 
regard to Huxley in my last chapter.  I have compared this kind of reading to the 
“midrashic” qualities expressed by Walter Benjamin and Leo Srauss (which expressed 
more fully in my appendix).  It is a reading of literature as enchantment itself – a space 
where divination occurs, when there is nothing left to do but draw straws.  Literature read 
as metempsychosis can help organize the “lawless” space of the international, a 
hermeneutic space of ordering in states of exception.  
   315 
There is certainly precedence for this reading in existing literary criticism.  
Earlier, I addressed poststructural criticism as being informed by psychedelic aesthetics.  
For so many of these thinkers, writing and death are intimately connected.  In Roland 
Barthes’ famous “Death of the Author” essay he calls for the birth of the reader and 
“scripter” or “writer” replaces author – an abdication of sovereignty of meaning, this is as 
intentional an immersion into the perennial as dropping 250mgs of acid.  But it also 
implies a hermeneutic.  Like Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco’s The Open Work concerns 
itself with a collision between reader and “work” in the sense that “every reception of a 
work of art is both an interpretation of it and a performance of it, because in every 
reception of the work takes on a fresh perspective for itself,” and even though this does 
not exactly define an “open work” in Eco’s definition (his more formulated conception of 
the open work is better suited for musical analysis), what is important here is the 
emphasis on the audience, on reception as a recurring move in the psychedelic era.  In 
their attempts to resist closure, “the open work” and the process-oriented works of the 
indeterminist composers and, for example, the New York School poets32 are psychedelic 
in the sense that they challenge liberal subjectivity with respect to open form. 
In Marjorie Perloff’s seminal study of The Poetics of Indeterminacy (1981), she 
emphasizes contrast over continuity between modernist or symbolist poets like Eliot with 
New York School poets like John Ashbery and Frank O’Hara, arguing that the distinction 
has been glossed-over by Amercan critics who had not given sufficient attention to 
                                                
32 I have an analysis of process poetry in Toward an Ethical Aesthetic.  
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European thought.  Tracing a distinct lineage from Rimbaud to John Cage, she argues 
that “the symbolic evocations generated by words on the page are no longer grounded in 
a coherent discourse, so that it becomes impossible to decide which of these associations 
are relevant and which are not.  This is the ‘undecideability’ [or indeterminacy] of the 
text” (18).  Again here we see transference from meaning grounded in the text (or the 
author’s intentional system) to the gaze of the reader, yet Perloff attributes the decision to 
the text itself.  This is a thinly disguised “enchanted view” of texts that also happens in 
deconstructive criticism where the text decenters itself without even the necessary gaze of 
a reader.  Such personification is not problematic with regard to psychedelic aesthetics.  
Perloff’s reading performs the text’s participatory call that more open and psychedelic 
works evangelistically make.  It is not that previous works do not do this, but there is an 
intensification of the necessity to participate with texts from the 1960s.   
Perloff also reviews the work of Roger Cardinal’s historical narrative of modern 
art moving toward mysteriousness (29) and Northrop Frye (39) on associative verse, 
eventually using the terms “language art” and “word system” to replace “poetry.”  All of 
these moves break open a metaphysical grounding either in the text or in the author’s 
mind, allowing for intertextuality between writers over time not based on a “center” of 
literary allusion or symbol, freeing text from the constraint of meaning, and requiring 
heightened participation by the reader in the ethereal space presented.  There is a 
movement from a unified perspective or “I” that overcomes its distinction with the world 
as other.  The “non-I” dissimulates into a cultural ether of intertextuality with which the 
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reader participates, thereby dissimulating his or her “self” through the act of participation.  
This is equivalent to the space of the perennial I have discussed with respect to 
psychedelic aesthetics. 
This necessitates thinking of aesthetics beyond meaning simply “of the senses,” 
which again is essentially what Perloff argues in The Poetics of Indeterminacy.  It 
requires regarding form in the sense of its artificial and fictive qualities, as an imposition 
of measure itself that leads to the rupture of such measurement.  In this sense we can 
begin to re-invoke the spiritual or enchanted qualities of reading as a kind of channeling.  
In this way we can more readily understand Maurice Blanchot in The Space of Literature 
while claiming that both creating the work and interpreting it are kinds of channeling.  
A work is only a work when it becomes the intimacy shared by someone who 
writes it and someone who reads it, a space violently opened up by the contest 
between the power to speak and the power to hear. And the one who writes is, as 
well, one who has ‘heard’ the interminable and incessant, who has heard it as 
speech, has entered into understanding with it, has lived with its demand […] He 
has mastered it by imposing measure. (37)  
  
The reader too, in the psychedelic sense, hears the call and imposes measure after the 
“violent contest” accompanying the return to a “state of nature” through the process of 
dissimulation and de-territorialization.  The reader too imposes measure, but it is not 
isolated to the particular text.  It exists in the vortex of human culture. 
The imposition of measure is the temporary and unstable, fragile necessity of life.  
It is indeed an ethical task to draw limits, and we must “beware of Mad John” whether he 
is the New Age beatnik in the Small Faces song or an enchanted Baptist in the desert.  As 
I noted in my introduction, religious theorists like Carl Raschke in The Interruption of 
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Eternity have warned of the dilution of history by 1960s New Age Gnosticism.  As we 
look to psychedelic aesthetics in order to decipher their contributions to a “supreme 
fiction” of final belief, we return from the “trip” and try to make sense of it after the fact.  
We are, as Martin Heidegger says, “thrown” into this life, but it is a life surrounded by, 
shaped by, and informed by the dead among us.  But he also says that culture helps us 
forget our own death. For Heidegger, being-toward-death is anticipation, fore-running, 
scouting out up to my death to project myself into my “ownmost” possibility of being. 
Therefore, anticipation shows itself as the possibility of authentic existence, seizing hold 
resolutely of my possibilities as my own – the possibility of being ripped away from “the 
they” and individualized.  My death would then be my most prized possession in the 
uniqueness of its experience.  But we all die…and some of us more than once. 
Gone are the days of Stonehenge and the valley of the Kings, where sacred and 
profane, death and life could be separated.  And as it appears that the nation-state’s 
affinity with transcendent religion must, in the phrase of Bishop Spong, “change or die,” 
something else must be accounted for.  The dead are among us and hover in the 
enchanted and immanent space of culture, which fabricates and constructs us and our 
bodies in incarnations over time until we all go home.  But life here need not, and should 
not be confined to a being-toward-death – if only because this world goes on, because 
most of us will not reach enlightenment in this life.  Psychedelic aesthetics point to a 
perennial, ongoing hum, an “Om.”  In this space, listening is necessary.  
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At this point I perhaps sound sufficiently “enchanted,” and yet as I revise I am 
aware that last week the United States Department of State announced the formation of a 
new office of “religious engagement.”  A wide collection of differing scholars’ views on 
this currently headlines The Immanent Frame, a blog inspired by Charles Taylor’s A 
Secular Age.  Opinions span the entire spectrum.  Many are concerned that there is no 
agreed upon working definition for religion.  Others applaud it as a way to create more 
religious tolerance and awareness.  In any case, we live in an age where enchantment is 
being negotiated at the level of the state.  It appears to me that many mistakes will be 
made regarding interpretation and agreement on terms and policy decisions.  In these 
discussions, as with aesthetic interpretation, my suggestion can only be that we allow a 
mental space for people to try again after they have failed, and that this conception be 
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